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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that William James's view of science is crucial for an
understanding of his position on such philosophical questions as truth and religious
belief. It attempts to show how he assimilated certain doctrines of science, in
particular, positivist science, within his pragmatic philosophy. The aim throughout is
to show how his views on such fundamental questions can be better understood and
evaluated.
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part One is an exploration of the main
elements of James's view of science. The discussion includes an examination of
James's account of scientific method and his stance on such concepts as hypothesis,
scientific theories and laws. Part Two examines James's theory of truth. It attempts
to show how his theory of truth can be formulated in terms of two conditions, those
of verifiability and satisfactoriness, of which the latter is contingent on the former.
Part Three is an analysis of the main characteristics of James's philosophy of
religion. It investigates his treatment of questions relating to religion from his
pragmatist standpoint.
INTRODUCTION
William James (1842-1910) is known as a scientist, psychologist, and philosopher.
His scientific training began at Harvard's Lawrence Scientific School, where he
graduated M. D. in 1869, having studied chemistry, anatomy, natural history and
physiology. In 1872, he started his career at Harvard, where he would stay until his
retirement in 1907, as a teacher of anatomy and physiology. In 1875 he began
teaching psychology and in 1879 he taught his first philosophy course. When James
turned from his early career in science to psychology and philosophy, his scientific
outlook was already embedded in his approach to the new disciplines. The high point
of his years of teaching psychology was the publication in 1890 of his classic The
Principles ofPsychology. James openly declared this book as scientific psychology; a
study of psychology from the point of view of positivist science. This he considered
his original contribution to the subject.
Since his early encounters with science in the 1860s, at the start of his scientific
education, James had been aware of the power and authority of science and its
dominance at almost every level of American culture. The special status that science
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had attained was due, undoubtedly, to its methods and the success it had enjoyed.
James also witnessed the recognition ofmany of his contemporaries of the boundless
capacity of scientific method to solve problems.
Such was the power and authority of science that one wished to be taken seriously,
had to come to terms with its nature. Philosophers, naturally, were among those who
sought most eagerly to come to terms with the conclusions of science in order to
make their philosophical outputs legitimate, and James was no exception. He writes:
[Pjhilosophy like Moliere, claims her own where she finds it. She finds
much of it today in physics and natural history, and must and will educate
herself accordingly.
James was aware of the challenges that the work of Charles Darwin (1809-1882) on
evolution and natural selection2 had presented to both science and religion. He
realised that the proofs of Darwin's views were open to debate. This led him to hold
such claims as those that scientific theories were not absolutely certain but probable;
thereby questioning the very ability of science to achieve certainty.
Darwin's theories sparked major conflict between science and religion concerning the
origin of humans and their place in the universe. While a student at Harvard, James
noted the heated debates on Darwinism between two of his teachers. On one side,
there was the geologist and zoologist, Louis Agassiz (1807-1873), who is described
as an idealistic thinker who would not hesitate to refer to a species as "a thought of
the Creator."3 Agassiz was against Darwin's transmutation hypothesis, insisting on
the immutability of species. Darwin's theories, he argued, were lacking in certainty.
On the other side, the botanist Asa Gray (1810-1888) accepted the general thrust of
'James, LWJ, I, 191.
2Darwin, On the Origin ofSpecies, published in 1859.
'Russett, Darwin in America, 9.
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Darwin's arguments and foresaw that Darwinism would be accepted before it could
be proved. He described himself as a strict empiricist, who further held that natural
selection is consistent with theism.4 Darwin's ideas were also a topic of continual
debate among the members of a discussion group at Cambridge of which James was a
member, the Metaphysical Club." Among its members, who were students or
graduates of Harvard, were Chauncy Wright (1830-1875), whom James describes as
the 'arch-exponent of positivism'6, and Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) whose
intellectual and personal friendship with James was to last throughout his life.
Hence, James's early encounters with science took place in an atmosphere of intense
debate over Darwinism which played a role in influencing his approach to science.7
He became convinced that the truths of science were provisional and could only be
probable but not certain. Their great value, he says, is in their "setting naturalists to
work, and sharpening their eyes for new facts and relations." 8 They are "doubtless,
provisional, but none the less serviceable for that."9
Having adopted this view of the lack of certainty of scientific knowledge, James was
impatient with arrogant advocates of science, like T. H. Huxley (1825-1895) who
granted to scientific truths a high degree of certainty and who used science as the
arbiter in the settlement of all questions. For such scientific writers, James tells us,
every piece of writing is good whose pages are speckled over with words
like "body," "ganglion-cell," "brute ancestor," "visceral emotion,"
JRussett, Darwin in America, 9-10.
"See Wiener, Evolution and the Founders ofPragmatism, Chapter Two, 18-30.
6Perry, I, 522.
7On the influence of Darwin on James, see Wiener, 'Darwinism in James's Psychology and
Pragmatism', in Evolution and the Founders ofPragmatism, Perry, The Thought and Character of
William James, 2 vols., Croce, Science and Religion in the Era ofWilliam James and Levinson,
Science, Metaphysics, and the Chance ofSalvation.




whilst the sight of a term like "soul," "design," or "free will" in a book
affects them with a sort of foaming at the mouth.10
Hence, we find James more appreciative of the approach to science that he
encountered, for example, in the work of the British scientist and philosopher W. S.
Jevons (1835-1882) who argued that scientific theory is only probable but never
certain.11 James developed a similar view of scientific theories and laws; holding that
laws are only approximations, that no theory is an absolute transcript of reality and
that subjective qualities such as simplicity, elegance and usefulness play a role in
theory choice. These aspects of James's interpretation of science are the topic of
Part One, in which James's theory of scientific method and his philosophy of science
are explained.
The notion of science of the kind briefly outlined, to which James has been taken to
be committed, has largely shaped the form of pragmatism that he later adopted. An
attempt is made in the second part of the thesis to examine this influence in the
course of the discussion of James's theory of truth. His account of truth, it is argued,
is distinguished by the following main features:
(1) an opposition to the copy theory of truth which regards truth as a relation of
agreement between ideas and reality, whereby ideas literally depict or copy the
realities to which they refer;
(2) an alternative empirical account of truth as agreement between ideas and their
objects in terms of two conditions of verifiability and satisfactoriness;
(3) an account of truth that incorporates both notions of objective truth and
subjective truth, whereby James starts from a subjective notion of truth, truth for the
individual, and seeks to develop a notion of objective truth.
'"James's review of Revue Philosophique de la France et de I'Etranger, edited by Theodule Ribot
(1876) in ECR, 319.
"James's review of Jevons's The Principles ofScience, in ECR, 290.
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In the treatment of James's theory of truth, the reading is on the whole sympathetic
and mainly concerned with the interpretation of his ideas. Some standard
interpretations of his account and replies to some standard criticisms are, however,
considered.
James although by training and temperament a scientist, also had a strong religious
sensibility. He was not prepared to sacrifice one for the other and was conscious of
the challenge of Darwinism to religion. He accepted Darwin's views as probable and
yet he acknowledged that they conflicted with religion. Many scientists and
theologians, and ordinary people, shared James's worries, especially those who
thought that the advances of science could only support religious truths; the findings
of natural scientists, some held, would reinforce the revelations of Scripture. Others,
however, identified Darwinism with Atheism.12
James had a genuine sympathy for religion which remained with him throughout his
life and played a major role in the shaping of his philosophical thinking. The threat of
Darwin's views to theism did not lead him into the camp of those thinkers who
announced the death of religion, nor into the camp of those who claimed that the
threat of Darwin to religion was unreal and overly estimated.
The task of reconciling science and religion preoccupied James throughout his
scholarly life. In Part Three of the thesis, an attempt is made to examine James's
efforts to achieve that goal. For this reason, James's treatment of the questions of
religion calls for attention. The main focus is on the exploration of how he dealt with
the problem of providing justification for religious beliefs.
l2Among those who defended this position was Charles Hodge, who was a Professor at Princeton
Theological Seminary, which William's father Henry James, Sr. attended. See Russett, Darwin in
America, 26.
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Some major distinguishing features of James's treatment of religion are now outlined.
(1) The existence of God, like every statement of fact, is only probable, though the
degree of probability in his case may be high.
(2) If the hypothesis of God, like any other scientific hypothesis, is to be said to
'work', it must satisfy the two conditions of verifiability and satisfactoriness. It
must "combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths."13 It must also be
verified whereby its verification requires the experience of the entire human race and
thus will not be completed until the very last person has had his say.
(3) The rejection of the attempt to establish the nature and existence of God by
logical proofs. These proofs, James argues, do not touch life; they are too remote to
relate to human beings' deepest aspirations. Hence he encouraged, and indeed argued
for, the recourse to the experience of God in the individual conscience as a source of
belief.
The discussion of James's account of religion focusses on these major features and on
some others, such as his attempt to establish a 'science of religions'.
The thesis concludes with an assessment of James's attempt to incorporate scientific
insights into truth and religion as described in the course of the thesis and briefly
charts some indications of areas of research of the extent to which James's pragmatic





Throughout his writings, James had shown a steady support for science, evolutionary
and positivistic. He argued for variants of his philosophical positions from within a
scientific model. Hence, it can justifiably be maintained that it is crucial for any
attempt to understand James's philosophical views to gain a clear grasp of his views
on science; this having exercised such an influence on shaping his philosophy. From
a close look at the literature on James, one observes that remarkably little has been
written about his theory of scientific method and his philosophy of science. One can
hardly find a detailed study of James's account of such concepts as hypothesis and of
scientific theories, theoretical entities and laws. In her fairly recent study of James,
Seigfried points out the difficulty of giving an account of what James exactly means
by science and its methods. She remarks that
his initial education in science placed him in a favorable position to evaluate
it, both as a participant and as a critic. However, this does not make it any
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easier to recognize what he meant by science, which must be derived from
scattered references.1
The present account of James's view of science exemplifies, in one aspect, this
difficulty. It is based, indeed, on scattered references and a number of clues
sprinkled throughout James's writings. Hence, it proved essential, whenever it
seemed appropriate, to compare James's ideas, especially those that seemed vaguely
formulated, with those which appeared relevant in the works of other philosophers,
in particular with those philosophers who had exerted a considerable influence on
him. Those who were influenced by him have been given less attention. The aim
throughout is to examine James's ideas by seeking new insights into his thought
rather than to offer the reader a review of the history of ideas.
It is important to point out at this stage that no attempt has been made to offer a
detailed examination of Darwin's influence on James's thought. The studies that
cover this topic are numerous enough, some of which are indeed so competent, that
an examination of them in the course of this discussion would seem to have little of
significance to add.
Among the topics discussed in this part of the thesis are the following:
(1) James's views on the use of hypotheses in scientific inquiry;
(2) the Baconian method and James's reaction to it;
(3) James's views on theoretical terms and the status of scientific theories;
(4) the influence of Duhem's holism on James;
(5) James's position towards positivist science and its method.
The examination of James's view of science is summed up at the end and followed
by some concluding comments.
'Seigfried, William James's Radical Reconstruction ofPhilosophy, 53.
8
2. ON THE ROLE OF HYPOTHESIS
2.1 THE ORIGIN OF HYPOTHESIS AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS
Like other scientists of his time, James strongly stressed the value of hypothesis as
an integral part of inductive investigation. He conceives the origin or genesis of
hypotheses as sudden and spontaneous. The origin of scientific hypotheses is akin to
that of 'flashes of poetry and eloquence' and 'sallies ofwit and humor.'2 He tells us
that hypotheses can neither be deduced nor induced from matters of fact. They are
originally produced in the shape of random images, fancies, accidental
out-births of spontaneous variation in the functional activity of the
excessively instable human brain, which the outer environment simply
confirms or refutes, adopts or rejects, preserves or destroys.3
But what makes an hypothesis a good one? James tells us that: "A good hypothesis
in science must have other properties than those of the phenomenon it is immediately
invoked to explain, otherwise it is not prolific enough."4 Thus, a probable hypothesis
is one which enables the investigator to infer the existence of new phenomena which
occur within his experience. If one was not able to deduce any further facts that
would occur if the hypothesis proved to be true, then the role of this particular
hypothesis is limited, it can be argued, to only offering an explanation of the
phenomena already known.
The one condition that James seems to lay down as an essential requirement of a
good hypothesis is that of deducibility, which enables the investigator to know what
2James, WB, 185; also PP, II, 1232 & 1233. Karl Popper also describes scientific hypotheses as "the





should happen if the hypothesis was true. Consequently, James does not object to the
scientist's consideration of all conceivable hypotheses relevant to his investigation
no matter how bizarre some of them might at first appear, so long as they are fertile.
James does not seem to lay down any other conditions, or constraints, to which
hypotheses must conform. For instance, one does not find a condition that if one is to
formulate or devise an hypothesis in physics it should not break the laws of
conservation of energy. Similarly, if an hypothesis is invented in chemistry, there is
no restriction that it must be verified using a certain empirical measuring device. The
role of hypotheses is to explain phenomena and to predict other phenomena which
are not already under observation.
James tells us that once formed, "[t]he scientific hypothesis arouses in me a fever of
desire for verification."5 He reports and praises W. Stanley Jevons for stressing this
point.
To Professor Jevons is due the great credit of having emphatically pointed
out how the genius of discovery depends altogether on the number of these
random notions and guesses which visit the investigator's mind. To be
fertile in hypotheses is the first requisite, and to be willing to throw them
away the moment experience contradicts them is the next.6
Thus, an hypothesis must be verifiable. The facts of experience are the test by which
the truthfulness of an hypothesis is judged. The investigator starts with a probable
hypothesis from which he deduces some consequences that he puts to the test. If they
harmonise with experience then this shows that the scientist's own speculations are
being confirmed - though not finally confirmed. However, if they did not, then either
dames, WB, 186. For James, the term 'verification' denotes something like confirmation rather than




the hypothesis would be abandoned or modified and subjected to testing again. The
scientist cannot start his inquiry, according to James, without a presupposed theory
or hypothesis. For scientific observation assumes theory. It is hardly to see how
science would progress without hypothesis or theory.
2.2 JAMES AND THE BACONIAN METHOD
In his Novum Organum, Francis Bacon presented a scientific method the application
of which he thought was essential to the progress of science. According to the
Baconian method, the scientist starts his inquiry by gathering facts. The compiled
facts or 'histories' are infallibly drawn from direct observation. Then, with the set of
rules which can easily be applied, successive general laws can be derived. In this
way, a whole system of knowledge can be established which is both certain and
infallibly true. The investigator, according to Bacon, should not have recourse to
flashes of inspiration or speculative hypothesis in his search. The investigator's
mind, he says, should "not [be] left to take its own course."7 Hence, Bacon was
understood by many as opposed to the use of hypothesis and speculation in scientific
... 8 • •
investigation. Karl Popper, for one, argued, against Bacon, that bold conjectures or
anticipations are crucial to the progress of science; that the theories we formulate are
not infallible; that the starting-point in inquiry is not the gathering of facts but bold
hypotheses and conjectures which are subjected to empirical testing. None of these
hypotheses, Popper argues, is maintained dogmatically. He says: "Our method of
7Quoted from Bacon, Works IV, 40 in Urbach, Francis Bacon's Philosophy ofScience, 18.
8Since James's references to Bacon's work are very few, the discussion of it here is rather sketchy.
Any further examination of Bacon's ideas might seem somewhat irrelevant to the present examination
of James's comments on the Baconian method.
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research is not to defend them, in order to prove how right we were. On the contrary,
we try to overthrow them."
Whether these estimates of Bacon's philosophy were accurate, is not a major
concern here; many did adopt this reading throughout the eighteenth-century. The
main intention is to examine James's view of the Baconian method. It can be said
that James seems to be on the side of Popper, among others, in being critical of the
Baconian method. He writes:
The Baconian method of collating tables of instances may be a useful aid at
certain times. But one might as well expect a chemist's note-book to write
down the name of the body analyzed, or a weather table to sum itself up into
a prediction of probabilities of its own accord, as to hope that the mere fact
of mental confrontation with a certain series of facts will be sufficient to
make any brain conceive their law. The conceiving of the law is a
spontaneous variation in the strictest sense of the term. . . . the important
thing to notice is that the good flashes and the bad flashes, the triumphant
hypotheses and the absurd conceits, are on an exact equality in respect of
their origin.10
It seems rather difficult to imagine how the simple gathering and the classification
of a mass of factual data are likely to disclose the general laws they embody. James's
view is that the mode of reaching the general law, or attribute shared by a concrete
collection or group of phenomena, is not achieved by the Baconian-inspired
compilation of disconnected facts. It is always achieved by a guess or an hypothesis,
which is then confronted by the facts, old and new, which would be made as a result
of this confrontation less or more probable, but 'never certain.'11 For it is more likely
that some other hidden feature or character of that phenomena might be revealed in
the future by some clever observer, or that an instance might be discovered which
would contradict that law. It seems somewhat difficult to imagine, from James's




point of view, how scientific discoveries can be reached by following the Baconian
method.
James gives the following formulation of the method that the physical philosopher
follows in testing an hypothesis.
He [the scientist] deduces from the hypothesis an experimental action, x;
this he adds to the facts M already existing. It fits them if the hypothesis be
true; if not, there is discord. The results of the action corroborate or refute
the idea from which it flowed.12
This simple formulation of scientific method, or induction, can be briefly described
as consisting of the following three steps:
(1) the formulation of an hypothesis about the nature of a general law;
(2) the deduction of some consequences from it;
(3) the comparison of the consequences with the facts which are the subject of
examination.
2.3 THE ROLE OF THE INQUIRER
What seems to lie at the heart of the matter is James's unwillingness to ignore the
active role that the scientist plays as a transformer of experience. In contrast with
traditional inductivists like Bacon and Reid, James insists that the scientist is not a
passive observer of nature; a mere recipient of empirical data, who gradually absorbs
and eventually generalises the facts that he has assimilated.13 On the contrary, the
l2James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 86.
L,James expresses this point clearly as follows. "For a hundred and fifty years past the progress of
science has seemed to mean the enlargement of the material universe and the diminution ofman's
importance... . Man is no lawgiver to nature, he is an absorber. She it is who stands firm; he it is who
must accommodate himself. Let him record truth, inhuman tho it be, and submit to it!" PRAG, 15.
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scientist functions as an active participant whose reasoning is guided from the start
of inquiry by subjective or personal interest, but inspired by a fertility of imagination
and an abundance of hypotheses and guesses. James writes:
Take science itself! Without an imperious inner demand on our part for
ideal logical and mathematical harmonies, we should never have attained to
proving that such harmonies lie hidden between all the chinks and
interstices of the crude natural world. Hardly a law has been established in
science, hardly a fact ascertained, which was not first sought after, often
with sweat and blood, to gratify an inner need. Whence such needs come
from we do not know: we find them in us.14
This appears to be only one way in which James describes the intervention of
subjective interests in the process of scientific discovery. Given the active role of the
inquirer, James argues in his writings for a more exact and also significant role for
subjective factors in science. Here we can distinguish between two strands in
James's scientific thought which represent this influence. One finds firstly, the
multiplicity of scientific formulae that may account for the same phenomenon.
Secondly, an employment of subjective criteria when choosing between rival
theories. These will be explored in the following chapters.
3. MULTIPLICITY OF SCIENTIFIC FORMULAE
3.1 SCIENTIFIC LAWS ARE NOT EXACT TRANSCRIPTS OF
FACTS
James argues that the implications of his conception of the way we arrive at the
formulation of scientific laws suggest that these laws cannot be mere copies of facts.
Thus, it is neither impossible nor unthinkable that the same phenomenon can be
l4James, WB, 51.
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accounted for by more than one law. James tells us that this view has been arrived at
by the radical change that occurred in our conception of scientific truth after 1850.
Prior to that, he argues, scientific truths were supposed to be
exact and exclusive duplicates of pre-human archetypes buried in the
structure of things, to which the spark of divinity hidden in our intellect
enables us to penetrate.15
For the scientific investigator sciences expressed "truths that were exact copies of a
definite code of non-human realities."16 But after 1850, there has emerged a
multiplicity of geometries, of logics, of scientific hypotheses, each one of them is
'good for so much and yet not good for everything' that the conception of a theory or
a law that is a literal transcript of reality seems to be somewhat impossible to
maintain. Consequently, our conception of scientific truths has become more flexible
and so should it be in the case of other types of truth.
Truth we conceive to mean everywhere, not duplication, but addition; not
the constructing of inner copies of already complete realities, but rather the
collaborating with realities so as to bring about a clearer result. Obviously
this state of mind is at first full of vagueness and ambiguity. 'Collaborating'
is a vague term; it must at any rate cover conceptions and logical
arrangements. 'Clearer' is vaguer still. Truth must bring clear thoughts, as
well as clear the way to action. 'Reality' is the vaguest term of all. The only
way to test such a program at all is to apply it to the various types of truth,
in the hope of reaching an account that shall be more precise. Any
hypothesis that forces such a review upon one has one great merit, even if in
the end it prove invalid: it gets us better acquainted with the total subject. To
give the theory plenty of 'rope' and see if it hangs itself eventually is better
tactics than to choke it off at the outset by abstract accusations of
self-contradiction.17
As said earlier, the advancement of science in the nineteenth-century had shown that





longer considered as mere copies of facts. James acknowledged this development of
the way scientific laws are understood. He develops a similar argument to the effect
that there is a multiplicity of viewpoints from which the world can be seen and no
one viewpoint can be deemed to be the truest one.
There is nothing improbable in the supposition that an analysis of the world
may yield a number of formulae, all consistent with the facts. In physical
science different formulae may explain the phenomena equally well—the
one-fluid and the two-fluid theories of electricity, for example. Why may it
not be so with the world? Why may there not be different points of view for
surveying it, within each of which all data harmonize, and which the
observer may therefore either choose between, or simply cumulate one upon
another? A Beethoven string-quartet is truly, as someone has said, a
scraping of horses' tails on cats' bowels, and may be exhaustively described
in such terms; but the application of this description in no way precludes the
simultaneous applicability of an entirely different description. Just so a
thorough-going interpretation of the world in terms of mechanical sequence
is compatible with its being interpreted teleologically, for the mechanism
itselfmay be designed.18
3.2 THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC LAWS
Taking into account James's view that scientific laws are not literally objective and
do not depict reality literally, the following claims by James seem to follow.
(1) That many competing conceptual frameworks may explain empirical phenomena.
(2) That different existing and competing formulae can not be reduced to one for
even if they are reduced to one another they are not ultimately reduced to one.
(3) That scientific laws are only approximations. They do not depict nature, they
only symbolise it. The talk about symbolising means the insistence on the
mathematical form of physical laws. Thus laws do not provide an absolutely literal
and definitive picture of reality, they merely offer a relative and approximate
formula of reality which is subject to possible revision in the future.
l8James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 66.
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(4) That it is not correct to talk about laws as true,19 in the sense of being absolutely
true.
(5) That the choice between rival formulae or laws when, and only when, it cannot
be made on empirical or logical grounds, is made by appealing to subjective criteria.
A scientific formula which is judged the best among its rivals, according to
subjective criteria, is considered as so for the time and other formulae which are
judged as not useful at that time might become so and be adopted as the best ones in
the future. Accordingly, James views laws as heuristic devices any one of which
might be useful at a given time. Therefore none of them could be regarded as
absolute for that reason. Each cannot be an absolute transcript of reality, but any one
of them may from some point of view be useful.
In Pragmatism, James refers to a group of mathematicians, physicists and chemists,
including Henri Poincare (1854-1912), Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and Pierre Duhem
(1861-1916), who developed a branch of philosophy called inductive logic. The most
important view advocated by these scientists is that laws are approximations. James
approvingly describes the efforts of these scientists.
One of the most successfully cultivated branches of philosophy in our time
is what is called inductive logic, the study of the conditions under which our
sciences have evolved. Writers on this subject have begun to show a
singular unanimity as to what the laws of nature and elements of fact mean,
when formulated by mathematicians, physicists and chemists. ... as the
sciences have developed farther, the notion has gained ground that most,
perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations. The laws themselves,
moreover, have grown so numerous that there is no counting them; and so
many rival formulations are proposed in all the branches of science that
investigators have become accustomed to the notion that no theory is
absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of them may from some
point of view be useful. Their great use is to summarize old facts and to lead
to new ones. They are only a man-made language, a conceptual shorthand,
l9For example, Carnap writes: 'Many empiricists ... feel that an empiricist should never use a
terribly dangerous word like "true" [when talking about scientific laws]. Otto Neurath, for instance,
said that it would be a sin against empiricism to speak of laws as true. American pragmatists,
including William James and John Dewey, held similar views.' Philosophical Foundations of
Physics, 213-14.
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as someone calls them, in which we write our reports of nature; and
languages, as is well known, tolerate much choice of expression and many
dialects.20
The notion of laws as approximations, with which James clearly sympathises, carries
with it certain characteristics of laws to which James does not explicitly refer. Let us
refer to Duhem's view of laws in his book The Aim and Structure of Physical
Theory. According to Duhem, to say that physical laws are approximations is to say
that they cannot be either true or false.21 For
any other law representing the same experiments with the same
approximation may lay as just a claim as the first to the title of a true law or,
to speak more precisely, of an acceptable law.22
For laws of this nature, physical theories, whose role is the classification of the
approximate laws, cannot "confer absolute truth on them." James is also uneasy
about speaking of physical laws as true. Since these laws do not depict reality he
argues, they are not suited to the provision of an absolute picture of things. Thus,
they are not absolutely true but only relative; representing reality in a more or less
exact manner but in the most satisfactory possible way. Because laws are
approximations, Duhem argues, they are provisional.24 A law is provisional because
it represents approximately the facts which scientists of the present consider as
satisfactory. However, it may well be the case that this law will not be considered by
scientists as such in the future. For instance, the improvement in conducting
experiments which may lead to more accurate results, might make the laws under
consideration unsatisfactory and require their revision. What it is extremely
important to point out is that provisional laws since they are symbolic constructions,
20James, PRAG, 33.





should they represent reality at one time, may not necessarily do so in the future.
Characterised as such, physical laws can only be retained by being modified.
James differentiates between the proximate laws of nature on one side and scientific
theories on the other. He writes:
The most persistent outer relations which science believes in are never
matters of experience at all, but have to be disengaged from under
experience by a process of elimination, that is, by ignoring conditions which
are always present. The elementary laws of mechanics, physics, and
chemistry are all of this sort. The principle of uniformity in nature is of this
sort; it has to be sought under and in spite of the most rebellious
appearances; and our conviction of its truth is far more like a religious faith
than like assent to a demonstration. The only cohesions which experience in
the literal sense of the word produces in our mind are, as we contended
some time back, the proximate laws of nature, and habitudes of concrete
things, that heat melts ice, that salt preserves meat, that fish die out of water,
and the like. Such 'empirical truths' as these we admitted to form an
enormous part of human wisdom. The 'scientific' truths have to harmonize
with these truths, or be given up as useless; but they arise in the mind in no
such passive associative way as that in which the simpler truths arise. Even
those experiences which are used to prove a scientific truth are for the most
part artificial experiences of the laboratory gained after the truth itself has
been conjectured.25
The distinction just mentioned between scientific truths and proximate laws of nature
is based on their origin and not on the methods of verification. On the basis of their
origin, the proximate laws of nature are regarded by James as empirical truths, which
are the product of the outer environment, while theories, which James refers to as
scientific truths, are considered as non-empirical, because they originate in the mind;
being a mere production of the mind. As James indicates above, scientific truths
must harmonise, with empirical truths. As examples of empirical truths, James gives
the proximate laws of nature such as 'heat melts ice' and 'fish die out of water'.
These laws are invented by human beings to enable them to interpret and organise
their experiences successfully.
25James, PP, II, 1233-34.
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James also talks about 'simpler truths' which arise in the mind in a 'passive
associative way'. These may be understood as those truths which arise out of
common-sense experience. There seems to be a direct connection between the
degree of abstractness of our ideas and the degree of passivity of our minds. The
more our ideas become abstract, the less passive our minds are. Another point to be
made is that the scientist approaches the data of experience with conjectures or
theories that have already been formed. Thus the only way that the scientist could
handle the empirical data is through scientific theories which are not derivable from
experience. This would make theories science's sine qua non.
3.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY
Having examined James's view on scientific laws, it is interesting to see how he
dealt with the principle of the conservation of energy (PCE) and to explore whether
James's treatment of this principle is in accordance with his views of scientific laws
as has been examined thus far.
In 1847, German physicist Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894), at the age of
twenty-six, presented a paper entitled 'On the Conservation of Force,' unaware of
the work ofMayer and Joule's experiments, where by he concluded that energy must
have many different forms and be conserved in total amount. This conclusion was
based on his belief that heat, light, electricity and so on are all forms of motion and
therefore forms of mechanical (kinetic) energy. It must have seemed obvious to
Helmholtz that kinetic energy was always conserved, not just in elastic collisions but
in all collisions, because it went into other forms that were really also kinetic energy.
Much of what Helmholtz so boldly suggested was eventually found to be correct,
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although not all forms of energy can be reduced to kinetic energy. The immediate
response to his paper was discouraging and most historians of science agree that it
was the experiments of Joule, backed by the reputation and influence of Kelvin, that
eventually convinced the physicists of the mid-nineteenth century that there was
indeed a PCE. James went to Heidelberg in 1868 to study physiology and
psychology with Helmholtz and Wundt.26 Perry tells us that Helmholtz was one of
James's 'scientific idols' who combined "experimental patience" with "skill and
fresh ways of observation."27 His afore-mentioned paper was for James "one of the
great classics of science."2 This admiration of Helmholtz remained only
intellectual.29
The PCE (The First Law of Thermodynamics) is one of the most fundamental laws
of science which is commonly stated as: The amount of energy in the universe is
fixed or as: Energy can neither be destroyed nor created. Scientists who were
positivists and determinists and who accepted the PCE and its universality, but who
also found the psychological evidence in the existence of free will and the active
power of mind on the body so compelling, were not prepared to give up any of these
contradicting views and thus have come up with ingenious ideas on how to reconcile




28Cf. PP (1891), II, 668 and Perry, II, 55.
29Perry notes James's failure to make any personal contact with Helmholtz. In one occasion where
Helmholtz was invited to tea with the Jameses in Chocorua, James described him as a '"monumental
example of benign calm and speechlessness,"—but he was "the great Helmholtz" none the less.'"
(Perry, II, 55. See also LWJ, I, 266, 347) In a letter to Carl Stumpf, dated January 24, 1894, James
again describes Helmholtz's lack of conversation. "We had Helmholtz here, by the bye, in the
autumn. A fine looking old fellow, but with formidable powers of holding his tongue, and answering
you by a friendly inclination of the head." (Perry, II, 188) James describes one of Helmholtz's
lectures which he attended in another letter to Stumpf, dated November 26, 1882, saying that
"Helmholtz, for example, gave me the very worst lecture I ever heard in my life except one (that one
was by our most distinguished American mathematician)." Perry, II, 60.
30UnIike Helmholtz, Delbosuf stands out in James's eyes as "an angel, and much the best teacher I've
seen." LWJ, I, 217-18. Perry says that "Delbceufwas not unlike James in the warmth and liveliness of
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In a series of articles on "Determinism and Freedom: Freedom Demonstrated by
Mechanics"31, Delboeuf attempts to prove, on the basis ofNewtonian mechanics, the
existence of discontinuous motions in nature whose existence is compatible with the
law of conservation of energy. The existence of these discontinuous motions can
only be explained by the concept of freedom. Thus he puts forward the idea that
freedom is compatible with the law of the conservation of energy.
Delbceuf firmly believed that determinism is irrefutable, that freedom exists and that
the PCE is universally valid. So how did he reconcile all these ideas? Delboeuf
recognised that the major objection that he must overcome is that if free will exists,
then it does create a new kind of energy which violates the law of conservation of
32
energy. He resolves this problem by suggesting that when one acts freely, one does
not introduce a new amount of energy, one only chooses the time when energies
already existing shall transfer to or from some physical source.33 Thus no energy is
created through the free action of the agent. The quantity of energy in the universe
remains constant. So given that matter is conceived as being essentially a form of
his temperament, and there was an instant affection which led to many years of friendly
correspondence." Perry, I, 687.
jl
Delboeuf, J., "Determinisme et Liberte: La Liberte Demontree Par La Mecanique", Revue
Philosophique XIII, 453-480, 608-638, 1882, XIV, 156-189, 1882.
32
"En d'autres termes, l'excercice de la liberte, si la liberte existe, implique-t il une creation de force?
John Herscheli, entre autres, l'a pense. II dit en quelque endroit qu'on est bien force d'avouer
que la force peut etre creee a nouveau, et, partant, de n'accorder au principe de la conservation de
l'energie que la valeur d'une loi approximative.
Hatons-nous de donner une reponse negative a la question.
Scientifiquement parlant, il nous est tout aussi impossible de concevoir une creation de force
qu'une creation de matiere. Les corps animes, aussi bien que les corps inanimes, sont incapables de
creer le mouvement. Leurs deplacements, et les deplacements qui en resultent pour les autres corps,
s'expliquent par une simple transformation ou un simple transport de forces." Delbceuf, I, 478-79.
33"Ou l'homme a ce pouvoir, ou il n'est pas libre. Ce resultat, comment peut-il 1'atteindre sans
compromettre la loi de la conservation de 1'energie? en disposant du temps." Delboeuf, I, 480. And
again "Mais, s'il etait necessaire d'accorder a la volonte une part d'action sur les choses, il etait
impossible d'admettre qu'une force nulle put, a l'aide d'aucun mecanisme, produire un effet
quelconque. Quelle puissance restait-il done a mettre a la disposition des etres libres? Une seule, le
temps. Agir librement, e'est suspendre son activite." Delbceuf, III, 188.
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energy, then the free act of the agent is restricted to choosing the time of intervention
which does not create energy, or at least potentially does not create matter.34
This claimed compatibility between the PCE and freedom assumes the existence of
discontinuous movements which Delboeuf takes as free motions. In fact, he argues,
all free movements are discontinuous.35 He insists that his recourse to freedom to
explain discontinuous motions36 does in no way cast any doubts on his part
surrounding determinism. On the contrary, as has been said earlier, he firmly holds
that determinism and its relationship to science is irrefutable. Science obliges us to
have recourse to freedom to explain discontinuous motions,37 given that
discontinuities cannot be explained scientifically.
James refers to Delboeuf s articles in the correspondence between himself and
Charles Renouvier38 (18 1 5-1903) and in a letter to C. A. Strong in which James
j4"le libre arbitre n'a rien a voir avec le principe de la conservation de l'energie. Qu'on le veuille ou
qu'on ne le veuille pas, la quantite d'energie reste necessairement la meme.... Libres ou non,
1'homme et les animaux ne font que convertir sans cesse du transformable en intransformable; ils
precipitent le cours les choses.... II est possible, il est meme probable que les pensees et les
sentiments et les volontes sont accompagnes d'une depense d'energies; mais le principe de la
conservation de l'energie n'est nullement interesse dans la question de la liberte."Delboeuf, II, 617-18.
j5"Il y a done certainement des mouvements discontinus, et ce sont precisement des mouvements
volontaires. Nous pouvons en inferer que tous les mouvements volontaires sont
discontinus."Delbceuf, II, 634.
",6See the discussion on the existence of discontinuous movements in Delboeuf, J., II, 631-34.
,7"A la science de la nature se substitue la recherche de la pensee et de la volonte creatrices. Cette
pensee d'ailleurs et cette volonte sont immuables et eternelles comme les lois de la matiere. Au point
de vue exclusif ou je me suis place, je n'ai pas a critiquer ce systeme, que je declare irrefutable. II me
suffit d'avoir montre que la science est obligee de recourir a la liberte pour expliquer les mouvements
discontinus." Delboeuf, II, 638.
j8Renouvier had a strong influence on James, especially on the his doctrine of the will to believe and
the question of free will and determinism. Renouvier was James's philosophical healer. His
frustration that led to the well-known crisis in 1869 referred to in Perry that "we are nature through
and through...." was fundamentally cured by his reading of Renouvier's Second Essay in 1870,
when Renouvier's doctrine of freedom gave James hope and courage and vision that he desperately
needed to overcome his fears of ultimate succumbing to the evils of materialism. James has also
dedicated his posthumously published book Some Problem ofPhilosophy to Renouvier wherein he
refers to him as "one of the greatest philosophic characters" whose well advocated pluralism saved
James from the spell of his father's 'monistic superstition.' Perry regards Renouvier's influence to be
the greatest "individual influence" upon the development of James's thought.
23
recommends to him Delboeuf s work on freedom.39 But what does James think about
Delbceuf s thesis? Both James and Renouvier agree that freedom and discontinuity
go together, just as determinism and continuity belong together.40 So the appearance
of discontinuity could not be explained in a system of continuity. James writes:
Defining discontinuous movements as he [Delboeuf] does, I see that we must
have such a movement whenever a force hitherto inactive begins to act; and I
think I see that the existence of apparent discontinuity cannot be explained
away by an appeal to absolute motion in which the discontinuity shall
disappear; for there must be some action ex abrnpto even in the absolute
movement to cause the appearance of discontinuity in the relative
movement. But whether all this means the same thing as indeterminism I
can't tell. . . . After all, pluralism and indeterminism seem to be but two ways
of stating the same thing.41
Renouvier is rather unsympathetic to Delboeuf s thesis. Writing back to James, he
says:
1 would not say with Delbceuf that determinism is "an irrefutable logical
system." ... As to the chief point of his thesis, I do not understand how he
can say that the law of the conservation of energy remains intact and
absolute, provided only the agent disposes freely of time—in choosing his
moment of action. Is it not always necessary that, at the moment when he
decides to intervene, he should introduce in the system of given motions
whatever new motion is necessary to change their actual relations? No, I can
make nothing of it.42
Let us now examine these responses to Delbocuf s thesis. Both Renouvier and James
seem to hold that freedom is incompatible with determinism. They both oppose
freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive.
39Perry, II, 26.
40"Continuity (or infinity of composition, and, in consequence, of action) and necessity or solidarity,
are, again, for me the same thing; just as freedom and discontinuity belong together, as you have so
well said." Renouvier's letter to James, dated December 28, 1882, in Perry, I, 689.
4lPerry, I, 686.
42Letter to James, dated December 28, 1882, Perry, I, 689-90.
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Renouvier discusses freedom in relation to the will, which is the foundation of
liberty, to certitude, of which freedom is its foundation and in relation to
indeterminism. As far as freedom's relation to will is concerned, his position is a
compromise between the positions of the determinists and the indifferentists, who
hold the doctrine of the so-called freedom of the indifference. According to
Renouvier, these doctrines are based on the concept of a separable will which is
detached from the representations in which it is manifested. This separable will must
be conceived as entirely indifferent to any motives or any decision the agent might
make. Thus, the determinists, as against the indifferentists, take the willing as the
moment of preponderance of one motive over others, where the pure will is being
taken by a mathematical point and the notion of a balance ofmotives is introduced.43
Renouvier does not find this detached conception of freedom acceptable. He
characterises freedom as follows:
La liberte que nous pouvons admettre est ce caractere de facte humain,
reflechi et volontaire, dans lequel la conscience pose etroitement unis le
motif et le moteur identifies avec eile, en s'affirmant que d'autres actes
exclusifs du premier etaient possibles au meme instant. Cette possibility,
apparente ou reelie d'ailleurs, est le titre le plus net de la liberte, ('element le
plus clair de sa definition.44
Thus Renouvier talks about the identification of the motive and the motor and
consciousness at the moment of the exercise of will. He also talks about the free acts
as being caused by humans.
Les actes libres ne sont pas des effets sans cause ; leur cause est l'homme,
dans 1'ensemble et la plenitude de ses fonctions.45
43Renouvier, Essai II, 60-73.
44Renouvier, Essai II, 73-74.
45Renouvier, Essai II, 86-87.
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Renouvier argues against determinism that if one did not admit the existence of one
motive of which will is an element, then this particular motive is in fact a willed
motive which stands equally possible to other motives.46 This, he argues, should
upset the determinist argument. But, we should try to understand how does the will
enter as an element into a motive. According to Delboeuf, the agent acts and is acted
upon according to physical laws. Renouvier's objection is that it is incorrect to
subject the agent's free acts to law that would involve a kind of necessity because,
for him, laws mean necessity.47 To try to clarify this, Renouvier seems to be against
holding free will while at the same time holding to the universality of law and
uniformity in nature. Free will is to be based upon a real contingency or
indetermination. But his theory of free will is even more bizarre. According to him,
when the will or freedom enters into a motive as an element, what happens is that an
agency starts a new series of events in the world which appears in the form of a
self-caused representation.48
There are certain complex ideas here which are best set on one side. What is
important for us is the fact that this explanation of the will is intended to avoid any
incompatibility with the PCE by basing freedom on real contingency or
indetermination. Thus we find Renouvier rejecting Delbceufs thesis of the
compatibility between freedom and the PCE. Renouvier draws the distinction
between two senses of freedom; freedom from law and freedom from coercion. An
act of choice is always free from coercion, for the choice implies freedom. On the
other hand, this act is not free from law, which is determined by the agent's nature
and his surroundings. But the act of choice is considered as part of a chain of
46Renouvier, Essai II, 71.
47"qui dit loi entend necessite. Rien de plus vrai et de plus legitime." Renouvier, Essai II, 83.
48
"Le motifpreponderant determine la volonte, on essaie d'introduire un enonce a termes pleins et
synthetiques, on trouve: L 'etatforme de passion, d'intelligence et de volonte, duqitelfait partie la
representation d'nn motifjuge capable de determiner un acte subsequent, determine effectivement ce
dernier acte. . .. La volonte est a elle-meme son motif. " Renouvier, Essai II, 72.
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conditions and what we are doing is to abstract it at the moment of choice which
makes this act to appear to be free in every sense, even from law. At this moment
that the agent chooses to begin to act depends the sense of freedom that he feels,
which in this case is real freedom. His lack of knowledge of the law enables him to
feel his own energy, which obeys the law, not as law but as energy. This sense of
freedom is a sense of power; it increases the force of the will in choosing the best
course. Here real freedom is contrasted with apparent freedom (the mere belief in
real freedom) which is complementary to it. Real freedom, Renouvier tells us, just as
the doctrine of determinism is not logically demonstrable.49
Returning to the initial problem, namely, the compatibility or lack of it of the PCE
with freedom, as has just been discussed, Renouvier's remarks are basically a
separation of freedom from the PCE. What is now of concern is the examination of
James's reaction to this problem.
James follows Renouvier in thinking that it seems rather absurd either to admit that
in the free act a new energy is created or to deny freewill in favour of PCE.
However, the choice between either view, freedom and determinism, is unavoidable;
we must choose one or the other and we cannot decide not to choose either. For
although in some issues one can suspend judgement, which seems the right thing to
do, in other issues the consequences of the suspension of judgement are disastrous.
In this sense one is forced to choose one or the other. As said earlier, this matter of
choice cannot be decided on intellectual grounds for both doctrines are logically
indemonstrable. But if one is forced to make the choice, then on what grounds can it
be made? Renouvier tells us that one is entitled to choose according to the kind of
consequences that would follow from choosing either doctrine. One must choose
49We return to this theme in Part Three when we examine James's essay 'The Will to Believe.'
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freedom because the advantages that accompany the belief in freedom far exceed
those that a belief in determinism promises.
Dans l'impuissance de rien demontrer, l'unique ressource qui reste est
d'affirmer la liberte a titre de postulat. La verite, non pas prouvee, mais
reclamee et digne d'etre choisie, est celle qui pose un fondement pour la
morale et aussi un fondement pour la connaisance pratique,
independamment de laquelle on ne peut asseoir «la science.))50
As it would appear from the present discussion, James seems to be in favour of the
separation between the scientific and the non-scientific or speculative approaches to
the question of free will. Since he seems to think that there is no decisive evidence
that would support one over the other, one is free to believe the doctrine that one
chooses. If one believes that the PCE is strictly applicable to the universe, then one is
entitled to a mechanistic view of the universe, which one might accept despite the
fact that the consequences of holding it are morally unsatisfactory. But if one
believes in freedom because it is morally satisfactory to do so, then one could still
adhere to the PCE but not as a law that is strictly applicable universally, but only as a
law which is a mathematical form that summarises and classify laws established by
experiment. The PCE is equivalent to a system of differential equations which rules
the changes of the bodies subject to them. If the state and motion of these bodies are
given at a certain moment, then their state and motion would then be determined for
the whole course of time; and thus no free movement can be produced among these
bodies, since a free movement would be essentially a movement not determined by
previous states and motions. Thus we start from the beginning by assuming that
these phenomena are subject to strict determinism. A phenomenon whose
peculiarities did not in the least result from the initial data would rebel at any
representation by such a system of equations. It was therefore certain in advance that
no place is reserved for free actions in the classification arranged. When it was noted
50Renouvier, Essai II, 419.
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afterwards that a free action couldn't be included in the classification, it would be
absurd to have concluded that freedom was impossible. So if the evidence for
freedom is lacking, what is legitimate is not to deny that freedom exists, but to
consider the consequences that would follow from holding it to exist. This would in
one sense constitute the evidence for believing in freedom.
4. ON THE STATUS OF THEORETICAL ENTITIES
When scientists talk about theoretical terms, James tells us, they talk
as if reality was made of ether, atoms or electrons, but we mustn't think so
literally. The term 'energy' doesn't even pretend to stand for anything
'objective.' It is only a way ofmeasuring the surface of phenomena so as to
string their changes on a simple formula. . . .We must find a theory that will
work; and that means something extremely difficult; for our theory must
mediate between all previous truths and certain new experiences.31
If a theoretical term like energy, for example, does not refer to anything objective,
then the question is: What status do theoretical terms have? For James, theoretical
entities do not possess an independent existence, i.e., they are not ontologically
independent from empirical experience. So he allows that the scientist postulates the
world as composed of atoms, but would insist that the scientist sees that theoretical
terms as such are merely instruments, in the case of energy, to measure "the surface
so as to string their changes on a simple formula." But at the same time, they are
irreducible to sensory experience.
Describing the developments of the late nineteenth-century physics, James clearly
emphasises this point in Some Problems ofPhilosophy. He writes:
5'James, PRAG, 103-04.
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[T]he concepts current in physical science have also developed mutual
oppugnancies which ... are beginning to make physicists doubt whether
such notions develop unconditional 'truth.' Many physicists now think that
the concepts of 'matter,' 'mass,' 'atom,' 'ether,' 'inertia,' 'force,' etc. are
not so much duplicates of hidden realities in nature as mental instruments to
handle nature by after-substitution of their scheme.32
Here one recalls what Poincare53 had stressed that a concept such as 'mass' is no
more than a 'device of the understanding'.
Masses are co-efficients which it is found convenient to introduce into
calculations.
We could reconstruct our mechanics by giving to our masses
different values. The new mechanics would be in contradiction neither with
experiment nor with the general principles of dynamics . . . But the
equations of this mechanics would not be so simple.54
The scientist who applies theoretical terms in formulating his theories does not
assume that they exist but only adopts a language which allows him to connect
various laws which would otherwise appear unrelated without theoretical terms. So
James refrains from bestowing on theoretical terms, which are subjective
innovations, any objective existence. In this respect, James seems to be in agreement
with Comte who was particularly uneasy about allowing scientists to make
hypotheses about unobservable entities for the danger lay in the fact that the success
of these theories may encourage scientists to consider these entities as having
physical reality.
Thus James assigns to sensory experience a major role in understanding empirical
phenomena while envisaging theoretical entities as ontologically dependent on
observational terms or empirical experience without being reduced to them. Here the
32James, SPP, n90.
53James was familiar with Poincare's works: Science et methode (1908); Science et I'hypothese
(1902); La Valeur de la science (1905). According to Perry these works by Poincare were among
those sold from James's library. See Notes in PRAG, 161-62. The last book has the entry
"pragmatism 44, 53, 57-58, 90, 125" on the flyleaf.
54Poincare, Science and Hypothesis, 103-04.
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act of postulation plays a pivotal role in this pragmatic view of theoretical terms.
These terms are postulated as a matter of procedure and justified by the way in
which they work.
The fact that they work in a certain interpretation of a certain physical phenomena
secures grounds for asserting them. James calls theoretical terms 'ejects.'55 Those
ejects are like "the contents of our neighbors' minds."56 They are the sorts of things
that we "can never get face to face".57 James seems to distinguish between 'ejects'
and 'imperceptibles' or 'unobservables'. He refers to atoms and ether-waves or
dissociated 'ions' as imperceptibles. Ejects are then those things that are not liable to
immediate confrontation with facts. The fact that such theoretical entities exist
constitutes one of James's main objections to the correspondence theory of truth,
which will be dealt with later.
James talks about 'ejects' in The Meaning of Truth. For James, experience is
ontologically prior to the self-transcendency of our ideas and their truth. Knowledge
consists of external relations which are real and have mostly a virtual rather than an
actual existence. But
[wjhat would the self-transcendency affirmed to exist in advance of all
experiential mediation or termination, be known-as? What would it
practically result in for us, were it true?
It could only result in our orientation, in the turning of our
expectations and practical tendencies into the right path; and the right path
here, so long as we and the object are not yet face to face (or can never get
face to face, as in the case of ejects), would be the path that led us into the
object's nearest neighborhood. Where direct acquaintance is lacking,
'knowledge-about' is the next best thing, and an acquaintance with what
actually lies about the object, and is most closely related to it, puts such
knowledge within our grasp. Ether-waves and your anger, for example, are
things in which my thoughts will never perceptually terminate, but my




concepts of them lead me to their very brink, to the chromatic fringes and to
the hurtful words and deeds which are their really next effects.58
In SPP, the following passage is so important that it must be examined closely.
Discussing concepts and percepts in physics, James writes:
The 'rationalization' of any mass of perceptual fact consists in assimilating
its concrete terms, one by one, to so many terms of the conceptual series,
and then assuming that the relations intuitively found among the latter are
what connect the former too. Thus we rationalize gas-pressure by
identifying it with the blows of hypothetic molecules; then we see that the
more closely the molecules are crowded the more frequent the blows upon
the containing walls will become; then we discern the exact proportionality
of the crowding with the number of blows; so that finally Mariotte's
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empirical law gets rationally explained. All our transformations of the
sense-order into a more rational equivalent are similar to this one. We
interrogate the beautiful apparition, as Emerson calls it, which our senses
ceaselessly raise upon our path, and the items there refer us to their
interpretants in the shape of ideal constructions in some static arrangement
which our mind has already made out of its concepts alone. The
interpretants are then substituted for the sensations, which thus get rationally
conceived. To 'explain' means to coordinate, one to one, the thises of the
perceptual flow with the whats of the ideal manifold, whichever it be. . . .
The conceptual order into which we translate our experience seems not only
a means of practical adaptation, but the revelation of a deeper level of
reality in things. Being more constant, it is truer, less illusory than the
perceptual order, and ought to command our attention more.60
The observation of certain physical phenomena, like that of the gas molecules, goes
with an interpretation of these phenomena. An experiment in physics does consist of
both elements. The interpretation that the scientist provides of the phenomenon
under investigation substitutes for the relevant concrete data that were collected, the
abstract and symbolic representations, the 'ideal constructions' which are the
products of the mind alone. The abstract representations correspond to the concrete
data on account of the theories already accepted by the physicist. The observational
58James, MT, 68-69.
59According to Mariotte's law, at a constant temperature, the volumes occupied by a constant mass of




data are rationalised by the formulation of a physical law, such as Mariotte's law,
which summarises the great number of experiments, past, present and future, that are
carried out.
Although James talks about the correspondence between concrete perceptual data
and the abstract conceptual formulations of them, and the translation of the former to
the latter, in the process of law formation, this does not imply that his intention is to
regard perceptual data as equivalent to abstract formulae. For as he already said, the
conceptual or the abstract is a higher and deeper level than the concrete. The
implications of what James is claiming now require examination.
The abstract being, as James has described, a more sophisticated kind of entity
compared to the perceptual suggests that the correspondence which he claims
between the conceptual formulation or abstract formula and the concrete fact does
not imply an equivalence between the two. The lack of equivalence suggests either
that the abstract formula does not furnish a satisfactory representation of the concrete
fact, or that the concrete fact cannot be the precise realisation of the abstract formula.
From this lack of satisfactoriness between the exact abstract formulae and the
corresponding concrete or perceptual facts, it may be argued with some justification
that the concrete facts may correspond to many incompatible theoretical formulae.
James also sees the way we rationalise sense experiences in general to be basically
the same as the way we rationalise experiments in physics, i.e., by producing
physical laws. James is assuming that in the same way that the laws of physics are
essentially grounded on the outcome of experiments, laws of common sense are
grounded on the observation of facts.
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James cites the example of Mariotte's law in the above quotation without any further
explanation of this generalisation. According to this law, volume, temperature and
mass are concepts61 which are both abstract and representations of the results of
experiments which acquire their meanings from the physical theories accepted by
physicists. The way these representations correspond to the things they symbolise is
far too complex in the way of formulation than the way in which abstract concepts
refer to perceptual data, where concepts rise from reality more immediately and
naturally.
5. MULTIPLICITY OF SCIENTIFIC FORMULAE AND CRITERIA OF
CHOICE
James said earlier that our dealings with physical phenomena might produce a
number of several formulae all of which explain phenomena equally and also are
consistent with facts.62 If the choice should be made between a number of like
competing formulae, on what grounds can it be made? In MT, James gives the
following in answer.
The suspicion is in the air nowadays that the superiority of one of our
formulas to another may not consist so much in its literal 'objectivity,' as in
subjective qualities like its usefulness, its 'elegance' or its congruity with
our residual beliefs.63
Also in WB, James makes a similar point. He says that
of two conceptions equally fit to satisfy the logical demand, that one which
awakens the active impulses, or satisfies other aesthetic demands better than
61




the other, will be accounted the more rational conception, and will
deservedly prevail.64
The application of a description does not preclude the 'simultaneous' application of
another entirely different description to the same empirical phenomena. The
procedure of selecting between competing descriptions, where the method of
reduction is not applicable, is based on subjective criteria such as those of simplicity
and elegance.66
Again the emphasis is shown in the following:
Truth in science is what gives us the maximum possible sum of
satisfactions, taste included, but consistency both with previous truth and
with novel fact is always the most imperious claimant.66
James here is offering a definition of truth in science which sums up his views about
it. His definition here is circular, but this is not the main issue at present. It is
important to be cautious as to how to interpret what James is saying. Several points
can be made here in this respect.
(1) Since literal objectivity is no longer the sole criterion for the choice between rival
theories, it becomes necessary to resort to other criteria that would assist us in
selecting between them.
(2) The choice between two or more scientific formulae is made on the basis of
subjective qualities only after it has been established in experience that these
formulae are equally empirically well-evidenced. Hence, the empirical verifiability
of scientific formulae is the primary condition of their truth. Subjective qualities





not necessary. They do not constitute an alternative to the fundamental condition of
verifiability. Thus, it can be said that satisfaction is contingent on verifiability.
(3) The consistency of a scientific verifiable hypothesis with previous acquired truths
and with new facts is one type of satisfaction to which James gives great emphasis. It
is considered the most important in comparison with other varieties of satisfaction
such as usefulness, elegance, taste, and simplicity and other possibilities.67 These
might include, for example, the satisfaction felt by the investigator when the
hypothesis he embarked on testing get verified. Furthermore, during the actual
process of verification, there are also the feelings of anticipation that the required
sought-after result will actually be achieved.
(4) James is not saying that a scientific theory is true iff holding it gives one the most
satisfaction possible, in the ordinary sense of the term.
Duhem shares with James his emphasis on the appeal to subjective criteria when
selecting among rival scientific formulae or theories. He argues that we are often
likely to have many conflicting theories that are consistent with our observations,
whatever those may be. However,
[i]f two different theories represent the same facts with the same degree of
approximation, physical method considers them as having absolutely the
same validity; it does not have the right to dictate our choice between these
two equivalent theories and is bound to leave us free. No doubt the physicist
will choose between these logically equivalent theories, but the motives
which will dictate his choice will be considerations of elegance, simplicity,
67The criteria of simplicity, taste and elegance and consistency apply to both scientific and
metaphysical theories. In a letter to R. B. Perry, dated August 4, 1907, James writes: "My position is
that, other things equal, emotional satisfactions count for truth—among the other things being the
intellectual satisfactions. Certainly a doctrine that encouraged immortality would draw beliefmore
than one that didn't, if it were exactly as satisfactory in residual respects. Of course it couldn't prevail
against knock-down evidence to the contrary; but where there is no such evidence, it will incline
belief." Perry, II, 475. James makes the same point again in the following quotation. "When I say that,
other things being equal, the view of things that seems more satisfactory morally will legitimately be
treated by men as truer than the view that seems less so, they quote me as saying that anything
morally satisfactory can be treated as true, no matter how unsatisfactory it may be from the point of
view of its consistency with what we already know or believe to be true about physical or natural
facts. Which is rot!!" Perry, II, 468.
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and convenience, and grounds of suitability which are essentially subjective,
contingent, and variable with time, with schools, and with persons; as
serious as these motives may be in certain cases, they will never be of a
nature that necessitates adhering to one of the two theories and rejecting the
other, for only the discovery of a fact that would be represented by one of
the theories, and not by the other, would result in a forced option.68
This passage exemplifies clearly the dilemma inherent in being faced with
conflicting and apparently equally well-evidenced theories.
6. THREE VIEWPOINTS OF APPROACHING REALITY
James argues that reality can be interpreted from at least one point of view. In
Pragmatism, he distinguishes between three different ways of approaching it.
There are . . . at least three well-characterized levels, stages or types of
thought about the world we live in, and the notions of one stage have one
kind of merit, those of another stage another kind. It is impossible, however,
to say that any stage as yet in sight is absolutely more true than any other.69
The viewpoints from which the reality of physical objects in the world can be
approached are the common sense, the scientific and the philosophical. On this
particular issue, James writes:
There is no ringing conclusion possible when we compare these types of
thinking, with a view to telling which is the more absolutely true. Their
naturalness, their intellectual economy, their fruitfulness for practice, all
start up as distinct tests of their veracity. . . . Common sense is better for one
sphere of life, science for another, philosophic criticism for a third; but
whether either be truer absolutely, Heaven knows. Just now ... we are
witnessing a curious reversion to the common-sense way of looking at
physical nature, in the philosophy of science favored by such men as Mach,
Ostwald and Duhem. According to these teachers no hypothesis is truer than
any other in the sense of being a more literal copy of reality. They are all but




their use. The only literally true thing is reality; and the only reality we
know is, for these logicians, sensible reality, the flux of our sensations and
emotions as they pass. 'Energy' is the collective name (according to
Ostwald) for the sensations just as they present themselves (the movement,
heat, magnetic pull, or light, or whatever it may be) when they are measured
in certain ways. So measuring them, we are enabled to describe the
correlated changes which they show us, in formulas matchless for their
simplicity and fruitfulness for human use. They are sovereign triumphs of
economy in thought.
No one can fail to admire the 'energetic' philosophy. But the
hypersensible entities, the corpuscles and vibrations, hold their own with
most physicists and chemists, in spite of its appeal. It seems too economical
to be all-sufficient. Profusion, not economy, may after all be reality's
key-note.70
There are several essential points to be stressed here. To begin with, we are
presented with one of James's various, and indeed inconsistent, treatments of the
nature of reality. Here, James is reporting the tendency in the philosophy of science,
of positivistic persuasion, which was flourishing then, which is based on a certain
interpretation of physical theories. The scientists to whom James was referring were
essentially positivists with an energetistic or phenomenological bearings.
To refer again to the views of Duhem, it was noted that he regarded physical theory
not as an explanation but as a method of classification of physical phenomena. It
consists, he tells us, of a system of mathematical propositions whose function is to
represent in a most possible, simple and economical way experimental laws.71 In this
sense, a physical theory does not reveal to us the inner depths of reality but is
confined to being merely a convenient and logical classification of observable
phenomena. Mach also conceived of a physical theory as an economy of thought and
so, experimental laws are held to be reduced to theories. The goal of science thus
79





It must be said that Duhem's view of the nature of physical theory seems to suggest,
as it actually did to some scientists and philosophers that reality is ultimately
phenomenal. But, he was careful to point out, nonetheless, that physical theories,
without any claim to reveal any information about a deeper kind of reality, do in fact
through the logical order in which experimental laws are arranged, reflect an
ontological order.73
James also expresses his discontent with a view that takes sensible reality as the only
reality that we know. Such a scientific point of view, he argues, though it has its
merits, is inadequate; sense reality is just too narrow to encompass other realities
which he considers as existing. In MT, while defending himself against the charge of
subjectivism, James gives the following distinctions between different kinds of
ontologies.
Cognitively we . . . live under a sort of rule of three: as our private concepts
represent the sense-objects to which they lead us, these being public realities
independent of the individual, so these sense-realities may, in turn, represent
realities of a hypersensible order, electrons, mind-stuff, God, or what not,
existing independently of all human thinkers. The notion of such final
realities, knowledge of which would be absolute truth, is an outgrowth of
our cognitive experience. . . . They form an inevitable regulative postulate in
everyone's thinking. Our notion of them is the most abundantly suggested
and satisfied of all our beliefs, the last to suffer doubt.74
James tells us that hypersensible realities, which include theoretical terms such as
electron, are the kind of realities that exist independently of all human knowledge.
How, then, can we know realities characterised as such? We can never attain a sure
knowledge of them. This does not mean, however, that we can never have any
knowledge of them of any kind whatsoever. When we think of them, we think of less




human thinkers. The reason why we postulate these hypersensible realities is that
they help us to organise our thinking and ordering our experiences.
According to this view of the role of hypersensible realities, the purpose of science is
not the establishment of structures of the external world by scientists. Rather, its aim
is to order our experiences. What makes one theory better than another is not how
much it depicts the exact structure of the world, but how good it proves at expanding
the limits of our experiences and bringing them to order. If the aim of science is to
formulate abstract structures of the world, then it is likely that no immediate
correspondence can be found between those mental structures and the world itself.
James is offering an interpretation of the relation of 'agreement' between ideas and
reality that goes beyond the simple correspondence between these two.
The first class of entities, to which James refers in the previous quotation, are the
private concepts which represent the 'sense objects' and as such are subjective
experiences. 'Sense objects' which belong to the second class are characterised as
public realities which are independent of the individual and are representative of the
hypersensible realities. These sense objects are both subjective and objective
realities. They are subjective because they are sense realities and so belong to the
domain of experience. They are also objective realities because they exist, as James
says, independently of the individual. Hence, in that respect they are public. Here
James is offering a distinctive characterisation of experience as not being only
subjective but also objective.
Suppose I say to you "The thing exists"—is that true or not? How can you
tell? Not till my statement has developed its meaning farther is it determined
as being true, false, or irrelevant to reality altogether. But if now you ask
"what thing?" and 1 reply "a desk"; if you ask "where?" and 1 point to a
place; if you ask "does it exist materially, or only in imagination?" and I say
"materially"; ifmoreover I say "I mean that desk," and then grasp and shake
a desk which you see just as 1 have described it, you are willing to call my
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statement true. But you and I are commutable here; we can exchange places;
and as you go bail for my desk, so I can go bail for yours.75
Here James seems to be attempting to bridge the gap between subjective realities and
objective realities; between the knower, the subjective individual, and the external
world of physical objects. But his outright renunciation of the existing of this
metaphysical and epistemological gap is put forward in his ERE, where he examines
the reality that underlies the common-sense objects of the external world and
concludes that experience is the sole and ultimate reality. Thus there is no need to
appeal either to the Absolute, as did Royce, as the sole possible bridge between the
subjective knower and the known object, or to scepticism acknowledging the
impossibility of the existing of an appropriate epistemological relationship between
subject and object, for there is simply no gap to be bridged.
As already noted, James had approached the problem of reality from two different
perspectives. At one stage, the problem of reality was for him the problem of the
reality of physical objects. In this respect, he distinguished between three viewpoints
from which this question can be approached. At another stage, he answers this
problem from a metaphysical viewpoint by inquiring into the fundamental reality
that underlies the objects of common sense. In the present discussion, the main
concern was the first stage and there is, therefore, no expansion of the second.
75James, MT, 117.
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7. THE NEW TREND OF SCIENTIFIC LOGIC AND A VERSION OF
HOLISM
In Pragmatism, lecture II: What Pragmatism means, James argues that on his
pragmatic outlook, theories do not provide definite answers to the riddles of the
universe. Theories are merely instruments which we hold to enable us to deal
effectively with reality. Pragmatism calls for a change of direction away from first
things and principles to last things, consequences and facts.76 This is what the
pragmatic method means for James, but pragmatism is also, as he continues to say, a
certain theory of truth. He then refers favourably to the new trend of scientific logic
which has been developed by Duhem, Poincare, Mach and others. John Dewey and
F. C. S. Schiller, James tells us, were
[rjiding ... on the front of this wave of scientific logic . . . with their
pragmatistic account of what truth everywhere signifies. Everywhere, these
teachers say, 'truth' in our ideas and beliefs means the same thing that it
means in science. It means . . . that ideas (which themselves are but parts of
our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into
satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience . . . Any idea upon
which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously
from any one part of our experience, to any other part, linking things
satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so
much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally.11
What is this new procedure which James reports enthusiastically? James tells us that
the procedure by which Dewey and Schiller arrive at their conception of truth is the
same as that which is followed by geologists, biologists and philologists and offers
proven success. It consists of taking "some simple process actually observable in
operation - as denudation by weather, say, or variation from parental type, or change





• 78it." How any individual settles on new opinions, is one good example of Dewey's
and Schiller's application of this procedure, which James chooses to examine.
According to this view, ascribed to both philosophers by James, the individual
encounters a new experience which puts strains on the 'stock of old opinions'
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already held. This causes an 'inward trouble' for the individual investigator which
he tries to avoid by 'modifying his previous mass of opinions.' However, this
modification must be carried out with the 'minimum disturbance' of the old stock of
beliefs, and most of it is retained, "for in this matter of belief', James says, "we are
all extreme conservatives."80 Consequently, the investigator attempts first at
changing
this opinion, and then that (for they resist change very variously), until at
last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the ancient stock with
a minimum of disturbance of the latter, some idea that mediates between the
stock and the new experience and runs them into one another most
felicitously and expediently.
This new idea is then adopted as the true one. It preserves the older
stock of truths with a minimum ofmodification, stretching them just enough
to make them admit the novelty, but conceiving that in ways as familiar as
the case leaves possible.81
The reference in the above quotation to the new trend of thinking, championed by
Duhem and other scientists, seems to indicate that for James, beliefs in general are
not tested individually but holistically. Both Duhem and James are presenting
versions of holism. But while Duhem's holism is restricted to descriptive sciences
such as physics, James's own version of holism applies to both cognitive and
non-cognitive systems of beliefs. In this respect, James had gone beyond Duhem.
Duhem's description of what is involved in the process by which the physicist tests a






investigator in acquiring new beliefs, as viewed by James. For Duhem and James,
propositions scientific or, in the case of James, these and others, are tested in
conjunction with the old stock of beliefs and both emphasise the investigator's
concern to save as much of the old stock of beliefs as possible. James adheres to his
originally accepted beliefs as the ones that he considers to be accurate. If confronted
with a belief or a new experience82 that contradicts them, then this new belief should
either be abandoned or the old beliefs modified. James also held that the new idea
had to make the least possible modification to the previously held beliefs. This
implies that in the course of testing a new belief, James considers that those old
beliefs are accurate and thus should be preserved in the face of a new belief.
Duhem argued for the denial of the existence of crucial experiments in science. A
theory can never be absolutely refuted by any experimental observation, for many
subsidiary empirical presuppositions are made when a scientific theory is subjected
to observational examination. In this process of testing, what appear to be negative
observations could be regarded as evidence of the falsity of one or another of those
subsidiary presuppositions rather than of the theory itself.84 It follows that
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experimental observation can never put a theory to total refutation.
It is now appropriate to mention one of Duhem's theses which is relevant to the
criterion of consistency of theory choice which we have mentioned earlier. In
science, according to Duhem, when a physicist wishes to examine a proposition, he
does not test it individually but he also put to test the whole set of theories that he
accepts.
82It might be worthwhile to point out that James's use of experience, as in the previous quotation, is
not limited to sense experience. A new experience might mean: "Somebody contradicts them; or in a
reflective moment he discovers that they contradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they
are incompatible; or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy." James, PRAG, 34-35.
8jThis view is succinctly put by Quine when he says that our theories "face the tribunal of sense
experience not individually but only as a corporate body." Quine, From a Logical Point of View, 41.
84Duhem, Aim, 185.
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The prediction of the phenomenon . . . does not derive from the proposition
challenged if taken by itself, but from the proposition at issue joined to that
whole group of theories; if the predicted phenomenon is not produced, not
only is the proposition questioned at fault, but so is the whole theoretical
scaffolding used by the physicist. The only thing the experiment teaches us
is that among the propositions used to predict the phenomenon and to
establish whether it would be produced, there is at least one error; but where
this error lies is just what it does not tell us. The physicist may declare that
this error is contained in exactly the proposition he wishes to refute, but is
he sure it is not in another proposition? If he is, he accepts implicitly the
accuracy of all the other propositions he has used, and the validity of his
conclusion is as great as the validity of his confidence.83
In sum, the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to
experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; when the
experiment is in disagreement with his predictions, what he learns is that at
least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and ought
to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be
changed. . . . People generally think that each one of the hypotheses
employed in physics can be taken in isolation, checked by experiment, and
then, when many varied tests have established its validity, given a definitive
place in the system of physics. In reality, this is not the case. Physics is not a
machine which lets itself be taken apart; we cannot try each piece in
isolation and, in order to adjust it, wait until its solidity has been carefully
checked. Physical science is a system that must be taken as a whole; it is an
organism in which one part cannot be made to function except when the
parts that are most remote from it are called into play, some more so than
others, but all to some degree.86
8. METAPHYSICS, PHYSICS AND PSYCHOLOGY
Duhem argued strongly for the complete separation of physics from metaphysics. A
close study of the history of scientific theories convinced him that they are not the
means to capture the inner depths of reality. Scientists employ physical theories
merely in classifying physical phenomena in order to help in comprehending them. If
one wants to dig deeper into reality, then, Duhem says, physical theories are not the




Duhem's total and strong separation of physics from metaphysics is not motivated
by a rejection of metaphysics. On the contrary, his aim in arguing for their separation
was to suggest for metaphysics a different basis other than physics, allowing thereby
room for metaphysical and religious beliefs. Hence, Duhem argued that physical
theories do not furnish an explanation of reality itself. He writes that
to explain (explicate, explicare) is to strip reality of the appearances
covering it like a veil, in order to see the bare reality itself.87
To consider physical theory as an explanation is to regard its purpose as the going
beyond the appearances and arriving at a full grasp of the physical reality underlying
them. That requires an acknowledgement of a reality distinct from the appearances
which are all that we encounter in observing. Thus we are confronted with the
questions of whether there exists a reality which transcends appearances and of the
nature of this reality, if it really exists. For Duhem, physics, as an experimental
science, cannot provide answers to both questions. This job is left to metaphysics to
deal with. Thus, he says that
if the aim ofphysical theories is to explain experimental laws, theoretical
physics is not an autonomous science; it is subordinate to metaphysics,88
The danger of this conclusion lies in the fact that the different and rival schools of
metaphysics, with physicists among their followers, each school with its own
methods, principles and conclusions, may extend their divisions into the domain of
physics. Duhem expresses this point in the following.
In order for the philosophers belonging to a certain school to declare
themselves completely satisfied with a theory constructed by the physicists
of the same school, all the principles used in this theory would have to be




made, in the course of the explanation of a physical phenomenon, to some
law which that metaphysics is powerless to justify, then no explanation will
be forthcoming and physical theory will have failed in its aim.89
Furthermore, physical theories do not derive completely from any metaphysical
doctrine. For "no metaphysics gives instruction exact enough or detailed enough to
make it possible to derive all the elements of a physical theory from it."90 It is thus
the case that in a physical theory, "there are always posited certain hypotheses which
do not have as their grounds the principles of the metaphysical doctrine."91 This
resulting confusion can only be avoided, in Duhem's view, by calling for the
independence of physics from metaphysics. This can be legitimately achieved,
Duhem argued, by holding a view of physical theory along the following lines.
A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical
propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to
represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of
experimental laws.92
Thus, mathematical laws are in themselves economical statements of experience.
However, they convincingly offer a suggestion of some transcendent order, that must
echo some harmony subsisting out there in reality. This harmony is not truly
represented by either mechanical models or pictorial images or any other form of
hypothesis. Our access to this harmony is possible through discerning natural
classifications among the laws of nature. By 'natural' Duhem means that which
reflects the relations of things in the natural order, though not their actual structure.
Proper classification guarantees the capacity of theory to guide experiment in the







This positivistic thesis of the separation of the natural sciences from metaphysics,
which originates with Comte, had also a deep influence on James. Its effects are well
manifested in his dealings with the relations between metaphysics and psychology in
his classic work The Principles ofPsychology. In PP, he offered a new starting-point
for psychology. In the preface to PP, published in 1890, he declares that psychology
could only become a science if it were treated positivistically and thus separated
from metaphysics. He tells us that this 'strictly positivistic point of view' is the only
feature of his book for which he feels 'tempted to claim originality.'93 In the preface
to the Italian translation of the PP,94 he again stresses the importance of treating
psychology as a positive science; setting forth exactly what he means by the claim
that psychology must be established in a similar manner to the other natural sciences.
Thus, he writes:
1 thought that by frankly putting psychology in the position of a natural
science, eliminating certain metaphysical questions from its scope
altogether, and confining myself to what could be immediately verified by
everyone's own consciousness, a a [sic] central mass of experience could be
described, which everyone might accept as certain, no matter what the
differing ulterior philosophic interpretations of it might be. I therefore
assumed uncritically an external world, I assumed the existence of states of
consciousness, and I assumed that the states of consciousness might "know"
both the external world and each other.93
Every science, then, assumes uncritically certain data; avoiding questioning their
origins and the problems that might continually surface about them. Hence, natural
sciences assume an external physical world that exists independently of
9jJames, PP, I, 6. It can be argued that James's claim for the originality of his project of establishing
psychology as a positivist science might be based on the fact that Comte did not include psychology
in his classification of the natural sciences. He held that it is not easy to ascertain laws between
mental phenomena, in the way that this can be done in physics, for example.
94This preface to Ferrari's Italian translation of The Principles ofPsychology was written ten years
after it was first published. It was mailed to Ferrari on October 28, 1900. See PP, III, Appendix III,
1482-84.
95James, PP, 111, 1483.
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consciousness. If psychology is to follow the example of the natural sciences, then it
must avoid metaphysical hypotheses and content itself with assuming uncritically
(1) thoughts andfeelings, and (2) aphysical world in time and space with
which they coexist and which (3) they know.96
Thus, psychologists leave to the metaphysicians questions such as whether there is a
deeper unity between subject and object, the real or deep nature of minds and
whether 'thoughts' can possibly know objects in general.97 Treating psychology as a
positive science, however, imposes some restrictions on what psychology can
actually achieve. James is careful to indicate the nature of these limitations. We
must, he says,
ask ourselves whether, after all, the ascertainment of a blank unmediated
correspondence, term for term, of the succession ofstates of consciousness
with the succession of total brain-processes, be not the simplest
psycho-physic formula, and the last word of a psychology which contents
itselfwith verifiable laws, and seeks only to be clear, and to avoid unsafe
hypotheses,98
Psychology, then, as a positive science is concerned only with the ascertainment of
lawful empirical correlations between brain states and mental states. It does not
attempt to plunge into regions which are "inaccessible to experience and
verification."99
James's remarks on the extent to which his project might succeed are barely
consistent. In 1890, for instance, he expresses his dissatisfaction with the results of
his research by describing it as "testifying to nothing but two facts: 1st, that there is
%James, PP, I, 6.
97James, "A Plea for Psychology as a 'Natural Science'" in EP, 271.
98James, PP, I, 182.
"James, PP (1981), I, 180.
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no such thing as a science of psychology, and 2nd, that W. J. is an incapable."100 In
1892, he shows strong support for his project of PP by remarking that "I wished, by
treating Psychology like a natural science, to help her to become one."101 Later in
1895, he suggests that the project of establishing psychology as a positivist science
seems to be impossible. He writes:
I have become convinced since publishing that book that no conventional
restrictions can keep metaphysical and so-called epistemological inquiries
out of the psychology-books.102
In light of the various comments that James made in support of his programme of
PP, one can with some justification give little attention to the negative ones.
However, this requires an investigation of the reasons that might underlie his
questioning the very possibility of his project. Several points can be made in this
context.
(1) The separation of psychology from metaphysics, in James's view, is only
provisional. In the conclusion of PBC, James says we must understand
how great is the darkness in which we grope, and never to forget that the
natural-science assumptions with which we started are provisional and
revisabie things.103
However, this separation seems at this stage of the development of psychology, in
James's view, most appropriate for the following reasons. To hold that the
assumptions of psychology are problematic while deciding to treat them as
unproblematic would allow the psychologist to focus on the examination of
psychological phenomena with the hope of arriving at results that could be subjected
to empirical verification. This does not suggest, however, that James is denying the
l00Letter to Henry Holt, dated May 9, 1890, LWJ, I, 294.




significance of the metaphysical problems concerning these phenomena or the
capability of metaphysics to deal with them ultimately. Once psychology as a
science is formed, it will then "fall a prey to philosophical reflection."104
(2) James's project of establishing psychology as a natural science is also deeply
motivated by his interest in the development of psychical research and his concerns
with the treatment of mental illnesses. Thus psychologists could conduct their
investigations into such phenomena without worrying about resolving metaphysical
problems.
The 'psychical researchers,' though kept at present somewhat out in the
cold, will inevitably conquer the recognition which their labors also
deserve, and will make, perhaps, the most important contributions of all to
the pile. But, as I just remarked, few of these persons have any aptitude or
fondness for general philosophy; they have quite as little as the
pure-blooded philosophers have for discovering particular facts.103
Later in his life, James became much interested in psychical research. He was very
sympathetic towards the American Society of Psychical Research which was
dedicated to the exploration of the abnormal and 'supernormal' phenomena like
clairvoyance and apparitions. In a letter to Carl Stumpf, dated Jan 1886, James
acknowledges the fact that there is much room for deception in these investigations
but that he believes that
there is no source of deception in the investigation of nature which can
compare with a fixed belief that certain kinds of phenomenon are
impossible.106
In WB, he warns that if such investigations are to be taken seriously by academic
scientists, they should produce 'facts', the sort of facts accepted by academic
104James, "A Plea for Psychology as a 'Natural Science'" in EP, 275.
105James, "A Plea for Psychology as a 'Natural Science'" in EP, 272-73.
106James, LWJ, I, 248.
• • 107
scientists. James thought that the temperament of investigators, in this case of
members of the society, or their theoretical inclination would not make a difference
because their task is to
ascertain in a manner so thorough as to constitute evidence that will be
accepted by outsiders, just what the phenomenal conditions of certain
concrete phenomenal occurrences are. Not till that is done, can spiritualistic
or anti-spiritualistic theories be even mooted.108
As a matter of policy, however, James later pointed out, the choice of the officers in
this particular society is confined to scientists. The reason is not that
scientific men are necessarily better judges of all truth than others, but that
their adhesion would popularly seem better evidence than the adhesion of
others, in the matter. And what we want is not only truth, but evidence.109
The talk of 'isms' is irrelevant. '"Facts' are what are wanted."110 In order that these
wild facts which are so discontinuous be legitimised, success must be achieved in
naturalising them as a branch of 'legitimate science'.111 In a letter to his sister Alice,
dated July 6, 1891, James expresses his disappointment in the inability of science to
account for the new findings concerning human psychology. This has made him, he
says, "to turn for light in the direction of all sorts of despised spiritualistic and
unscientific ideas."112 However, James took no active role in the work of the society
after 1896.113
107Here James distinguishes between 'facts', like those accepted by academic scientists, and what he
calls 'wild facts'; those with 'no stall or pigeon-hole', like those accepted by the 'feminine-mystical'
mind.
108James, LWJ, I, 250.
l09James, LWJ, I, 250.
"°James, LWJ, 1,250.
"'James, LWJ, I, 306.
"2James, LWJ, I, 310.
"3James, LWJ, II, 286.
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(3) In PP, James, the psychologist, defended a 'thoroughgoing dualism' which
assumes two elements, thoughts and objects which are irreducible.114 A thorough
overhaul of these assumptions, James tells us, is the task of metaphysics."5 In his
later writings, James, as a metaphysician, held that this dualism couldn't be
maintained as ultimate. He argued for the philosophical position known as radical
empiricism according to which thoughts and objects are revealed as accidentally
co-given in our experience though they are distinguishable. According to radical
empiricism,
things and thought are not at all fundamentally heterogeneous; they are
made of one and the same stuff which as such cannot be defined but only
experienced; and which, if one wishes, one can call the stuff of experience
in general.116
James appeals to the stuff of pure experience wherein subject and object are not
experientially given as separate entities, but rather as essentially relational. What
experience presents in its immediacy is the object and subject in an inseparable
bond. The 'subjective' consciousness is always inseparable from the content of
experience. James proposes that what we suppose to exist is only the content of
consciousness, not consciousness as an entity. Thus radical empiricism denies the
straightforward conception of intentionality of consciousness, that it is about
something, and endorses "its aboutness as a function which it only performs by way
of its consequences in further experience."117
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to examine closely James's formulation of
radical empiricism. It might have some degree of relevance, however, to point out
that the focus of some commentators on James's PP, while overlooking his later
"4James, PP (1891), 1,218.
ll5James, PP (1891), I, vi.
"6James, ERE, 271.
"7Sprigge, James & Bradley, 110.
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writings, in particular, his ERE, has inspired at least one major interpretation of
James according to which James features as proto-transcendental phenomenologist;
the pioneering soul of the phenomenologist movement. The examination will not be
attempted on the detail of this interpretation of James, but some comments may
suffice here.
Bruce Wilshire, for example, in his William James and Phenomenology, argues that
James discovered the essential phenomenological themes prior to and independently
of the work of Husserl. James made the 'phenomenological breakthrough' by his
discovery of the law of the intentionality of consciousness, yet he was unaware of its
implications. The difficulties that James was confronted with in his programme for a
'natural scientific psychology' arise from his assumption of a dualism of states of
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consciousness, on one hand, and of brain states, on the other. Thus, when James
sought to identify conscious states, he realised that conscious states could not be
identified independently of their 'cognitive objects.'119 To be able to investigate the
relationship between conscious states and brain states, Wilshire argues, James must
first identify conscious states independently of their cognitive objects.
James's de facto tendency to specify mental states in terms of their
cognitive objects has significant repercussions. I believe that this
tendency—or latent strand as I call it—can be profitably discussed within
the conceptual framework of the phenomenological concept of
intentionality. . . . More than this, however, I believe that the latent strand
in James's Principles can be discussed profitably within the conceptual
framework of the phenomenological doctrine of the lived world or
Lebenswelt.120
So, while struggling with this problem, James discovers, Wilshire tells us, the notion
of intentionality. Conscious states always deal with 'objects' that transcend
"8Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology, 11-13.
"9Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology, 17-19.
l20Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology, 18.
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themselves; they always intend the objects of which they are conscious. Hence the
collapse of James's dualistic programme. According to Wilshire, James was also
unable to identify the objects of consciousness without identifying them as part and
parcel of the whole 'world of practical realities.'121 Here James arrived at the
phenomenological idea of 'Lebenswelt', as Wilshire puts it, 'the companion notion
to intentionality', i.e., the life-world within which he can identify conscious states.
However, a comparison between the specific features of consciousness revealed by
James's natural scientific psychology and those revealed by Husserl's
phenomenology would guide us in deciding on the soundness or otherwise of
Wilshire's views. Taking into account James's intention of establishing psychology
as a natural science of 'finite individual minds' and the features of consciousness
which he laid down, as a living, striving and selecting agency, something active,
changing and adapting, one finds James's views in sharp contrast with the view of
consciousness that Husserl seems to be defending.
For Husserl, intentionality is the main theme of phenomenology, the truth of which
is an a priori truth.122 This implies that a truth as such is not discovered by empirical
inquiry or by a natural scientific study. It is evident that James and Husserl hold
contrasting views of consciousness. James's view of human consciousness differs
from Husserl's phenomenological view of it. James would regard Husserl's view of
consciousness as essentially 'intentional', as psychologically unrealistic. For James,
the cognitive function of consciousness has no significance apart from its relation to
the knower's purposes and private interests. Hence, James argues that
,,123 •
"consciousness is at all times primarily a selecting agency. " He writes:
121Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology, 19.
l22Husserl, Ideas, para 36.
l23James, PP (1891), I, 139.
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Every actually existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a
fighter for ends, of which many, but for its presence, would not be ends at
all. Its powers of cognition are mainly subservient to these ends,
discerning which facts further them and which do not.124
Consciousness, in Husserl's terms, is not to be understood as a fighter for ends, but
as intentional. Consciousness understood as such does not create interests or fight for
them. Thus the consciousness that Husserl's phenomenology introduces is only the
epistemic consciousness, not the finite individual consciousness. Therefore,
Wilshire's reading of James is unsound because it distorts James's conclusions about
human consciousness related to his natural scientific psychology.
Husserl's later investigations into consciousness also contrast sharply with James's
later view of consciousness. Although Husserl appeals to lived-experience, he holds
a view of consciousness for which mental acts are inherently intentional. All
straightforward experiences have a complex of latent intentionalities, a complex
explicated in eidetic and transcendental reflection. What is implied in this revealed
intentionality is the pure ego, a notion which has been disputed by James.
It is worth pointing out that the term 'intentionality' never features in James's
discussions of consciousness. In PBC, he abandoned this property as one of the
essential characters of consciousness. His omission of this property should not be
taken as evidence of James's lack of a full grasp of the importance of the distinctions
he was making, as some commentators hold. James's omission of this property
should be explained as a further step in the direction of radical empiricism whereby
consciousness becomes a function of pure experience. Wilshire has ignored the
further development in James's thought which sets him far from transcendental
phenomenology. As for Wilshire's ascription to James the honour of discovering the
l24James, PP (1891), I, 141.
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law of the intentionality of consciousness, it is worth mentioning that this notion of
intentionality known as the fundamental characteristic of consciousness to be a
consciousness of something is not a new insight; traces of a theory of intentionality
can be found as early as Aristotle and continue up to the modern period. Thus
James's application of this property in PP lies wholly within the traditional use,
while it was for Husserl to give it a fully explicit elaboration.
Some commentators have pointed out parallels between Husserl's and James's
thought, namely, their rejection of rationalistic constructions, their appeal to
pure-experience and their questioning the working distinction between mind and
world which was dominant in modern thought. However, these views are also shared
by other philosophers who are neither phenomenologists nor pragmatists. As for
James's later philosophy of radical empiricism, although both he and Husserl started
from a common ground, both developed quite different philosophies. James's
characterisation of thoughts in relation to objects rules out the possibility of an
eidetic or transcendental phenomenology. Thus, James's radical empiricism is in
contrast with Husserl's phenomenological project.
In terms of the influence they exerted on one another, there is evidence on Husserl's
side, expressed in his references to James and in his admiration of James's
philosophical doctrines. He credits James in Logical Investigations with teaching
him how to overcome psychologism, and in the Krisis, with being the first to
describe the horizonal structure of experience in the notion of the 'fringes of
consciousness.' Husserl refers James as '"a daring and original man," an "excellent
investigator," unshackled by any tradition.'125 On James's side, however, one finds a
complete neglect of Husserl, except for James's advice against publishing an English
l25Edie, 'William James and Phenomenology', 489.
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translation of Husserl's book Logische Untersuchungen. At the time, James believed
that "nobody in America would be interested in a new and strange German work on
logic."126
9. THE IMPACT OF COMTEAN POSITIVISM
9.1 SOME REMARKS ONJAMESAND POSITIVISM
The question arises as to how far was James committed to positivism.127 Perry tells
us that in the years 1868-1870 James was a provisional adherent of positivism.
James accepted Chauncy Wright's positivistic view of science according to which,
science is "an inductive discovery of the relations of phenomenal happenings
reduced so far as possible to their elements."128 In Pragmatism, James refers to
Wright as a tough-minded man whose "alpha and omega are facts. " Wright used to
say, James recalls, that "Behind the bare phenomenal facts . . . there is nothing. "129
In WB, James seems to be in agreement with Wright on the limitations of the
positivist view of science. He counts himself among those who believe that
the physical order of nature, taken simply as science knows it, cannot be
held to reveal any one harmonious spiritual intent.130
But already before 1875, Perry tells us, James came to think that positivism is 'both
narrow and arbitrary.' He explains why James thought so:
l26Spiegelberg, The Context of the Phenomenological Movement, 107.
127According to Gillispie, the term positivism was coined by August Comte in the early
nineteenth-century. The Edge ofObjectivity: An Essay in the History ofScientific Ideas, 496.
l28Perry, I, 521, cf. C. Wright, Philosophical Discussions, 1877, 71, 244-50.
l29James, PRAG, 126.
l30James,' Is life worth Living?' in WB, first published in the International Journal ofEthics, October
1895,52.
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For James positivism was not only unresponsive to men's religious hopes, it
was repugnant to common sense and contrary to metaphysics; and in
pointing this out he made it quite evident that his sympathies were with
"common sense and metaphysics."131
Perry maintains that although both James and Wright held similar views on 'actual
experience', their main differences arise from "Wright's profession of positivism,
and . . . from James's avowed sympathy with the rationalistic or transcendental
school."132
Perry's remarks seem to suggest that James's main quarrel with positivism is its
rejection of metaphysics. This denial of metaphysics would leave religion
dissatisfied because of the absence of moral ideals, the ultimate fulfilment of which
is ensured by God. Thus the 'physical order' which science informs us about is only
a 'partial order' that needs to be complemented by spiritual order. Here a distinction
is made between positivism as a world-view and positivism as a method and view of
science. As a world-view, it can be argued, James was unsympathetic to positivism
which he regarded as unsatisfactory. But as a method and a view of science, his
sympathy, it can be shown, remains with it.
We find that the general attitude among some of James's commentators is to
categorise James as anti-positivist, without even trying to examine the main
assumptions of positivism. Dissatisfied with positivism as a world-view, James set
out to reform positivism so that it would accommodate what he thought positivism,




P. 2 SOME TENETS OF COMTEANPOSITIVISM
Positivism is a distinct trend in improved methodological thinking which had
flourished in the nineteenth-century. It was advocated by the eminent French thinker
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) who coined the term 'positivism'. Positivism is
concerned with what there is and what is directly experienced. It has liberated itself
from metaphysics by confining itself to the study of phenomena. Hence, it was in
one way taken to be connected with the phenomenalist theory of knowledge. In more
modern terms, it was linked to the logical positivist movement through its
verificationist theory of meaning. The great achievement of Comte's philosophy of
science was to bring the positive, scientific approach to the study of social
phenomena. J. S. Mill tells us that Comte was the first to attempt the scientific
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extension of the positivist viewpoint to all domains of human knowledge. But
what are the main tenets of Comte's positivist philosophy? There are certain
fundamental features of it which are directly relevant to this discussion of James's
philosophy of science. A summation of the relevant features is offered below.
(1) Hypotheses are essential to scientific inquiry. Knowledge of things can only
progress by the framing of hypotheses, by testing them by observation and
experiment and by modifying them according to the results. Hence, the starting-point
of science is not the collection of facts but the use of hypotheses. Scientific truths are
not established by the gathering data, but by hypotheses.
(2) Hypotheses must be verifiable. From among two or more verifiable hypotheses
which are equally consistent with the phenomena, we opt for the simplest one.
Simplicity is not an alternative to verifiability, which is the most fundamental, but is
applied in conjunction with it.134
lj3Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism, 3.
'^Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, 154.
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(3) Natural sciences set a methodological standard model against which the degrees
of development of all the other sciences may be measured. Any attempt to
investigate the world that does not employ the methods of the empirical sciences
deemed misguided. Metaphysics is one such example.
(4) The only genuine knowledge that is accessible to us is that of phenomena and
their succession expressed in the form of laws. These laws enable us to predict
phenomena. The ultimate causes or essences of phenomena are unknown to us and
thus excluded from the range of possible hypotheses that are candidates for scientific
investigation.
(5) The postulation of theoretical or unobservable entities does not involve any claim
of their objective existence.
(6) The role of the Law of the Three Stages in interpreting the history of science.
These stages are: the theological, the metaphysical and the positive. The first stage is
one in which an attempt is made at explaining facts by reference to the supposition
of extra-phenomenal reality. The second stage of explanation is an intermediate or
transitional one which does not offer a new principle of explanation of facts, it,
rather, fluctuates between the supernatural and the positive. Its explanation of
phenomena, however, is still one that has recourse to something that goes beyond
phenomena - though it is not given by the appeal to the supernatural, but by the use
of certain abstract concepts. The last stage is one where it is only permissible to use
concepts that refer to phenomena only. The criterion that determines their acceptance
or rejection is that of verifiability, since given concepts at this stage refer only to
phenomena.
(7) What we really have as a consequence are two mental attitudes of the human
mind. On the one hand, there is the tendency to pursue the causes and essences of
phenomena in an attempt to explain them and their laws. In this sense, the mind
seeks the knowledge of the absolute. On the other hand, there is the tendency to
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focus on the knowledge of the relative through the satisfaction by the examination of
the phenomena and their laws. The latter enables us to predict new phenomena.
(8) Comte's classification of the sciences includes six fundamental sciences,
mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and sociology. Psychology was
not included in this classification because Comte did not regard the method of the
observation of psychological phenomena as a scientific method that enables us to
discover their laws. Psychological phenomena, according to positivist philosophy,
must be studied in the same way as other natural sciences. Positivist philosophy does
not concern itself with the causes and essences of psychological phenomena. It deals
only with their laws.135
It can be argued that James is fundamentally in agreement with Comte on most, if
not all, of these doctrines. It is hoped that our discussion of the various aspects of
James's view of science does support this claim. James's dissatisfaction with
positivism as a world-view, however, did lead him to make further claims in which
he appears to depart from Comtean positivism in order to accommodate his
sympathy with metaphysics and religion. Firstly, he considers both scientific and
metaphysical propositions of predictive power, while for Comte, predictive power
functions as a criterion for distinguishing scientific propositions from non-scientific
ones. In this sense, he takes metaphysical propositions to be lacking in any predictive
power.136 Secondly, James combines the criterion of predictive power and the
anticipated consequences, either empirical or metaphysical, of a proposition as
determinants of its meaning. In contrast, Comte stresses the predictive power of
propositions (scientific ones only), or simply predictions, because they are
135See the following references which discuss the main claims ofComte's philosophy. Mead,
Movements ofThought in the Nineteenth Century; Appendix: French Philosophy in the Nineteenth
Century, 418-510, Levy-Bruhl, History ofModern Philosophy in France, 375-396 and Mill, J. S.,
A uguste Comte and Positivism.
b6Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, 142.
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empirically testable or verifiable and, in his view, only verifiable propositions are
meaningful.137
James thus protests against the positivists' application of predictive power to
scientific propositions only, thereby excluding metaphysical ones. As said earlier, for
James the predictive power is extended to metaphysical propositions so that a
metaphysical proposition like 'God exists' becomes meaningful if it enables the
believer to anticipate certain consequences which are different from those
consequences anticipated by the non-believer. For James, theism and materialism
are, from an empirical point of view equivalent, in the sense that there is no
sufficient empirical evidence in favour of one as against the other. However, they
differ in the metaphysical consequences that are likely to follow from each. On the
theistic hypothesis we may anticipate the fulfilment of our moral demands which are
guaranteed by God. On the materialist hypothesis, however, we may not. James
describes these meaningful alternatives as follows.
The world may in fact be likened unto a lock, whose inward nature, moral
or unmoral, will never reveal itself to our simply expectant gaze. The
positivists, forbidding us to make any assumptions regarding it, condemn us
to eternal ignorance, for the "evidence" which they wait for can never come
so long as we are passive. But nature has put into our hands two keys, by
which we may test the lock. If we try the moral key and it fits, it is a moral
lock. If we try the unmoral key and it fits, it is an unmoral lock. I cannot
138
possibly conceive of any other sort of "evidence" or "proof' than this.
b7Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, 144.
138James, WB, 88.
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10. CONCLUSION TO PART ONE
The main features of James's view of science are now examined. The most
significant of these are listed below.
(1) Hypotheses are necessary for the progress of science and can neither be deduced
or induced from matters of fact. Hypotheses must be subjected to the test of
verification or refutation by experience.
(2) Rejection of a correspondence view between theories and facts.
(3) Scientific theories are not transcripts of reality. Scientific laws are only
approximations.
(4) The existence of a multiplicity of conceptual frameworks that account for the
same empirical phenomena, without the need of either their being reduced to a single
framework or being ultimately reduced to sensory experience. Accordingly, when
James's views about truth in science are investigated, two conditions can be
distinguished: (1) the primary condition of verifiability; (2) the secondary condition
of satisfaction; where (2) is contingent on (1).
It can be argued that these elements are strongly echoed in James's pragmatic
method. In fact, James did think of his pragmatic method as an extension of
scientific method. He did regard all philosophical claims as hypotheses to which the
pragmatic method could be applied. He tells us that "a normal philosophy, like a
science, must live by hypotheses."139 Just as scientific hypotheses are subjected to
verification or falsification by empirical experience, philosophical hypotheses are
subjected to acceptance or rejection according to whether they have or lack certain
consequences. The application of the pragmatic method assists us in the process of
differentiation between alternative philosophical hypotheses according to the
l39James, LWJ, II, 184.
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consequences, empirical or metaphysical, that they may anticipate. Just as scientific
theories are dependent on sensory experience, philosophical hypotheses are
dependent on consequences.
Part Two attempts to show how these elements of James's view of science were
incorporated in his pragmatic view of truth. The following quotation of James offers
a good introduction to it by stating what exactly it is not.
The trail of the human serpent is thus over everything. Truth independent;
truth that we find merely; truth no longer malleable to human need; truth
incorrigible, in a word; such truth exists indeed superabundantly—or is
supposed to exist by rationalistically minded thinkers; but then it means
only the dead heart of the living tree, and its being there means only that
truth also has its paleontology and its 'prescription,' and may grow stiff






In the previous part of the thesis, an outline of James's conception of the nature and
scope of scientific method is attempted. The present part shows how his view of
scientific method was one of the principal factors in his philosophising on truth. In
fact, how he applied his view of scientific method to the problem of truth and the
role that his general views on science played in shaping his views on the issue is
examined; also this application is assessed.
James's pronouncements on truth engendered a storm of controversy and criticism.
His views were at first dismissed in an offhand manner and indeed ridiculed by many
philosophers, to whom James's conception of truth amounted to no more than the
equating of truth and both expediency and workability. Many of those critics found it
quite evident that there exists an important difference between the truthfulness of
ideas and their utility or workability.
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Such characterisation of James's theory of truth is indeed a narrow one, let alone an
unfair summary of a complex and subtle theory. It is far more subtle than it is
generally thought to be and deserves to be taken much more seriously than most
philosophers are inclined to take it. It is fair to say, however, that James was partly
responsible for the misreading of his views. The form in which he presented his
views on truth and pragmatism in general was that of popular lectures where his
vivid imagery and rich forms of expression seemed to hide his carefully worked out
ideas. Thus, the way he formulated his views was not sufficiently guarded against
their being misunderstood. Despite the hostile reception of his theory, however,
James defended his views insisting that some of his critics had misread and distorted
them. In the preface to The Meaning of Truth, he remarks that some of these critics
seem to "labor under an inability almost pathetic, to understand the thesis which they
seek to refute."1 Hence, it is not uncommon to find in the literature many a James
scholar who tries to defend James's position and to show how it could be established
consistently. It can be shown how some commentators in their attempts to defend
James against some criticisms have produced a distorted account of James's original
views. It is, in my view, most crucial when discussing James to endeavour to see
things from his point of view. If his views on truth are to be criticised or dismissed,
they must be criticised or dismissed for the right reasons.
2. A THEORY OF TRUTH
James placed his theory of truth at the heart of his pragmatic philosophy. Indeed,
when he defined pragmatism, he defined it both as a method and as a 'genetic'
theory ofwhat is meant by truth. He did regard it as a theory, as a genuine alternative
to both the correspondence and coherence theories and as one of his most original
'James, MT, 10.
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contributions to the study of truth. However, some commentators had a different
opinion as to whether what James was defending could rightly be described as a
theory of truth or merely be characterised as an account or a criterion of truth. Let us
consider some of these views.
In his The Theory of Knowledge, D. W. Hamlyn in a chapter on theories of truth
dedicates two paragraphs for examining the pragmatic theory of truth. His overall
assessment of it is that it is 'founded on a muddle.' Thus he thinks it is not a proper
theory of truth that could stand on equal grounds with other traditional theories of
truth. It is worthwhile to cite what he actually said:
William James, the originator of the theory, took over the central idea from
C. S. Peirce, but altered it in the process. Peirce had put forward practical
usefulness as a criterion of meaningfulness, with the plausible suggestion
that a scientific term can be considered meaningful only if its use has
practical consequences. James applied this idea (perhaps confusedly) to
truth in the attempt to supply a down-to-earth substitute for certainty within
the theory of knowledge. But merely to reject the search for certainty by
putting something less in its place without diagnosis of the reasons for the
demand for certainty in the first place is to some extent an abrogation of
the philosopher's responsibility. The pragmatic theory cannot therefore be
put on the same level as the other two theories—the correspondence and
coherence theories. I shall not discuss it further. (It would not be unfair to
say that it is founded on a muddle.)2
It is highly likely that Hamlyn's statements about James are the ones which are
founded on a muddle.3 Josiah Royce's question "how the mere pragmatist can feel it
"Hamlyn, The Theory ofKnowledge, 119.
'Hamlyn is ascribing to James the originating of the pragmatic theory of truth while Peirce not James
is its originator. The equation of truth with utility is not as straightforward as Hamlyn seems to be
implying here. James's theoiy of knowledge, his turning away from certainties, is itself influenced by
the view of science which was dominant in his day. Science in James's time was no longer looking
for certainty, and it is quite understandable that a philosopher who takes science seriously, like James
indeed was, cannot be blind to its developments. Thus the effects of science as a principal factor in
shaping his philosophical views cannot be ignored when assessing his views on truth. This is by no
means to suggest that James had given up the search for truth. It is fair to say that James's yearning to
know what truth is was one of the major occupations of his life. Hamlyn's last remark about the
relation between the pragmatic theory of truth and the correspondence and coherence theories makes
one wonders if he had really given James's texts a close examination. One does have the right to
dismiss or accept James's views, but one has first to gain the right of doing so by a thorough study of
those views.
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a duty to think truly",4 seems to reflect Hamlyn's worries about James's alleged
abandoning of the quest for certainty.
G. E. Moore, in his 'pretentious fiasco'5 "Professor James' 'Pragmatism'", argued
that James's notion of truth is really silly. He addressed his criticisms to James's
views as they were presented in the sixth lecture of Pragmatism, the one entitled,
'Pragmatism's Conception of Truth.' Moore held, among other things, that James
wished to establish connections of some sort between truth and verification or utility.
He presented the connections which James set out to establish in the form of
propositions which he sought to refute by producing counter-examples. James's
account of truth did depart from the common-sense usage and that was what mainly
provoked Moore's objections.
Some philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell and Nicholas Rescher, argued that
James had better offered his views on truth as a criterion rather than a definition of
truth. In his 'James's Conception of Truth', Russell argued that "if pragmatists only
affirmed that utility is a criterion of truth, there would be much less to be said
against their view."6 Russell's objections were quite similar to Moore's. Rescher
distinguished between theories of truth which offer a definition of what truth is and
those which offer a criterion of truth. Accordingly, what James has really presented
to us, he argued, is a criterion of truth and not a definition of truth.7 F. H. Bradley
raised a similar objection. He argued that he had no problem with the successful
working of ideas as a criterion for determining their truth. However, the practical
working of ideas does not constitute the essence of truth.
4Perry, II, 433.
'Described as such by James in a letter to H. M. Kallen, dated January 26, 1908, quoted in MT, 305.
6Russell, Philosophical Essays, 120.
7Rescher, The Coherence Theory ofTruth, Chapter One, §1, 1-4.
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More recently, Gerald Myers in his study of James's life and thought said that "By
today's standards, pragmatism is not a genuinely technical theory of meaning or
truth; it is rather a method of choosing what to believe from among philosophical
and religious propositions."8 His position seems essentially akin to Russell's.
On the subject of interpretation, there is a wide disagreement among James scholars
on the accurate interpretation of his theory of truth. For instance, A. J. Ayer held that
James's theory is anti-realistic.9 H. S. Thayer argued that it was fundamentally
realistic.10 Other interpretations were to some extent concerned with defending
James against standard criticisms, especially those ofMoore and Russell."
James's characterisation of his pragmatic view of truth was first introduced in the
sixth lecture of his Pragmatism. This was followed by the volume The Meaning of
Truth which he subtitled, 'A Sequel to 'Pragmatism", wherein he collected "all the
work of. . . [his] pen that bears directly on the truth-question."12 The first chapter of
the volume, 'The Function of Cognition', was published in Mind in 1885. James
describes this paper in a letter to C. A. Strong as 'the fans et origo of all my
pragmatism (in its second sense as "theory of truth")'.13 The rest of the volume
consists of papers mainly written in James's later years, between 1904 and 1909,
with the principal aim of clarifying his doctrine further, replying to some criticisms
and defending and sharpening the theses advocated in Pragmatism. Our discussion
will draw in great part on what James says about truth in those two volumes.
8Myers, William James: His life and Thought, 298.
9Ayer's introduction to James's, Pragmatism and The Meaning ofTruth, xxx.
"Thayer, the introduction to MT.
"Among commentators who specifically targeted such attacks on James's view of truth are: Sprigge
in his James and Bradley: American Truth and British Reality, and 'James, Aboutness, and his
British Critics'; Hertz in his 'James and Moore: Two Perspectives on Truth'; and Susan Haack in her
'The Pragmatist Theory of Truth.'
l2James, MT, 4.
'Tetter from James to Strong, dated September 17, 1907, in Perry, II, 548.
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James has given several statements of his conception of truth which reflect the
various aspects of his theory. The main features of his account can briefly be
outlined as follows. James maintained that there would be no truth had there been no
mind (which can only know reality through ideas).14 Truth is basically a relation
between two things: a thought and a reality outside of the thought.1" Truth-bearers
are thus mental items such as thoughts, beliefs or ideas16 and not propositions.17
True thoughts are concrete items or things which are possessed by persons at certain
times and places. Thus, true ideas are concrete events in the world, having
continuous relations with the world into which they fit.
A true idea agrees with the reality of which it is true, while a false idea is one which
disagrees with the reality which it concerns. The standard or common view is that
agreement means copying. Truth characterised as such is at bottom an empty and
empirically vacuous notion. However, it could only be made intelligible if it was
'cashed out' in experiential terms. Hence, true ideas are those which agree with
reality, where agreeing means leading, fitting or any other process defined
pragmatically. The fundamental process among those various processes is that of
verification. Our ideas are true insofar as they are verified or verifiable. Hence
James's main claim that the truth of a given thought is not some inert property
inherent in it, it is something that happens to it through the process of verification.
l4This goes for James for both absolute truth and concrete truths. The postulating of absolute truth
necessarily requires the existence of a superior mind, infinite perhaps, that is able to perceive a truth
of that sort. In 'Are We Automata?', James says that for "Ideal truth to exist at all requires that a mind
also exist." However, a mind with such capacities, even if it was identified with God, is for James
'dimly' real. EP, 44.
15James, MT, 91.
'"James uses these terms interchangeably. 1 follow him in that.
l7For James, the term 'proposition' as used by philosophers like Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore,
seems 'expressly invented' to foster the confusion between truth as applied to opinions and truth as
applied to the facts which the opinions assert. See MT, 151. Nevertheless, James did at times use the
term 'proposition' himself.
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When deciding which beliefs to accept, beliefs of any kind whatsoever, we are
justified in applying subjective criteria only when objective criteria have proved
unhelpful. Thus, we are justified in accepting beliefs as true according to their being
satisfactory, useful and emotionally satisfying when and only when objective
evidence (logical or empirical) is unattainable. Consistency is another crucial factor
in accepting beliefs. A belief is accepted as true if and only if it is consistent with
previously held beliefs or causes a minimal change in one's stock of old beliefs.
Finally, James held that there are many viewpoints from which the world can be seen
or understood. One cannot speak of the unique and truest angle of vision. We shall
examine these claims in detail showing how using his view of science, James
endeavoured to construct a theory of truth based on science's basic assumptions.
3. THE ACCEPTED VIEW OF TRUTH
James recognises the urgent need to overhaul the concept of truth.
The whole notion of truth, which naturally and without reflexion we assume
to mean the simple duplication by the mind of a ready-made and given
reality, proves hard to understand clearly. There is no simple test available
for adjudicating offhand between the divers types of thought that claim to
possess it. Common sense, common science or corpuscular philosophy,
ultra-critical science, or energetics, and critical or idealistic philosophy, all
seem insufficiently true in some regard and leave some dissatisfaction. It is
evident that the conflict of these so widely differing systems obliges us to
overhaul the very idea of truth, for at present we have no definite notion of
what the word may mean.18
The currently accepted notion in question is that of copying, one version of
correspondence, which is based on a certain way of looking at the mind's relation to
reality. According to this view, truth means the mere copying or simple duplication
by the human mind of a fixed, independent and absolute reality. This view is best
l8James, PRAG, 93-94.
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known as the common-sense view of truth which was widely held among
philosophers. To James's mind, this view can no longer be held satisfactory. But, on
what grounds did James find this notion unsatisfactory? And why is a change of
views required?
The reasons are wholly inspired by the developments of science and its methodology
which occurred in the second half of the nineteenth-century. James, the committed
scientist that he is, firmly held that philosophy cannot ignore those advancements in
science. They ought to be applied to philosophy and truth. Describing the state of
science and philosophy before 1850, James writes:
Throughout almost the entire past both Science and Philosophy have been
accustomed to suppose that "Truth" must needs consist of a hard-and-fast
system of propositions, valid in themselves and eternally, which our minds
have only to copy literally. Logic and mathematics had always seemed to
constitute such systems, and the entities and laws of physics and chemistry,
just as our text-books formulated them, were supposed to be equally
"objective."19
Thus, James argues that true scientific propositions were expected at the time
possess the following properties. They are literal copies of their realities; they are
absolute and non-revisable; they are literally objective. What science was expected
to be seeking was simply and solely absolute truth, a truth with a big t. Philosophy
has also followed the path of science in its quest for absoluteness; for abstract truth
with a big t. Thus truth was regarded by many philosophers to be a literal copy of
reality. Once an idea is recognised as true it is judged to have been eternally true, one
which does not undergo any future revision and also one which does not and cannot
be related to human contexts.
"James, ECR, 550.
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This notion of absoluteness pursued by science, however, had become too difficult to
sustain in the mid-nineteenth century due to some influences which had entered the
scientific scene. These influences are described by James as follows.
First, philosophic criticisms like those of Mill, Lotze, and Sigwart have
emphasized the incongruence of the forms of our thinking with the "things"
which the thinking nevertheless successfully handles. . . . Second, not only
has the doctrine of Evolution weaned us from fixities and inflexibilities in
general, and given us a world all plastic, but it has made us ready to
imagine almost all our functions, even the intellectual ones, as
"adaptations," and possibly transient adaptations, to practical human needs.
Lastly, the enormous growth of the sciences in the past fifty years has
reconciled us to the idea that "Not quite true" is as near as we can ever get.
For investigating minds there is no sanctity in any theory, and "laws of
nature" absolutely expressible by us are idols of the popular-science level
of education exclusively. Up-to-date logicians, mathematicians, physicists,
and chemists vie with one another as to who will break down most barriers,
efface most outlines, supersede most current definitions and conceptions,
and show most skill in playing about the old material in new ways, limited
only by the one rule of the game, that the new thoughts must dip into and
coalesce with the material at more than one point of sensible experience.
Thus has arisen the pragmatism of Pearson in England, of Mach in
Austria, and of the somewhat more reluctant Poincare in France, all of
whom say that our sciences are but Denkmittel—"true" in no other sense
than that of yielding a conceptual shorthand, economical for our
descriptions. Thus does Simmel in Berlin suggest that no human
conception whatever is more than an instrument of biological utility; and
that if it be successfully that, we may call it true, whatever it resembles or
fails to resemble. Bergson, and more particularly his disciples Wilbois, Le
Roy, and others in France, have defended a very similar doctrine. Ostwald
in Leipzig, with his "Energetics," belongs to the same school.20
This quotation best describes the various views from which James's pragmatism and
indeed his theory of truth had emerged. Outlined above are the main points of
James's theory of truth. Now listed are the main features of science, as he saw it, and
how these bore on his account of truth. It has been established in Part One that James
was committed to each of the following propositions:
(1) scientific theories are not literal copies of physical phenomena. They are
instruments that represent phenomena only symbolically;
20James, ECR, 550-51.
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(2) there exists a multiplicity of formulae which may account for the same
physical phenomena; when the choice between rival theories cannot be decided on
empirical or logical evidence (evidential grounds), we are justified in applying
subjective factors like elegance, simplicity, taste, etc., to assist us in deciding which
theory to accept;
(3) science deals with hypotheses which are subject to verification or
refutation by experience;
(4) the scientist is not a mere spectator who receives and registers facts but an
actor who interacts with the reality which is not fixed but plastic and malleable to his
own needs and purposes;
(5) scientific theories are neither absolutely true nor absolutely false; they are
revisable and relative; hence, the concept of absoluteness can no longer be applied in
science;
(6) when testing a scientific proposition, we also test the whole set of
previously held scientific propositions; the condition of consistency;
(7) scientific propositions allow us to make predictions;
(8) physics must be separated from metaphysics.
The influence of the ideas expressed in these propositions in the course of our
discussion of the main themes of James's account of truth as outlined above is here
examined.
4. TRUTH-BEARERS
Before discussing what it is for something to be true or false in James's view, let us
first examine his views on the items to which the predicate 'true' is ascribable. For
James, the primary truth-bearers are concrete items such as beliefs, thoughts, or
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ideas. He also regards truth as a property ofmental images and of names.21 In 'The
Function ofCognition', truth is attributed to feelings. James uses these candidates for
the role of primary truth-bearers interchangeably. Unlike many philosophers, such as
Russell and Frege, James did not understand beliefs as expressing propositions.
James's position regarding propositions is worth exploring in order to understand his
account of truth. He thought that the ascription of truth to propositions only induces
confusion. He does make, however, occasional uses of them in the course of some
discussions.22 The evidence that he regards their use as truth-bearers by philosophers
as unfortunate is well-established in his writings. Let us now look at the way he
describes propositions before explaining the real reason for his dismissive attitude
towards them.
James asks: To which realities do propositions belong? Do they belong to the world
of facts or to the world of ideas? His answer is that they belong to neither.
Propositions or 'supposals'23 are linguistic entities which have no room in either
world. They are, he says, mythological beings which are the product of a confusion
that arises between truth as an attribute of beliefs and truth as an attribute of the facts
which the beliefs assert.24 Hence, any attempt to explain truth as an attribute of
propositions is likely to cause such confusion. James describes this very clearly in a
letter to H. N. Gardiner. He writes:
"That" Caesar existed, e.g., is not an intermediary between the objective
fact "Caesar-existed" and the other objective fact "someone's-belief-that-
Caesar-existed," but a muddle of the two facts, made to appear as a medium
of connection between them by granting to it the objectivity of the first fact
and the truth of the second. Surely truth can't inhabit a third realm between
realities and statements or beliefs. Ifmythology be a "disease of language,"
then your [Gardiner's] "supposal" (excellent term, however) is certainly a
mythological being. It is easy to see how it arose, for we say indifferently
2lIn Pragmatism, he says: "Names are just as 'true' or 'false' as definite mental pictures are." PRAG,
102.
22See for example, PRAG, 122.
2'This term was suggested and used by H. N. Gardiner. See James's letter to him in Perry, II, 484-85.
24James, MT, 151.
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"the fact that Caesar existed," and "the belief that Caesar existed"; so that it
becomes natural to marry fact and belief together by this tertium quid of a
that which is neither fully objective nor fully subjective, and can mean
sometimes what is real and sometimes what is true. It seems to me the great
merit of pragmatism to have stepped right over all such mongrel figments . .
. I wish you'd search your heart seriously about this mongrel cur of a
supposal, begotten upon you by the unspeakable Meinong and his English
pals.25
In a letter to H. M. Kallen quoted in MT, James emphasises the same point:
Those propositions or supposals which they make the exclusive vehicles of
truth are mongrel curs that have no real place between realities on the one
hand and beliefs on the other. . . . 'Propositions' are expressly divised for
quibbling between realities & beliefs. They seem to have the objectivity of
the one and the subjectivity of the other, and he who uses them can straddle
as he likes, owing to the ambiguity of the word that which is essential to
them. 'That Caesar existed' is 'true,' sometimes means the fact that he
existed is real, sometimes the belief that he existed is true. You can get no
honest discussion out of such terms.26
James seems to be holding that 'propositions' carry an air of ambiguity while mental
items such as beliefs are more adequate and less problematic bearers of truth.
I do not say that for certain logical purposes it may not be useful to treat
propositions as absolute entities, with truth or falsehood inside of them
respectively, or to make of a complex like 'that-Casser-is-dead' a single
term and call it a 'truth.'27
This use of 'proposition', James protests, is ambiguous because "sometimes it means
the fact that, and sometimes the belief that, Caeser is no longer living."28 The fact
being that which corresponds to the belief.
Whether there is really such a confusion in the realist's use of 'proposition' is
doubtful. For 'propositions' are used as neither referring to a subjective thought or
belief nor referring to a fact or an event in the world. Propositions are simply used as





terms that allow us to talk about what is believed. James seems to be expecting of
'propositions' as truth-bearers to tell us more than they are generally devised to do.
They refer simply to abstract entities. Let us see why did James concentrate on the
truth of beliefs or mental items instead. There are two problems that would have
confronted James had he chosen propositions, or sentences, as the ultimate bearers of
truth. First, he was interested in the problem of how truth-bearers come to be true.
Taking propositions to play that role is problematic because it seems to overlook this
important problem, as if the problem of intentionality has already been resolved.
James has a great interest in the way in which truth-bearers come to be true. In other
words, he is interested in the way truth-bearers refer to their realities. Taking
propositions as the primary bearers of truth might seem to marginalise the problem
of intentionality or take it as if it has already been resolved. Second, the truth and
falsity of propositions are independent of human beings and their interests and of
place and time. If one took beliefs as expressing propositions, if a belief means, for
example, the belief that Caesar existed, then in this case, the belief seems to have
already had an interpretation - presupposing an intentional relation between the
belief and its object. While James is interested in finding out what makes a sentence
true and what gives it its interpretation. He is not merely interested in what makes an
already interpreted sentence true. James's pragmatic account of truth begins with the
question of how our ideas refer to their realities. While the intellectualist account of
truth presupposes the intentional relation between our ideas and their objects.29 We
shall have more to say about James's position towards intentionality later. The
intellectualist account of truth also referred to by James as the copy theory of truth,
which he has taken as a foil to his own position, will be examined next.
29J. B. Pratt, for example, who criticised James's account of truth from the point of view of a
correspondence theorist, seems to regard the intellectualist notion of truth as presupposing the
intentional relation between beliefs and their objects. He writes: "The intellectualist's meaning of
truth is so simple, so commonplace, so close at hand, that the pragmatist has quite overlooked it. By
the truth of an idea the intellectualist means merely this simple thing, that the object ofwhich one is
thinking is as one thinks it. Is there anything hard about this, anything meaningless, anything
'metaphysical' or abstract?" Pratt, 'Truth and its Verification', 322.
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5. THE COPY VERSION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY
OF TRUTH
James has rightly shown, as was discussed in Part One, that the copy theory fares ill
in science. For this theory supposes that the world explored by science has a given
objective pattern and that any thesis about the world pretends to be a literal copy of
some part of this pattern. Thus, a scientific hypothesis or a theory is accepted as true
or rejected as false according to whether it is a literal copy of the reality to which it
corresponds or not. James rejected this view. His alternative view is that an
hypothesis is accepted as true not because it literally depicts its reality, but because it
works. Thus, in science, the agreement of hypotheses or theories with their realities
does not mean copying but rather working. In science, James writes,
[w]e must find a theory that will work; and that means something extremely
difficult; for our theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain
new experiences. It must derange common sense and previous belief as little
as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be
verified exactly. To 'work' means both these things.30
What makes a scientific theory work is its summing up of past events and its
successful prediction of future concrete experimental phenomena. This involves both
the occurrence of a minimal change in the previously held propositions and the
verification of hypotheses. Thus, truth in science is rooted in the verification of
hypotheses. As we have seen in Part One, James recognised the provisional nature of
scientific hypotheses and their instrumental character. All theories, including
scientific ones, are "instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest. "31
This characterisation of scientific theories as instruments rather than literal copies of




of the truth or falsity of those entities. Let us suppose that we have two incompatible
hypotheses such as two conflicting theories on the nature of light. According to the
copy theory of truth, we must reject one or the other because reality cannot possess
the patterns claimed by both theories. On James's view, neither theory is to be
rejected, since there is sufficient empirical evidence that supports each theory and
each sums up and expands some part of experience. In other words, each is
successful as an instrument in the further exploration of physical phenomena and in
this sense, both are necessary tools for giving an adequate account of the
phenomenon of light.
James's general view about theory choice has been detailed in the previous part. It
suffices here just to emphasise his view that in some cases, scientists would choose
one or the other of two well-evidenced theories on entirely subjective grounds.
[Sjometimes alternative theoretic formulas are equally compatible with all
the truths we know, and then we choose between them for subjective
reasons. We choose the kind of theory to which we are already partial; we
follow 'elegance' or 'economy.' Clerk Maxwell somewhere says it would
be "poor scientific taste" to choose the more complicated of two equally
well-evidenced conceptions; and you will all agree with him. Truth in
science is what gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfactions, taste
included, but consistency both with previous truth and with novel fact is
always the most imperious claimant.32
Thus truth in science is primarily but not entirely based upon objective evidence. In
some cases, subjective criteria, and most importantly consistency as James
characterised it, contribute to the determination of the truth of scientific theories or
propositions. James's view of truth gains its basic validity and strength from being
more or less an accurate theory of de facto method in experimental science. James
offers his view of truth as a legitimate extension of his view of science. Having
shown that the copy theory of truth does not work in science, James shows that in
"James, PRAG, 104.
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philosophy also the copy theory of truth equally does not work. Thus, at the
beginning of his discussion of truth in Pragmatism, James starts with a severe attack
on the copy theory of truth. Let us now examine what this theory really tells us about
truth and what James's criticisms of it are.
According to the copy theory of truth, truth is a relation of agreement between ideas
and their realities or objects, whereby ideas picture or literally copy the realities to
which they refer. On this theory, reality objectively obtained and exists
independently of our ideas of it. James rejected this bare agreement-formula as
meaningless and obscure. His rejection, however, did not seem to be outright at the
beginning of his sixth lecture on Pragmatism. Let us see what James says about this.
Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of our ideas. It
means their 'agreement,' as falsity means their disagreement, with 'reality.'
Pragmatists and intellectualists both accept this definition as a matter of
course. They begin to quarrel only after the question is raised as to what
may precisely be meant by the term 'agreement,' and what by the term
'reality,' when reality is taken as something for our ideas to agree with. . . .
The popular notion is that a true idea must copy its reality. Like other
popular views, this one follows the analogy of the most usual experience.
Our true ideas of sensible things do indeed copy them. Shut your eyes and
think of yonder clock on the wall, and you get just such a true picture or
copy of its dial. But your idea of its 'works' (unless you are a clock-maker)
is much less of a copy ... it is hard to see exactly what your ideas can
copy-
You perceive that there is a problem here."'"
What James calls 'the popular notion of truth' is the common-sense view. One
serious objection that James raises against this view is that although it is true that
some of our ideas do copy their realities, many of our ideas are not exact or even
rough copies of their realities. It seems even hard at times to determine what
precisely one's idea is actually copying. James identifies the root of this 'vulgar'
notion of correspondence as mere copying as lying in the distinction that we draw in
ordinary life between mental terms and real terms. We often take, he argues, mental
"James, PRAG, 96.
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terms as images and real terms as sensations, holding that in many cases our images
copy the sensations.34 The adequacy of such an explanation may be recognised in
objects like clocks. However, it is hardly satisfactory in cases where the thing that is
copied is something like the fact that the clock is a mechanical device which works
as a time keeper. In cases as such, no image could satisfactorily capture that
meaning. James tells us that in "many realities our ideas can only be symbols and not
copies. 'Past time,' 'power,' 'spontaneity'—how can our mind copy such
realities?"33
It has been shown in the previous chapter, in the course of our discussion of James's
view of scientific theories, that these theories do not depict reality literally and make
no pretence of giving an absolute portrait of things. They are not absolute. They
represent reality in a more or less exact manner. James takes this central view in his
account of scientific theories and applies it to truth. Here common sense tells us that
true ideas are copies which mirror their realities literally. James rejects this naive
view arguing that the way our ideas correspond to their realities is far too complex
than the copy theory may lead us to think. Its characterisation of the notion of truth
in terms of copying is too narrow and simplistic, since there are many cases where
our ideas do not simply duplicate their realities.
Furthermore, to assume that the relation of agreement is always that of copying is to
assume that truth as copying is essentially an inert and static relation. For if the
agreement means in all situations copying, then once an idea is judged as true of
something, it is true of that thing and 'there's an end of the matter.' No consequences
are to follow. No predictions to be made. This calls for a serious revision of the




because it is empirically vacuous. That is a crucial reason for James's distrust of the
copy relation which he saw as lacking the appropriate empirical credentials.
His attempt to revise the common-sense notion of truth is only one part of his
programme of revising several common-sense concepts, such as material substances
and the soul, because they do not satisfy his empirical commitments. For example,
for James, "The theory of the Soul is the theory of popular philosophy and
scholasticism, which is only popular philosophy made systematic."36 But the concept
of "the substantial Soul", James tries to show, "explains nothing and guarantees
nothing. . . . our reasonings have . . . only proved its superfluity for scientific
purposes."37 Similarly, he shows that the popular notion of truth, i.e., the
common-sense notion of copying, is also scientifically superfluous. Hence, it must
be replaced by a theory that goes in line with the spirit and practice of science.
Moreover, James points out that the concepts which are accepted by common sense
are also accepted by metaphysics. Just as he tried to separate psychology from
metaphysics in his project of establishing psychology from the point of view of
positivist science, James sought to provide an empirical account of truth that avoids
the postulation of a metaphysical and absolute truth, as postulated by the
intellectualists. His alternative account of truth is offered as an account of truth in the
plural, of truth with a small t. It has been argued in Part One that James applauded
the phenomenalist view of science which called for the separation of physics from
metaphysics. Here James extends this to truth, suggesting the elimination of any
metaphysical elements that may underlie the concept of truth through revising the
common-sense notion of truth held by the intellectualists.
36James, PP, I, 325.
'Tames, PP, I, 331-32. See also PP, I, 15, 181-82, where James associates the views of common sense
on the Soul with those of scholastic psychology and concludes that the wisest attitude that would keep
our psychology positivistic and non-metaphysical is to take no account of the soul.
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Thus, the revision that James proposes is one which clearly departs from the
common-sense view of truth as described above. In this bold departure lies the
originality of his viewpoint and that is precisely what makes it particularly
interesting. This point has been emphasised several times because some
commentators insist that James did not reject the copy version of the correspondence
theory of truth, that his view of truth is a confused correspondence theory of truth, as
Marcus Ford has argued.38 Thayer thought that James's theory is a specialised
version of the correspondence theory.39 Such interpretations that distort James's
theory and fly in the face of what is intended to be original in his theory simply
cannot command agreement. Some of these interpretations will be examined later on.
As the discussion proceeds, it will be seen how our construction of James's theory
takes into account subtle aspects of this theory that have in many cases been
overlooked by commentators. Thus, it is hoped that a fair assessment of James's
theory can be offered at the end of the part.
6. AGREEMENT PRAGMATICALLY DEFINED
It has been shown that for James, when agreement as copying is regarded as
uninformative and empirically empty, it is legitimate to consider revising the whole
notion of agreement providing thus a defensible explanation of that relation that
could adequately account for all objects or realities,40 both simple and complex.
If agreement is not copying, what is it then? James tells us that:
Pragmatism . . . asks its usual question. "Grant an idea or belief to be true,"
it says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual
life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different
"'sFord, William James's Philosophy, 59-74.
j9See Thayer's introduction to The Meaning ofTruth, xi-xlvi.
40James's conception of'reality' is rather wide and comprehensive and includes various entities.
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from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is
the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?"
The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: True
ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify.
False ideas are those that we cannot. That is the practical difference it
makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it
is all that truth is known-as.
This thesis is what I have to defend. The truth of an idea is not a
stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is
made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process
namely of its verifying itself, its vevi-Jication. Its validity is the process of
its valid-ationf
Let us examine these passages closely. James starts his analysis of truth with the
notion of verification. The verification of ideas is described entirely in experiential
terms. To begin with, the notion of truth that James is proposing here is one which is
relative to both individual and time. Truth is not, as the rationalists hold, a timeless
quality.42 Thus, we find James associating truth with verification, corroboration and
assimilation. These active processes are dependent on both the individual who
carries them out and the time where they are being conducted. What constitute the
meaning of truth, James tells us, are certain verification-processes. Before examining
what these processes are, let us recall very briefly what James thinks about scientific
hypotheses. An hypothesis which is subjected to testing and stood up well, in terms
of being verified, is considered as true. However, it may turn out later, due to several
factors like, for example, the use of more accurate measurements in experiments or
the occurrence of some change in our accepted theories, that it is false. Also, an
hypothesis that was falsified may turn out to be true, due to similar reasons. James
took this idea and applied it to truth. True ideas are those which are discovered to be
true. The truth of an idea is not something inherent in it, as the intellectualist asserts,
its truth is discovered by us through the process of its verification, 'truth happens to
an idea'. Accordingly, an idea which was judged as true at one time, and for the first




as true at that particular moment. Thus, its first verification is an initial step by which
it enters into the verification-process. It will, then, undergo further verification by
which the true idea may face either of two fates. It may preserve its truthfulness as
long as it is not falsified by experience, or lose its truth at the moment it is being
falsified. In both cases one cannot maintain that an idea is either absolutely true or
absolutely false. An idea may be temporarily false or temporarily true. The
verification or falsification of ideas merely gives them temporary truth-values. To
put it plainly, absoluteness is not an inherent property of true ideas. Once an idea is
true, it is not absolutely true and once it is false, it is not absolutely false. This seems
highly to be James's position on the temporality of truth. He seems to contrast his
view, the one we have just been describing, with the view held by intellectualists
which considers truth to be absolute. James saw the common-sense view of truth as
one such view that totally opposes his view.
It is thus crucial to be clear about James's usage of terms such as 'verification'. If
this term were understood in a common-sense way, then the equation of truth with
verification which James is offering as a criterion of truth would be rightly dismissed
as false. Similarly, in James's equation of what is true with what is useful, the term
'utility', as we shall see later, is used in a way that also departs from the
common-sense usage.
G. E. Moore, in his criticisms of James's pragmatism, argues that James's equation
of truth with verification fails to reconcile with the common-sense usage.43 Moore
shows this by showing that there are true propositions which become false when 'is
verified' is substituted for 'is true' in the propositions that 'what is true is what is
verified' and that 'what is verified is what is true'. One cannot deny that it is true that
4jBertrand Russell was also a leading opponent of the objection that James's account of truth fails to
square with common sense. However, 1 focus only on Moore's criticisms as representative of this line
of argument.
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it is possible that a proposition p is verified, even though it is not the case that p is
true. However, when 'is verified' is substituted for 'is true', we end up with the
necessarily false proposition that it is possible that a proposition p is verified, even
though it is not the case that p is verified. Moore applies the same analysis to utility.
Once 'is useful' is substituted for 'is true', we face a similar result to the effect that
'is useful' is not synonymous with what 'is true'. Moore and others, who raised these
objections, are appealing to the common-sense law of bivalence which states that, for
every proposition p, either it is true that p or it is true that not-p. This law ceases to
be true once 'is verified' is substituted for 'is true'. The reason is that not every
proposition is either verified or its denial is verified. This shows that 'is verified' is
not synonymous with 'is true'. Hence, our conclusion is that James cannot hold
consistently both to his pragmatic account of truth and to the law of bivalence upon
which Moore's, and indeed the realist's, accounts of truth are based. To give a fair
assessment to his equation of truth with verification, one should not appeal to the
common-sense analysis to which Moore and others have resorted. This analysis
seems to overlook the fact that James is using verification in a different sense.
This tension between James's view of truth and the common-sense view, in the way
we presented it, i.e., in terms of the former's inconsistency with the law of bivalence,
is best described by James in 'A Dialogue' between two opponents. On one side
there is 'a pragmatist', i.e., James, and an 'anti-pragmatist'; a sharp critic who adopts
the common-sense view, on the other. The anti-pragmatist confronts James with a
'bad dilemma'. He says to him:
Now suppose a certain state of facts, facts for example of antediluvian
planetary history, concerning which the question may be asked: 'Shall the
truth about them ever be known?' And suppose (leaving the hypothesis of
an omniscient absolute out of the account) that we assume that the truth is
never to be known. I ask you now, brother pragmatist, whether according to
you there can be said to be any truth at all about such a state of facts. Is
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there a truth, or is there not a truth, in cases where at any rate it never comes
to be known?44
The anti-pragmatist continues that this question puts James in a bad dilemma for the
following reasons:
[l]f on the one hand you elect to say that there is a truth, you thereby
surrender your whole pragmatist theory. According to that theory, truth
requires ideas and workings to constitute it; but in the present instance there
is supposed to be no knower, and consequently neither ideas nor workings
can exist. ... if you elect to say that there is no truth under the conditions
assumed, because there are no ideas or workings, then you fly in the face of
common sense. Doesn't common sense believe that every state of facts must
in the nature of things be truly stateable in some kind of a proposition, even
tho in point of fact the proposition should never be propounded by a living
soul?45
The dilemma which the anti-pragmatist is proposing for James is the following. You
cannot hold consistently to both the pragmatic account of truth and common sense.
You could either accept common sense and in this case, reject your account of truth,
or you can stick to your pragmatic account of truth and acknowledge your departure
from common sense. In other words, James is confronted with the choice between
accepting or rejecting the law of bivalence.
James replies that common sense is correct in its assertion that there are truths which
will never come to be known by any person. He tells his critic that he is
wholeheartedly willing to accept this on the condition that, James says, "you let me
hold consistently to my own account of truth, and do not ask me to abandon it for
something which I find impossible to comprehend."46 But, if James is sticking to his
position of ascribing truth to thoughts or beliefs, then how can he account for the fact





account of truth-bearers as mental items, there cannot be truths about unthought
things. To solve this problem, he distinguishes between two types of truths: virtual
truths and actual truths. Thus, there cannot be actual truths about unthought things,
there can only be virtual truths about them, however. James puts this point to his
critic as follows:
There have been innumerable events in the history of our planet of which
nobody ever has been or ever will be able to give an account, yet of which it
can already be said abstractly that only one sort of possible account can ever
be true. The truth about any such event is thus already generically
predetermined by the event's nature; and one may accordingly say with a
perfectly good conscience that it virtually pre-exists. Common sense is thus
right in its instinctive contention.47
How to interpret those virtual and actual truths remains the key difference between
the pragmatist and the anti-pragmatist. James does not think that virtual truth about
an event, or fact, could be expressed by claiming that if a person had acquired a
belief about that fact, then that belief would actually be true. One acquires actual
truth through a verification-process which terminates in a direct perception of the
fact or a substitute for it, like the case of theoretical terms such as atoms. Virtual
truth becomes actual when and only when the process of verification is completed, as
we have just described. In this sense, truth is something that 'happens' to an idea. It
becomes true by the process of its verification. This understanding of truth requires
for truth and knowledge to be "correlative and interdependent."48 As James says,
"wherever knowledge is conceivable truth is conceivable, wherever knowledge is
possible truth is possible, wherever knowledge is actual truth is actual."49
James also talks about direct and indirect verification. At the basic level of common
sense, full verification is achievable. This simple form of verification is the
47James, MT, 155.
48James, MT, 158. James regularly shifted from the notion of Truth' to that of'knowledge'. For him,
a thing which is true is one which is thought, believed or asserted by a knower.
49James, MT, 158.
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foundation of truth-processes. They "are certainly the originals and prototypes of
the truth-process ".50 However, we accept many ideas as true without attempting to
verify them directly. In fact, most of the beliefs that we hold as true are verified only
indirectly. James tells us that "Where circumstantial evidence is sufficient, we can go
without eye-witnessing. Just as we here assume Japan to exist without ever having
been there."31 These indirect verifications are dependent on direct verifications.
Without "direct face-to-face verifications", James says, "the fabric of truth collapses
like a financial system with no cash-basis whatever. . . . beliefs verified concretely
by somebody are the posts of the whole superstructure."52 Here it should be noted
that indirectly verified truths are not the same as virtual truths. The former are truths
which have not been exhaustively verified. We accept them, however, because there
are masses of circumstantial evidence which we take as enough for us for not
attempting the task of directly verifying those ideas which we accept as true. In this
case, those ideas are backed by empirical evidence and directly verified ideas.
Hence, indirectly verified truths must be distinguished from virtual truths. The latter
expresses what would have been discovered or known (i.e., the truth of the idea) had
the idea been appropriately tested. Indirectly verified truths only state the existence
of the possibility of being verified.
The truth of an event, past, present, or future, is for me only another name for
the fact that if the event ever does get known, the nature of the knowledge is
already to some degree predetermined. The truth which precedes actual
knowledge of a fact means only what any possible knower of the fact will






Ideas which are at one time actually verified were previously true virtually.
"Pragmatically, virtual and actual truth mean the same thing: the possibility of only
one answer, when once the question is raised. "54 Thus instead of saying with
common sense that for every proposition p, either p is actually true or not-p is
actually true, James replaces this by saying that for very proposition p, either p is
virtually true or not-p is virtually true: that if there were a knower who would
appropriately perform certain tests, he would discover that either p is true or not-p is
true. In other words, this can be equally expressed by stating either that p is
verifiable or not-p is verifiable.
Accordingly, James replies to the second horn of the dilemma which the
anti-pragmatist had presented to him by thinking of truth as a "mere abstract
possibility, so I say it does exist, and side with common sense."55 This abstract
possibility is that of there existing a knower who verifies the idea in question.
James's account of the common-sense view of abstract truth is that it "might be only
another name for a potential as distinguished from an actual knowledge of the
reality. ... [It is] knowledge in the form of possibility merely."56 This siding with
common sense which James is trying to point out by holding to an abstract
possibility seems to be incompatible with some of his basic claims about the
properties of true ideas. The main issue is that an abstract possibility neither resides
in time or space nor does it possess any sensible properties, and therefore abstract
propositions are held by common sense. This seems to go against James's project of





Another way in which James departs from common sense is in his insistence that the
truth of a belief that p does not entail that p is the case and p does not entail that the
belief that p is true. This he states as follows:
The social proposition 'other men exist' and the pragmatist proposition 'it is
expedient to believe that other men exist' come from different universes of
discourse. One can believe the second without being logically compelled to
believe the first; one can believe the first without having ever heard of the
second; or one can believe them both. The first expresses the object of a
belief, the second tells of one condition of the beliefs power to maintain
itself. There is no identity of any kind, save the term 'other men' which they
contain in common, in the two propositions; and to treat them as mutually
substitutable, or to insist that we shall do so, is to give up dealing with
realities altogether.57
Here 'it is expedient to believe that other men exist' means 'it is true that other men
exist.' We shall examine later James's precise use of the term 'expediency'. Now,
James's claim both that p does not entail the truth of p and that the truth of p does
not entail p seems to be consistent with his views concerning the relativity of truth to
both time and person. A proposition becomes true in the course of experience, when
and only when its practical consequences are actually verified. When a proposition is
discovered to be true, it sheds a backward light making it to have been true despite
the fact that no past thinker had ever thought so.58 Thus, for a proposition p which is
discovered to be true today, James would not say that it has been true that p before p
was discovered to be true. He would, rather, insist that it had been true that p only
because p has now been discovered to be true.
Hence, James is not committed to the formula that for any proposition p, p is true iff
p. This formula, however, would be accepted by the copy theory of truth for which a
proposition p is true iff it is a copy of a fact. What we have tried to show above is




clearly departs from ordinary usage and is opposed, as he thought it was, to the copy
theory which views truth as absolute. He argued that the copy theory's
characterisation of the relation of truth flies in the face of the practice and spirit of
science. He thought that his theory of truth fits well with scientific attitudes.
As we have seen, James starts his analysis of truth with the notion of verification. He
characterises the verification of ideas in wholly experiential terms. He tells us that an
idea has "associates peculiar to itself, motor as well as ideational.'09 The verification
of an idea happens when the actions and other ideas associated with it follow an
acceptable pattern of succession thereby leading us
into or up to, or towards, other parts of experience . . . The connexions and
transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious,
satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an
idea's verification.60
This idea of 'leading' requires a close examination. The leading of an idea may be
'towards' as well as 'into' the independent reality or, more broadly, into the
neighbourhood of or into the universe of its independent reality. James characterises
the realities with which true ideas agree in the following.
In Pragmatism, he tells us that:
Realities mean . . . either concrete facts, or abstract kinds of things and
relations perceived intuitively between them. They furthermore and thirdly
mean, as things that new ideas of ours must no less take account of, the






Realities include both the empirical and the abstract or the conceptual. The focus
here is on empirical reality.62 Empirical reality, for James, is a 'world of pure
experience', a continuous world of thoroughgoing objective relatedness. Things that
belong to reality are conjoined one and all by a continuous manifold of relations that
more or less smoothly lead from one thing to another. This definition applies to the
other two kinds of realities which are not the focus of our discussion here. It is clear
that James needs a different account of the relation between ideas and reality than
that of correspondence. The latter relation simply does not fit with such an
interpretation of reality. An account is needed of the relation of truth that accounts
well for reality defined as such.
In MT, James distinguishes between two types of relations, 'saltatory' relations and
'ambulatory' relations.63
Now the most general way of contrasting my view of knowledge with the
popular view (which is also the view of most epistemologists) is to call my
view ambulatory, and the other view saltatory.64
As said earlier, what James says about 'knowledge' or 'cognition' applies also to
truth. In a saltatory relation there is an instantaneous leap from the idea to its object.
The common-sense relation of correspondence is an example of a saltatory relation
which James had rejected for being mysterious and empirically vacuous. For it does
not tell us how our ideas refer to their objects. In contrast, James holds that the
relation of truth which connects an idea with the object to which it refers is an
ambulatory relation. In ambulatory relations, ideas lead us through intervening
experiences to a direct perception of the object to which they refer or to one or other
of their associates, whether these are other ideas or mental states of another person or
62The third meaning of reality is discussed later on.
6jJames attributes this distinction to Strong.
64Jantes, MT, 79.
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unobservable scientific entities. Ambulation becomes constitutive of the relation of
truth. Truth is made by the ambulation through the intermediate experiences.65 These
intermediate experiences lead from ideas to their objects or from the knower to the
known. Those empirical intermediaries constitute the workings of true ideas. These
ideas are found in James's writings at various periods. In his essay 'A World of Pure
Experience', published in 1904, James says:
Whenever certain intermediaries are given, such that, as they develope [sic]
towards their terminus, there is experience from point to point of one
direction followed, and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that their
starting-point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an object meant
or biown.66
Again
Pragmatists are unable to see what you can possibly mean by calling an idea
true, unless you mean that between it as a terminus a quo in someone's
mind and some particular reality as a terminus ad quern, such concrete
workings do or may intervene. Their direction constitutes the idea's
reference to that reality, their satisfactoriness constitutes its adaptation
thereto, and the two things together constitute the 'truth' of the idea for its
possessor. Without such intermediating portions of concretely real
experience the pragmatist sees no materials out of which the adaptive
relation called truth can be built up.67
Thus the workings of true ideas establish the 'agreement' pragmatically defined
between true ideas and their objects to which they refer. What distinguish true ideas
are chains of empirical intermediaries that run from these ideas to reality. This
characterisation of agreement is also found in Pragmatism, where James writes:
To 'agree' in the widest sense with a reality, can only mean to be guided
either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such
working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it






In 'The Function ofCognition', James has already formulated this pragmatic account
of agreement between ideas and reality. He says that
a conceptual feeling, or thought, knows a reality, whenever it actually or
potentially terminates in a percept that operates on or resembles that
reality, or is otherwise connected with it or with its context. The latter
percept may be either sensation or sensorial idea; and when I say the
thought must terminate in such a percept, I mean that it must ultimately be
capable of leading up thereto—by the way of practical experience, if the
terminal feeling be a sensation; by the way of logical or habitual suggestion,
if it be only an image in the mind.69
This leads us directly to James's account of intentionality. For once one rejects the
copy notion of truth, which regards thought a mere duplicate of reality, one is faced
with the problem of giving an account of how thought can know or be 'about'
reality. James was confronted with this problem having already rejected the
copy-theory epistemology. Hence, he had to provide an account of the aboutness of
thought. The same series of empirical intermediaries that go between the idea and its
reality constitutes the foundation both James's account of agreement between
thought and reality and his account of intentionality. His empirical account of truth
follows naturally from his account of intentionality as we shall now see.
The truth of our ideas depends on both how the world really is and what these ideas
are about. As remarked earlier, James's account begins with the question of how our
ideas can be about what they are, or how our ideas can know realities independent of
them? James expresses this puzzling question in the following.
Although we cannot help believing that our thoughts do mean realities and
are true or false of them, we cannot for the life of us ascertain how they can
mean them. If thought be one thing and reality another, by what pincers,
from out of all the realities, does the thought pick out the special one it
intends to know?70
69James, MT, 27-28.
70James's review of Royce's The Religious Aspect ofPhilosophy in ECR, 386.
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In the case of sense-perception, James told us in the quotation above that one's ideas
can know things outside one's perceptual field by being capable of leading one
through a series of intermediary experiences that would terminate in an actual
percept of the object referred to. For instance, my idea of my violin is regarded as
'cognitive' ofmy real violin because the actual fabric of experience is constituted in
a way that makes the idea capable of leading into a chain of other experiences which
terminate at the end in a vivid sense perceptions of a small instrument with four
strings and a bow which is the violin. My being led to the violin does not merely
indicate what I have been thinking about. Rather, the leading relation is supposed to
be constitutive of the intentional one. The objects that we practically operate on are
the same ones that our ideas refer to. My percept of the violin does not only verify
my idea of it; proving "its function of knowing that percept to be true,"71 the
existence of the percept, in which the series of intermediaries terminates, also
indicates that it was to what my idea has referred. James's account here is rather the
contrary to what we commonly assume. On his account, the 'direction of fit'
between the violin and my attempt to identify it suggests that it is the violin which
adjusts itself to my inquiries rather than the other way around. My idea of the violin
refers to the violin because if I had to identify the violin, I would eventually track it
down.
The next obvious question is how can the cases be accounted for in which the object
referred to is mis-located? If the ideas are constituted by the chain of intermediaries
which extends back to the object itself, then it seems rather difficult to account for
the cases where our ideas misidentify their objects. In general, the problem is: how
can false ideas or error be accounted for?
"James, MT, 64 and also ERE, 31.
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Let us again use a similar example to illustrate James's answer. On his explanation,
when thinking of a book which I should take to the library for renewal and have left
in my room, my idea of the book will determine the direction ofmy way to the place
were the book is. My idea of it will endure until the sensible presence of the book is
there. So my idea of the book is cognitive of the actual book in which it terminates.
Now, if I went back to my flat to get the book and picked up accidentally another
book, then I have committed a mistake having picked up the wrong object. But
having picked up the wrong book does not imply that my idea all the way was of the
wrong book. If the leading process does create the function as James was just saying,
then it seems unlikely that this result could be avoided. James does, however,
provide an account of error that would avoid this outcome. In 'The Function of
Cognition', he says that an idea
knows whatever reality it resembles, and either directly or indirectly
operates on. If it resemble without operating, it is a dream; if it operate
without resembling, it is an error.72
An example of error which James gives is that of an idea that operates on a reality
which it resembles only partially and one that does not intend. In contrast, a true idea
is one which resembles the object it refers to more completely.73 Such as in the case
where I picked up a different book thinking that it was the book that I wanted to pick
up. Accordingly, in order that I refer to the book successfully, I should not only
operate on the book but also that it should be the one that most resembles my idea.
Hence, the object of the wrong book partially resembles my original idea, while the
right book resembles my idea more completely rather than partially.
On this account, we can say that the object that partially resembled my original idea
is one that does not prove to harmonise with my general set of beliefs while the idea




with my previous set of beliefs. However, it should not be concluded that James's
account is no more than a resemblance theory. If it was so concluded, then we are
committing ourselves to holding that James's account has nothing to do with our
investigations and interests. This is by no means the case. The appeal to resemblance
may only pose some constraints on our inquiries and interests but it does not make
the only determinant factor in deciding the truth of ideas. The reason is that if it were
the only determinant, then James's account would become impossible. For he thinks,
against the copy theory, that an idea may be equally satisfied by a number of objects.
For our future inquiries and interests play an important role in deciding the degree of
truth that we ascribe to ideas. The copy-theory epistemology that takes ideas as exact
portraits of the objects to which they refer obviously holds that there is only one way
in which a true idea can refer to its reality, and that is by copying it. This leaves no
room for the contribution of our interests and future investigations and the role that
our previously held beliefs play. Moreover, even if an idea copied its reality so
closely, we would still have to account for the way in which that idea refers to this
particular reality rather than another reality that may resemble it. So some common
intermediary experiential environment constitutes the basis for the reference of this
idea to that reality.74 There are various types of relations that hold between our ideas
and the objects to which they refer. These are:
(1) Our thoughts and our acts, with the relations between them;
(2) Our acts and our "objects," with the relation between them
(environmental). These are direct relations. Another direct relation that
obtains only in cases of maximum knowledge of the object is
(3) that our thoughts shall resemble it, the more completely the better, so to
be "true" portraits of it.
(4) The fourth relation is the indirect one, between the thought and that
object, established by means of (1) and (2).75
74James's letter to Strong, Perry, II, 544.
"Perry, II, 545.
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The essential point that James is making is that in order to establish reference one
needs both (1) and (2). Both are necessary in order to establish (3) and (4).
Resemblance by itself is not sufficient to account for why an idea refers to that
particular reality. In fact (1) and (2) give the account for (3) for ideas cannot be
portraits of reality "unless there be some real path to the individual thing
portrayed"76 by being led into its general environment by a chain of intermediary
experiences. These experiences, as said earlier, terminate in a direct sense percept
somewhere.77 Thus, reference "demands (1) and (2), and gives (4) when taken
abstractly and saltatorily; while the perfection of knowledge, or of "truth," requires
(3) as well."78
This classification of the relations by which an idea can be true of its object suggests
that truth may have degrees. At its highest level, truth becomes absolute or perfect.
This level can be, James seems to be saying, based on direct and indirect relations
which are assumed to be of a lower degree, culminating in a type of truth according
to which ideas become exact 'portraits' of their objects. Besides this distinction
between types of truth, James distinguishes between different types of objects for
ideas to know that start from sensations up to the thing-in-itself. The truths that we
have of these objects range from the imperfect symbolic and representative to the
perfect absolute. James calls our knowledge of absolute truth as adequate knowledge
as opposed to inadequate knowledge which we possess of objects other than absolute
realities. The knowledge of the latter is one that is obtained by 'absolute telepathic
confluence' in which case the idea and its object are identified.79
76Perry, II, 545.
77James says: "The paradigms to which all cases reduce are direct percepts of relation, ethical,
mathematical, or what not; and these are not "true" so much as "real." They correspond to sense
percepts in the realm of outer fact." Perry, II, 547.
Perry, II, 545.
79See James's letter to C. A. Strong, dated July 1, 1907 in Perry, II, 538.
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Thus James provides two types of truth: (1) empirical truth which is established by
the process of verification by which we accept ideas; (2) absolute truth which is
established by confluence and in which an idea is identified with its object. It
appears at once that there is a problem here. If James is arguing for an empirical
account of truth that analyses it in terms of the working of ideas in an experiential
context, then his adherence to an absolute truth established by confluence seems to
lead to unavoidable contradiction or inconsistencies. Although he argues for this type
of truth, however, he is seen at times willing to give up this notion of absolute truth
quite easily. In a letter to C. A. Strong, James writes:
I see no obstacle to supposing that such telepathic fusion might some time
be realized, but if you consider it eternally impossible or self-contradictory,
drop it. I only used it ad hominem as a type of what my adversaries might
mean by absolutely final truth.80
Perry points out that this type of absolute truth, which sounds rather mystical, is
different from the notion of ideal truth which is based on the idea of agreement.81
7. ABSOLUTE TRUTH
While defining truth as relative to person and time, James postulates the notion of
the 'absolutely true'. The notion of truth as an ideal and absolute seems at odds with
his pragmatic view of truth. It is not clear if he was really committed to such a view.
The postulation of this type of truth may be due to James's major concern to
preserve the objectivity of truth. The origin of this idea can be traced back to Duhem.
A physical theory, Duhem tells us, is a classification of experimental laws and not a
mere representation of them. A theory brings different experimental laws together
80Perry, II, 540.
8lSee Perry's footnote to James's letter to C. A. Strong in Perry, 11, 540.
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forming a certain order and classification among them. The classification of laws of
different phenomena under different categories makes the use of these laws in
solving problems easier and more convenient. ''Order, wherever it reigns," Duhem
says, "brings beauty with it. Theory not only renders the group of physical laws it
represents easier to handle, more convenient, and more useful, but also more
beautiful."82
This order and organisation that physical theories show makes it "impossible for us
to believe that this order and this organization are not the reflected image of a real
order and organization."83 But since physical theories are only concerned with the
data of observation, they cannot disclose to us any order that goes beyond sensible
experience. Thus,
the more complete it [physical theory] becomes, the more we apprehend that
the logical order in which theory orders experimental laws is the reflection
of an ontological order, the more we suspect that the relations it establishes
among the data of observation correspond to real relations among things,
and the more we feel that theory tends to be a natural classification.
It is in the nature of the method that the physicist employs in investigating physical
phenomena that it cannot be used to prove or disprove the existence of real relations
that correspond to the relations which are established by the theory. In this case,
when the logical evidence is not available, the matter may legitimately be decided on
subjective grounds.
Yielding to an intuition which Pascal would have recognized as one of those
reasons of the heart "that reason does not know," he [the physicist] asserts
his faith in a real order reflected in his theories more clearly and more






Hence, natural classification is, for Duhem, an ideal form of a high degree of
perfection towards which physical theory aspires to arrive. Since this ideal form
transcends the world of appearances or phenomena, it is not in the power of the
scientist who applies his methods in constructing physical theories in the world of
appearances to provide a rationally argued answer to the question of whether or not
this ideal order exists. However, the scientist can feel free to adopt this notion as a
mere act of faith and not of reason.
This brief discussion of Duhem's view of natural classification has for intent
preparation for examining James's arguments for absolute truth which run on similar
lines. James also distinguishes between what he calls "the sensible order and . . . the
ideal order."86 This characterisation is similar to Duhem's. James admits this
distinction but, unlike Duhem, he attempts to provide an empirical account of the
ideal order. It can now be shown that James's attempt to give such an account fails
terribly. His notion of absolute truth is confused and in fact superfluous to his
empirical account of truth. It is a view that seems difficult to square with his declared
antipathy for abstractions. He was always interested in truth in the plural, holding
that truth with a capital T is a mere abstraction. His adherence to it is best taken as a
mere act of faith on his part.
In Pragmatism, James writes:
The 'absolutely' true, meaning what no farther experience will ever alter, is
that ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine that all our temporary
truths will some day converge. . . . Meanwhile we have to live to-day by
what truth we can get to-day, and be ready to-morrow to call it falsehood.
Ptolemaic astronomy, euclidean space, aristotelian logic, scholastic
metaphysics, were expedient for centuries, but human experience has boiled
over those limits, and we now call these things only relatively true, or true
within those borders of experience. 'Absolutely' they are false; for we know
86James, PRAG, 101.
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that those limits were casual, and might have been transcended by past
theorists just as they are by present thinkers.87
The same point is emphasised in MT:
Truth absolute, he [the pragmatist] says, means an ideal set of formulations
towards which all opinions may in the long run of experience be expected to
converge.88
James also characterises the absolute truth as
at7 ideal opinion in which all men might agree, and which no man should
ever wish to change®
Let us examine these passages in detail. Absolute truth as James understood it can be
characterised by the following. Firstly, it is objective in the sense that it transcends
the subjectivity of individual truths held by any individual. Thus, there is a natural
progressive development of truths from the subjective to the objective, from the less
perfect to the more perfect. Secondly, since it is an ideal limit to which relative truths
may in the future converge: it is fixed, independent of person, time and circumstance
and can never be replaced by a better set of truths. Thirdly, it can be described
entirely in experiential terms and at the same time it is expected to be objective in the
sense of being independent of what any individual may think. Fourthly, James's
move from relative truths to absolute truths can only be achieved through the
admission that truth has degrees. Thus, individuals, by sharing their knowledge and
exchanging ideas via social intercourse, are able to interpret and predict a whole
range of experiences. They become more competent at reaching more objective






Having rejected the common-sense notion of truth according to which truth is
independent of experience, to preserve some objectivity to truth, James posits
absolute truth whose content, however, is entirely experiential. He seems to be using
the concept of absolute truth in different ways or meanings though he does not
explicitly distinguish between these different uses.
In one usage, James distinguishes absolute truth from relative truth by claiming that
the former is not in the position of being overthrown or refuted by the further
experience of any individual or individuals. Thus, absolute truth can be described as
the kind of truth where there is no possibility that it may be refuted by future
experience. An example that James gives which represents this meaning of absolute
truth is given in his ERE.
[T]he immediate experience in its passing is always 'truth,' practical truth,
something to act on, at its own movement. If the world were then and there
to go out like a candle, it would remain truth absolute and objective, for it
would be 'the last word,' would have no critic, and no one would ever
oppose the thought in it to the reality intended.90
Thus, at the moment that the world would end, the beliefs held by individuals
become absolutely true. For in this case, there would be no experiences that might
render any beliefs refuted. However, one might argue that since there are no
consequences to follow from those beliefs, the talk about their truth-value at that
circumstance is meaningless. Absolute truth, in this meaning of it, would be a
pragmatically meaningless notion. Thus, we have here beliefs which are both true
and meaningless.
The second way in which James understands the notion of absolute truth is as an
ideal limit towards which human opinions converge with respect to a certain topic.
""James, ERE, 13. In a footnote to the word 'truth' in this passage, James writes: "Note the ambiguity
of this term, which is taken sometimes objectively and sometimes subjectively."
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How this idea of convergence is to be understood is what we shall now examine. The
first question to be raised is the following: is the convergence at issue one of total
agreement among individuals to a certain limit or proposition or does the
convergence concern the actual content of the proposition agreed upon? Some
passages suggest that the convergence sought is one of total agreement. In addition
to the passages cited at the beginning of our discussion of absolute truth, the
following clearly emphasises this answer. James tells us that "the more fully men
discuss and test my account, [of truth] the more they will agree that it fits, and the
less will they desire a change."91
When the pragmatist defines absolute truth, James says, he postulates, among other
things, "that there is a tendency to such convergence of opinions, to such ultimate
consensus."92 So it seems that the convergence that James is holding is, in one sense,
one of extensive agreement among individuals. In this sense, if all individuals come
to agree on a limit, then this limit would certainly be absolutely true because it will
not be refuted by any individual and thus will not be judged as false by any
individual. Thus, assuming the first meaning of absolute truth, the limit to which all
opinions have converged would be pragmatically absolutely true.
James also introduces another meaning of absolute truth according to which
agreement among individuals is not the most crucial element in defining absolute
truth. Truth, he says, neither follows "the counting of noses, nor is it only another
name for a majority vote."93 He allows that beliefs which are subject to total
agreement might actually be false.
That men do exist who are 'opinionated,' in the sense that their opinions are





one's notion of truth in general may be. But that this fact should make it
impossible for truth to form itself authentically out of the life of opinion is
what no critic has yet proved. Truth may well consist of certain opinions,
and does indeed consist of nothing but opinions, tho not every opinion need
be true. No pragmatist needs to dogmatize about the consensus of opinion in
the future being right—he need only postulate that it will probably contain
more of truth than anyone's opinion now.94
Here James is fully aware of the various elements that contribute to the formulation
of beliefs. He recognises that some opinions are better than others, that the scope and
type of one's experiences are co-determinants of the beliefs that one holds as true.
The experiences upon which the opinions of individuals are formed are experiences
of an independent reality "the existence of which all opinions must acknowledge, in
order to be true."9" Here James is trying to show that the fact that absolute truth is
comprised of individual opinions does not detract from its objectivity, for those
opinions are founded on or related to objective facts. In this way, he shows that his
account of absolute truth remains within experiential boundaries and retains its
objectivity. James recognises that the total agreement is neither a necessary nor
sufficient condition for establishing absolute truth.
James agrees that the more we come to agree on a matter, the closer we come to
absolute truth. However, it does not follow that absolute truth should be defined in
terms of complete consensus. Having said that convergence as agreement is not
necessary for establishing absolute truth, let us now consider the second meaning of
convergence which concerns the actual content of the ideal limit. James refers to this
type of convergence as the regulative notion of truth. In Pragmatism, he writes:
The regulative notion of a potential better truth to be established later,
possibly to be established some day absolutely, and having powers of
retroactive legislation, turns its face, like all pragmatist notions, towards
concreteness of fact, and towards the future. Like the half-truths, the




growth of a mass of verification-experience, to which the half-true ideas are
all along contributing their quota.96
An absolute truth which may be ascertained some day is a regulative notion which
can only be made sense of within the world of concrete fact. In the sense James
describes, a 'better truth' with 'powers of retroactive legislation' as a truth which
provides the ideally best explanation or account of our experience. Thus
characterised, it is the ideal limit which is entirely objective. It is so because it can
never be superseded or improved upon in the future. Note here that this absolute
truth includes the first meaning of absolute truth, in the sense that it cannot be
refuted by future experience.
Furthermore, James seems to be holding that although, at the present moment, we
cannot, within the limits of our own experience, and the beliefs that we now hold
provide evidence for the existence of absolute truth, we can still hold that it does
exist. James's attempt to adhere consistently to an empirical account of truth and a
notion of absolute truth is likely to fail because the tension between these two
different types of truth cannot be resolved in the way that he seems to be suggesting.
On his characterisation of absolute truth as regulative notion, absolute truth is
independent of the experiences of individuals. The fact that a set of propositions may
be the best explanation of experience and thus be regarded as absolutely true, is
independent of whether this set is believed to be true in the present or in the future
by any individual. Furthermore, we are not in a position to empirically determine
that this set of proposition will ever be identified as such. Yet we assume that this set
of propositions can be true knowing that it is possible that it will never be recognised
as such. If it is considered James's view that every proposition, scientific or
otherwise, is subject to revision or rejection in the light of future experience, it would
%James, PRAG, 107.
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seem obvious that the set of propositions which is absolutely true is likely to be in
contradiction with this claim.
One might then conclude that James cannot consistently combine his notion of
absolute truth and his empirical account of truth. For on James's account we can
hold that some ideal set of propositions is absolutely true at the present, although we
do not have any empirical grounds for accepting it. This notion of the 'absolutely
true' seems also at odds with some of James's fundamental views of scientific
theories which are against the idea of convergence towards one theory. As we have
argued in Part One, James held that any given phenomenon may be equally well
accounted for by more than one theory. Most importantly the idea that a scientific
theory cannot be a literal copy of reality as it is in itself, a view which has lost its
scientific credibility in modern science. James's views of science rule out the very
possibility of deciding on empirical grounds that some theory is absolutely true or
that different or successive scientific theories may converge some day to an ideal
limit. James's commitment to empiricism far exceeds his commitment to absolute
truth. On his account, to preserve the objectivity of truth, James must resort to an
ideal limit, as he defined, it on the cost of abandoning his experientialism. In one
way, this conflict can be resolved once he follows Duhem by honouring his
commitment to empiricism; declaring that his adherence to absolute truth is a mere
act of faith and not an act of reason.
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8. SATISFACTION
James clearly states the principal difference between his view of truth and that of the
anti-pragmatist, or the common-sense view, in the following.
Where the pragmatist postulates a 'reality' for our ideas to be true of, the
antipragmatists postulate a preexistent or absolute 'truth' for them to
imitate. So far, it would seem that there is only a verbal difference. But the
difference is really pragmatic. For the absolute truth must be univocally and
literally copied by any belief that is true. Its fixity is of its essence. 'Reality'
on the other hand, ever so fixed in itself, permits of an indefinite variety in
our ways of knowing it truly. We make our contribution to the truth product
and the same reality may be the object for many formulas, none false, and
none irrelevant.97
The notion that our contributions bear on determining the truth-value of ideas is
based on the claim that there are various ways by which we can know reality. This
suggestion is based on an application of one of James's propositions about science;
that the same phenomenon can be accounted for equally by more than one scientific
formula and that the choice between them, provided it cannot be made on evidential
grounds, becomes a matter of the maximum satisfactions that one formula may
guarantee compared to its rivals. These 'satisfactions',98 which can also be referred
to as subjective factors, include simplicity, taste and consistency with previously
held beliefs. The contributions of individuals to determining the 'truest' formula
come in place in that sense. This notion is extended to truth, where James lays
emphasis on the multiplicity of ways in which truth can be known. This requires the
introduction of subjective elements such as satisfaction or satisfactoriness as
co-determinants of the truth of beliefs. These satisfactions as applied to truth include




"[t]he truth is constituted by its verifiability, not by the act of verification."99 He
introduces satisfaction as a criterion for determining the truth of ideas.
Satisfaction is indispensable, for truth, but it isn't sufficient. Between the
indispensable and the sufficient, there is a wide chasm. It is indispensable,
for a belief to be true, that it should be satisfactory, but it isn't sufficient.100
The exact way in which James links the verifiability of beliefs with their
satisfactoriness is not clearly demonstrated. The way this connection is established is
crucial to understanding his use of satisfactoriness as a criterion in determining the
truth of ideas. Let us now consider the different senses of satisfaction which are
applicable to all kinds of beliefs. James writes:
One can distinguish 3 ranges of satisfactoriness in our hypotheses:
Intrinsic, as when they form a pretty picture, schemes, Utopias,
subjective reveries generally, language of flowers, their soul, etc
Relational, as when they "agree" with all sorts of other hypotheses
and beliefs.
Subsequential, as when the consequences to ourselves of believing
them are satisfactory. These subsequential satisfactions can be divided into
two kinds. The first kind follows from our merely having the belief
(religions, fool's paradises etc) the second from its "object" being a
reality.10'
The first type of satisfactoriness is relatively straightforward.
The second type of satisfactoriness represents a second meaning of the relation of
agreement whereby a true belief is one which fits with other beliefs that the
individual already accepts. This second type of satisfactoriness as agreement
depends on the fundamental meaning of agreement as an affair of leading. These two
meanings of agreement are added by James to the unsatisfactory form of agreement





meanings of the relation of agreement is clearly put in the following quotation from
Pragmatism:
And often agreement will only mean the negative fact that nothing
contradictory from the quarter of that reality comes to interfere with the way
in which our ideas guide us elsewhere. To copy a reality is, indeed, one very
important way of agreeing with it, but it is far from being essential. The
essential thing is the process of being guided. Any idea that helps us to deal,
whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings,
that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that fits, in fact, and adapts
our life to the reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the
requirement. It will hold true of that reality.102
According to this second meaning of satisfactoriness, satisfactory beliefs are those
which are protected from contradictions with later experience. What makes any true
idea a satisfactory one, in this sense, is its consistency with previously accepted
beliefs. This fitting is realised through the smooth and continuous transitions
between experiences which go uninterrupted by contradictions and inconsistencies
which future experiences may confront us with. When a contradiction arises in one's
stock of beliefs one ought to revise his whole set of beliefs causing in this process
the minimal possible changes in it. When a new belief of any kind is tested, it is
tested in conjunction with one's previously held beliefs. For beliefs of any kind are
not tested individually but holistically. If it is accepted as true, it is expected to have
caused the least possible modification to one's originally held stock of beliefs. For in
this matter of belief, James tells us, "we are all extreme conservatives."103 James
recognised, for example, that the belief in the Absolute might be satisfactory or
useful in the sense of securing a kind of 'moral holiday'. He rejected it, nevertheless,
on the grounds that it does not cohere with his stock of previously held beliefs. If one
took satisfactoriness in an ordinary usage, and took James to be equating the true
James, PRAG, 102.
ltbThis point is clearly stated in the following. "The individual has a stock of old opinions [or beliefs]
already, but he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain. Somebody contradicts them; or in a
reflective moment he discovers that they contradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they
are incompatible . .. The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger,
and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of opinions. He saves as much of
it as he can." James, PRAG, 34-35.
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with the useful, as some commentators did, then one must consider the belief in the
Absolute as true for some people because it is useful in the above sense. In James's
second sense of satisfactoriness, however, the belief in the Absolute is rejected as
unsatisfactory because it clashes with James's previously held beliefs. James
illustrates this point as follows:
[T]he greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths.
Truths have once for all this desperate instinct of self-preservation and of
desire to extinguish whatever contradicts them. My belief in the Absolute,
based on the good it does me, must run the gauntlet of all my other beliefs.
Grant that it may be true in giving me a moral holiday. Nevertheless, as I
conceive it,—and let me speak now confidentially, as it were, and merely in
my own private person,—it clashes with other truths of mine whose benefits
T | • • 104
1 hate to give up on its account.
Internal consistency of one's held beliefs, as one type of satisfactoriness, and indeed
the chief among other satisfactions, is considered by James as a human contribution
to the determination of the truth of any belief of whatever kind.
Our nouns and adjectives are all humanized heirlooms, and the theories we
build them into, the inner order and arrangement is wholly dictated by
human considerations, intellectual consistency being one of them.
Mathematics and logic themselves are fermenting with human
rearrangements; physics, astronomy and biology follow massive cues of
preference.105
Consistency is considered as a type of satisfaction because it assists us in handling
the mass of beliefs that we hold by our "assimilating, rejecting, or rearranging"106 of
new and old beliefs when we are presented with new beliefs in the course of
experience. In the course of this process the new idea or belief that we admit to our





"mediates between the stock and the new experience and runs them into one another
most felicitously and expediently."107
The individual's stock of beliefs includes active truths and latent truths. An active
truth is one which is practically relevant to a certain situation and upon which the
individual is prompted to act. A latent truth is one which is practically irrelevant to
any present situation for the individual and in that sense the individual is unlikely to
act on it. James refers to those temporary latent truths as 'extra truths' which are
"ideas that shall be true ofmerely possible situations."108 He writes:
Whenever such an extra truth becomes practically relevant to one of our
emergencies, it passes from cold-storage to do work in the world, and our
belief in it grows active. You can say of it then either that 'it is useful
because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful.' Both these phrases
mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled
and can be verified. . . . True ideas would never have been singled out as
such, would never have acquired a class-name, least of all a name
suggesting value, unless they had been useful from the outset in this way.109
Thus, to be useful, a beliefmust be relevant to the believer's circumstance and that it
can be acted on in a satisfactory manner.
To be either true or false the idea must be relevant. Second the truth must be
establisht [sic] by satisfactoriness in the working.110
James's use of 'utility' is founded on the notion of the total system of beliefs and the
notion of relevance as just described.
In the third sort of satisfactoriness, that which James calls subsequential, he






would follow from holding a belief and those that would follow from the existence
of the object to which the idea is referring. In Pragmatism, James fails to make the
distinction clear between these two different types of consequences, causing thereby
considerable difficulties.111 To attain a good grasp of how he uses consequences as a
type of satisfactoriness in his account of truth, it is essential to examine his views on
the meaning of ideas which he defines in terms of consequences and which is related
to his account of truth, though he does not make this connection as explicit as it
might have been. The tying of meaning with practical consequences is based on his
view that thinking is one step in a process that terminates in action. Our ideas and
thoughts are instruments that help us to act and fulfil our aims and purposes in life
and to cope better with our experiences. In this lies the significance of thinking for
James and to that extent he is interested in the meaning of ideas as connected with
experience and human action. Here also, like truth, James's use of 'meaning' departs
from the common usage, according to which the meaning of an idea is independent
from the way it is applied.
9. PRAGMATIC METHOD
James made several remarks on meaning which he did not attempt to formulate in
any consistent way. Hence, the commentator is confronted with the difficult task of
constructing his view and that requires a good deal of interpretation. A brief
discussion of his account of meaning prepares us for examining some of the
UIA. O. Lovejoy was among those who raised this problem and expressed it in the clearest of terms.
James acknowledges his failure to make this distinction clear in a letter to Lovejoy, dated September
13, 1907, in which he writes: '[Wjhen it comes to your distinction between two meanings in the first
meaning of pragmatism, 1 have to frankly cry peccavi—you convict me of real sin. Consequences of
true ideas per se, and consequences of ideas qua believed by us, are logically different consequences,
and the whole "will to believe" business has got to be re-edited with explicit uses made of the
distinction. 1 have been careless here, and I hope that you, in your article, will spread out that matter
at the length it deserves. Failure to do it on my part has been a misdemeanor.' Perry, II, 481.
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significant interpretations of James's theory of truth and also helps in replying to
some criticisms raised by his critics.
In the second lecture of Pragmatism, James argues that practical consequences
determine the meaning of the ideas or concepts from which they follow.112 He
introduces the 'pragmatic method' as a tool that helps us in tracing the practical
consequences of concepts in order to determine their meaning. Thus, the meanings of
concepts, such as 'truth' and 'God' and other metaphysical concepts, are to be
determined by the application of the pragmatic method which is designed to assist us
in recognising the meanings of these concepts. James explains that:
To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only
consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may
involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we
must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or
remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as
that conception has positive significance at all.' 3
What James is suggesting is that if an idea does not possess any practical effects,
then it lacks any meaning. He appeals to science to find support for this notion.
Ostwald, who James describes as the 'illustrious Leipzig chemist', is one good
example which James takes of someone utilising the pragmatic method and
advocating a pragmatic view of meaning. James reports him as saying that:
"All realities influence our practice . . . and that influence is their meaning
for us. I am accustomed to put questions to my classes in this way: In what
respects would the world be different if this alternative or that were true? If
I can find nothing that would become different, then the alternative has no
"'James, PRAG, 28.
"
'James, PRAG, 29. James says that this principle of pragmatism was first introduced into
philosophy by C. S. Peirce in 1878 in his paper 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear'. James, PRAG, 28.
James, PRAG, 29.
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James endorses Ostwald's words by remarking that "the rival views mean practically
the same thing, and meaning, other than practical, there is for us none."11"'' He quotes
an example from Ostwald where the pragmatic method is at work.
Chemists have long wrangled over the inner constitution of certain bodies
called 'tautomerous.' Their properties seemed equally consistent with the
notion that an instable hydrogen atom oscillates inside of them, or that they
are instable mixtures of two bodies. Controversy raged; but never was
decided. "It would never have begun," says Ostwald, "if the combatants had
asked themselves what particular experimental fact could have been made
different by one or the other view being correct. For it would then have
appeared that no difference of fact could possibly ensue; and the quarrel was
as unreal as if, theorizing in primitive times about the raising of dough by
yeast, one party should have invoked a 'brownie,' while another insisted on
an 'elf as the true cause of the phenomenon.116
The basis of Ostwald's method is captured by James in his claim that in meaning
[t]here can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference
elsewhere . . . The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what
definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life,
if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one."7
James is saying that whenever a debate arises over a certain philosophical problem
which is expected to involve opposing positions, the dispute is likely to be futile
unless the opposing views imply different practical consequences. This point is also
emphasised in the following:
The serious meaning of a concept, says Mr. Peirce, lies in the concrete
difference to someone which its being true will make. ... if it can make no
practical difference whether a given statement be true or false, then the
statement has no real meaning.118
115James, PRAG, 29.
"6James, PRAG, 29-30. Quoted from Ostwald's 'Theorie und Praxis', Zeitsch. des Oesterreichischen





If, questioning whether a certain concept be true or false, you can think of
absolutely nothing that would practically differ in the two cases, you may
assume that the alternative is meaningless.1'9
There are two kinds of practical consequences which are logically independent of
each other: those that follow from the object of which the idea is true and those that
follow from someone's believing that that idea is true. In order to determine whether
an idea is true or false, it must be meaningful. This requires both types of practical
consequences. Thus, a proposition is meaningful iff there are practical consequences
that follow from it and if holding that proposition by someone involves the
expectation or prediction of those consequences which is reflected in the various
number of experiences that they may lead to. Combining these two kinds of
consequences as constitutive of the meaning of an idea is not put forward in this way
by James, whose several statements about meaning were not very clear. The
combination of objective consequences and subjective consequences parallels
James's attempt to connect objective and subjective criteria as constitutive of truth.
10. SOME INTERPRETATIONS AND CRITICISMS
James's conception of practical consequences has been explained, pointing out his
definition of a meaningful idea as one which is constituted by practical consequences
both objective and subjective. Some of the formulations of James's view of meaning
which have inspired certain interpretations of James's theory of truth will now be
examined. In particular, the focus will be on A. J. Ayer's interpretation of James.
"9James, SPP, 60.
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Near the end of this Part, there will be a formulation of James's theory of truth and
indications of how it stands against other interpretations.
Because of James's varied references, such as the last two quotations and others, to
two kinds of practical consequences, some commentators ascribed two distinct
theories of meaning to James. A. O. Lovejoy distinguishes two different theories of
meaning as propounded by James. On one theory, the meaning of any proposition
consists entirely in the future experiential consequences to which it points, whether it
is believed or not.120 On the other theory, the meaning of any proposition is
constituted by the future experiences that will only occur upon believing it,
independent of whether the proposition itself allows the believer to predict the
experiential consequences to which the proposition points.121 Hence, if a proposition
possessed consequences for the life of the believer, then it would be regarded as
meaningful. It is not difficult to show, if James's account of meaning embodies these
two criteria, that a proposition which is considered as meaningful according to one
criterion may well turn out to be meaningless on the other. Construed in both its
senses, James's theory of meaning, Lovejoy argues, is composed of two criteria of
meaning which are inconsistent with each other. Take for example, the proposition
"There is an afterlife'. According to the first criterion of meaning, this proposition is
meaningless since there are no empirical consequences that would succeed upon the
presupposition that it is true. This proposition would be judged as meaningful on the
second criterion if the belief in afterlife would have good consequences for the
believer by bringing feelings of hope and emotional satisfaction.
To add to the incompatibility of the two criteria of meaning, Lovejoy shows that
each one is unsatisfactory. The first criterion is obviously a narrow one which
l20Lovejoy, 'The Thirteen Pragmatisms. I.', 8, and 'The Thirteen Pragmatisms. II.', 37.
mLovejoy, 'The Thirteen Pragmatisms. I.', 8, and 'The Thirteen Pragmatisms. II.', 37.
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excludes a whole range of propositions which we usually regard as meaningful, and
that makes it a 'highly paradoxical contention.' As for the second criterion, it is so
broad and inclusive that it guarantees meaning to whatever proposition that a
believer may wish to believe no matter how bizarre or unintelligible it might be.122 If
James did hold what Lovejoy is ascribing to him, then one cannot but admit the force
of these criticisms which he is making.
This bifurcation of James's account of meaning into two incompatible criteria of
meaning provided the foundation of some of the positivistic interpretations of
James's theory. Paul Henle followed Lovejoy in distinguishing within James's
account of meaning two criteria of meaning, highlighting the positivistic aspect of
James's theory. Henle writes:
A statement is meaningful if either (a) it has experiential consequences, or
(b) it has no such consequences, but belief in it has experiential
consequences. In case (a) the experiential consequences constitute the
meaning. This is the tough-minded view. In case (b) there is no explanation
of what constitutes the meaning and we are left with the bare criterion of
meaningfulness. This is the tender-minded view.123
Henle is thus trying to reconcile the two incompatible criteria by holding that the
first is what we may call the 'hard' one which is equivalent to the verifiability
criterion of meaning. The second criterion is the 'soft' one which he characterises as
a mere 'criterion ofmeaningfulness' which gives meaning to those propositions that
lack any experiential consequences in themselves but which have consequences for
the believers who hold them. However, there is no way of explaining the meaning of
such propositions.
'"Lovejoy, 'The Thirteen Pragmatisms. I.', 9.
'^Henle's introduction to William James in Fisch's Classic American Philosophers, 126.
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In his discussion of the pragmatic method, A. J. Ayer argues that James's use of it
goes far beyond his announced purpose of using it as a tool for "settling
metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable."124 He does not embark
on discussion of James's account of meaning on the grounds that he had already
discussed "Peirce's rather more sophisticated version of it."123 However, he remarks
that this extended use of the pragmatic method can be traced in James's equation of
true beliefs with those that work and his holding that different kinds of beliefs work
in different ways.126 Ayer holds that James's theory of meaning is linked with his
theory of truth.127 In fact, James's claim that true beliefs are those which work,
follows from his application of the pragmatic method.128 Unlike some
commentators, Ayer does not focus on the apparent inconsistencies of James's
statements on truth, he, rather, endeavours to reconstruct James's views to form "a
consistent and even tenable theory."129
Ayer holds that James equates the true with what works. However, all beliefs, Ayer
argues, do not work in the same way. The way beliefs work depends on the kind of
beliefs they are. Thus, beliefs concerning matters of fact are true if they work in the
sense that they describe sense experiences or predict experiences that they point to.
However, moral, aesthetic and religious beliefs are true if holding them secures
comfortable feelings or emotional satisfaction. The distinction between the different
ways different beliefs may work renders James's view of truth consistent. Ayer
insists that James is not to be accused of giving a confused account of truth, he just
did not make it clear how the different kinds of beliefs work.
l24James, PRAG, 28.
'""Ayer, The Origins ofPragmatism, 201.
l26Ayer, The Origins ofPragmatism, 201.
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Ayer, The Origins ofPragmatism, 199.
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Ayer, The Origins ofPragmatism, 199.
l2<5Ayer, The Origins ofPragmatism, 198.
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Satisfaction as a criterion of truth, on Ayer's view, only applies to the third class of
propositions, those of moral and religious ones. James's mistake was to offer it, as
some of his critics accused him, "as a general criterion of truth." Ayer thinks that
James only applied the criterion of satisfaction to beliefs of the third class.
The criterion of satisfaction which Ayer thinks that James only applied to moral and
religious beliefs is not very different from Henle's tender-minded criterion of
meaningfulness which leaves the question of meaning of such beliefs unanswered.
Indeed, we are left with no indication of what the meaning of these beliefs consists
in. We can simply believe what pleases us. For, it is one thing to argue that we do
accept such beliefs on the basis of their being emotionally satisfying, it is another
implausible claim to make the meaning of such beliefs lie exclusively in their
satisfying personal needs. On both Henle's and Ayer's accounts, this problem
persists and indeed is a major inadequacy in their formulations of James's theory of
meaning and of truth, for it only leads to really weird results. For assuming that
James did hold that the meaning of moral and religious beliefs consists wholly in
their guaranteeing emotional satisfaction, then the belief 'there is an afterlife', for
example, would have one meaning for the theist who firmly believes in afterlife and
another for the atheist who shrinks from the dreadful notion of an afterlife. This
shows that restricting the meaning of religious and moral beliefs to bare personal
satisfaction is an implausible view and one to which James was never really
committed. As shown earlier, the satisfaction that the believer gains as a result of
holding a belief belongs to the third type of satisfactoriness which James applied to
all beliefs. Later when the formulation of James's theory of truth is given, it will
become clear how this type of satisfactoriness functions. Moreover, the view that
James applies personal satisfaction to moral and religious beliefs only can hardly be
supported by James's text. On Ayer's interpretation, the meaning of moral and
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religious beliefs becomes so vague that it may be easily taken to be reduced to being
meaningless.
My view is that, for James, the claim that a belief is meaningful iff it has practical
consequences can apply to scientific, moral and religious beliefs. Henle's
tough-minded criterion and Ayer's criterion, according to which the meaning of a
belief consists in its future consequences, which he applies only to beliefs about
matters of fact, are both applied, as I understand James, to all kinds of beliefs. The
crucial point is to understand what James really meant by 'practical consequences'.
It seems that he uses this term in a much broader sense than both Ayer and Henle do.
Ayer restricts the consequences of beliefs to sense experiences. Taking into account
James's statements quoted above, that beliefs which have no practical consequences
lack meaning, one can see things from Ayer's point of view in his depriving moral
and religious beliefs of any serious meaning, since no empirical experiences are to
follow from them.
However, if one looks carefully at the way James uses 'practical consequences' and
the way he applies the pragmatic method to various kinds of concepts, one will see
that Ayer's interpretation is hardly tenable. Just as the pragmatic method was applied
by some scientists to settle scientific quarrels, as has been shown in the example of
Ostwald, pragmatic method is applied by James to settle metaphysical disputes by
clarifying the meaning of the concepts involved. The extension of application of the
pragmatic method from the realm of science to philosophy depends on James's
broadening the concept of practical consequences so as not to include only sense
experiences or empirically verifiable ones, but to include also metaphysical
consequences. The motivation behind this move is to ascribe meaning to those
concepts which lack empirical verifiable consequences and might otherwise be
disqualified as meaningless.
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An example might be helpful to show how this works. Consider James's discussion
of materialism and theism. On Ayer's account of James, which limits meaning to
beliefs which have empirically testable consequences and which applies satisfaction
only to moral and religious beliefs, the proposition 'God exists' will be meaningless
on Ayer's first criterion of meaning because it does not enable the theist to predict
empirically verifiable consequences from it. Its only meaning consists in the personal
satisfaction it gives to its holders.
On my view, which emphasises James's use of consequences in an inclusive rather
than solely empirical sense, the meaning of 'God exists' is not wholly based on the
personal satisfaction of holding the belief. It is also based on the future consequences
that would follow from the proposition itself. The consequences we are talking about
here are the moral ideals or standards and a life of hope and optimism that this
proposition promises. That 'God exists' is a meaningful proposition is not primarily
because it satisfies one to believe in it. It is primarily so because of the consequences
that follow from the proposition itself. We are not claiming that James denies any
role for personal satisfaction in determining the meaning of religious and
metaphysical concepts. All we are emphasising is that this element plays a secondary
role as a determining factor of meaning. Hence, we can say, as we have said earlier,
that the meaning of moral and religious beliefs is determined by both the
consequences that follow from the belief and the consequences for the believer from
believing them. These cannot be split into two distinct criteria as some commentators
thought. On Ayer's account, the proposition 'God exists' is denied any objectiveness
and seemed to have been located in the realm of total subjectiveness and even
meaninglessness, since Ayer does not tell us what the meaning of this proposition
does consist in.
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Similarly, the meaning ofmaterialism is determined by the future consequences that
it predicts, those of pessimism and destruction of moral values. Its meaning is not
determined by sheer personal satisfaction which the believer in materialism might
have upon believing it. In this sense, both theism and materialism are pragmatically
meaningful. If consequences were restricted to empirical ones, the debate between
theism and materialism would be meaningless. For the empirical consequences, so at
least James seems at times to suppose, are the same on either view and in this sense
the two positions are equal. The real difference that distinguishes one from the other
is the consequences (non-empirical) that each promises. One can then choose
objectively between them according to what satisfies one. Hence, the meaning of
moral and religious beliefs does not consist merely in the personal satisfaction which
the believer gains upon holding them, as Ayer and Henle thought.
That the meaningfulness of a moral or religious belief does not consist only in the
consequences that follow from believing it but also in the consequences that follow
from it is also shown in James's view of the Absolute. Regarding the meaningfulness
of the proposition 'The Absolute exists', James contends that:
Affirming the Absolute Mind, which is its substitute for God, to be the
rational presupposition of all particulars of fact, whatever they may be, it
remains supremely indifferent to what the particular facts in our world
actually are. Be they what they may, the Absolute will father them. . . . You
cannot redescend into the world of particulars by the Absolute's aid, or
deduce any necessary consequences of detail important for your life from
your idea of his nature.130
What James seems to be saying here is that there are no consequences that would
follow from the existence of the Absolute and the only pragmatic meaning that can
be ascribed to the proposition 'The Absolute exists' consists in the religious comfort
that the belief in the Absolute brings to its believers. This quotation may be taken as
l30James, PRAG, 40.
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showing James's denial to that proposition of any consequences that might follow
from it. However, this is by no means the case. For what he is pointing out in the
discussion of the pragmatic meaning of the Absolute, is that the meaning of this
proposition is not determined wholly by the consequences of believing it. James
shows that there are consequences that follow from the proposition itself which are
partly constitutive of its meaning. For even if there were no specific experiential
consequences to be deduced from it, it can still be the case that the proposition itself
predicts that good will eventually win over evil, if it proves to be true. Expectations
as such constitute the consequences that would follow from the proposition. Thus,
the meaning of the Absolute consists in both the consequences that are anticipated
from postulating its existence and the consequences that follow from believing it. To
conclude this discussion of the meaning of moral and religious beliefs, an attempt
has been made to show that James held that the meaning of these beliefs is
determined by both the consequences that follows from the beliefs themselves and
the consequences that follow from believing them, such as the feelings of comfort
and personal satisfaction. In fact, James held one criterion of meaning which is
comprised of two distinct and logically independent notions which he applied to all
kinds of propositions.
The interpretations of James's theory ofmeaning by Ayer and Henle when applied to
truth, deny any contribution of our interests to the determination of the truth of all
propositions and restrict it to moral, aesthetic and religious propositions. The aim of
such interpretations is to save James from the charge of subjectivism of which many
of his critics accused him. This reading, however, deprives James's theory of truth of
its most significant aspects, which he intended to apply to all kinds of propositions,
and leaves him with nothing new to offer.
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Another misguided reading of James's theory of truth is the one offered by H. S.
Thayer. Thayer distinguishes in James's theory between 'cognitive' and 'pragmatic'
truth holding that what James was offering is an analysis of pragmatic truth. He
defines a pragmatically true idea as one which satisfies three conditions. It must:
1. Be cognitively true.
2. Be compatible with the older body of truths.
3. Work. It must provide some satisfaction of a need or purpose.131
Here several points can be made. Nowhere in James, one can find the distinction
between cognitive truth and pragmatic truth. On James's account, as we have shown
earlier, the copy version of the correspondence theory has been replaced, or reduced,
to the pragmatic theory of truth. This goes against Thayer's claim that pragmatic
truth is based on cognitive truth. What follows from this is that an idea cannot be
pragmatically true unless it was cognitively true. This goes against what James has
been arguing for all along. The notion of truth in terms of agreement, according to
James, has been replaced by the notion of working. In this sense, if one is to decide
the relation between pragmatic and cognitive truth, cognitive truth, on James's
account, becomes based on pragmatic truth. Thayer's account which regards
cognitive truth as an essential component of pragmatic truth seems to ignore James's
many statements in which he emphasised the emptiness and unintelligibility of the
notion of cognitive truth and the urgent need to replace it with an empirical notion of
truth that works for all kinds of ideas. If James intended his pragmatic view of truth
to be based on cognitive truth which he already charges with vagueness and
unintelligibility, then one would not expect his account of truth to be any less vague
and sterile. Thayer's account seems to represent James's theory of truth as an
addition to the intellectualist account of truth and not as a replacement to an account
which James challenged and subsequently rejected. The second and third conditions
lj'Thayer, Introduction to MT, xxxvii.
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of pragmatic truth, as Thayer put them, are not additional conditions to the first
condition, i.e., cognitive truth, they are rather co-determinants of cognitive truth.
G. E. Moore's132 account of James's theory of truth lacks any recognition of the way
James connects verifiability and satisfactoriness in its different types as two
conditions of truth. According to Moore, James's only objection to the copy theory
of truth is that 'copying' is not a property of all true ideas, since some of our true
ideas do not actually copy reality.133 However, Moore held that verification and
utility are the properties which James thought to have belonged to all true ideas. 'Our
true ideas, he [James] seems to say, are those that "work," in the sense that they are
or can be "verified," or are "useful."'134 Consequently, James sought to establish
some connection between truth and verification or utility by asserting that:
(1) we can verify all those of our ideas, which are true;
(2) that all those among our ideas, which we can verify, are true;
(3) that all our true ideas are useful and
(4) that all those of our ideas, which are useful, are true.
Moore had no serious objection to (2) but he had serious objections to (3) and (4) the
basis of which were that all true ideas are not at all times useful and that we do at
times have useful ideas which are not true. For instance, one counter-example which
Moore gives against (4) is that of someone lying to a "party of savages, who wish to
make a night attack and massacre a party of Europeans but are deceived as to the
position in which the Europeans are encamped. It is surely plain that such a false
idea is sometimes useful".135
I32As a keen defender of the common-sense viewpoint, Moore was hostile to any other view of truth
which he believed to depart from or to conflict with common sense. According to him, a belief is true,
if and only if it corresponded to a fact. An analysis of this relation of'correspondence', Moore admits,
cannot be easily given. However, it is the kind of relation that holds between any belief and one fact
only, where both sides of the relation are explicated by the use of sentential expressions according to
which, a belief is described as 'the belief that p' and the fact as 'the fact that p'. Moore, Some Main
Problems ofPhilosophy, 277-78. See also Sprigge, James & Bradley, 16.
'"Moore, Philosophical Studies, 98.
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From our discussion of the different ranges of satisfactoriness which James had
distinguished within our beliefs and hypotheses, it can be certain that Moore is using
"utility' in its usual and ordinary usage. For James, as has been seen, satisfactoriness
in its different types is a co-determinant of the truth-value of beliefs. Thus, only
consequences which are relevant to the belief are taken into account in determining
the truth-value of beliefs. To consider Moore's example just mentioned, the savages'
belief about the position of the Europeans is, according to Moore, false because they
were deceived as to the correct position of their enemies. Here we have a false belief
held by the savages which was useful for the Europeans. When we talk about truth,
for James, we talk about truth for the individual and the determination of the
truth-value of any belief is based on the consequences that follow from that belief for
the believer. Hence, although the savages' belief about the position of the Europeans
is false because the Europeans succeeded in deceiving them about their position, the
fact that they were located elsewhere does not follow from the savages' belief about
the position of the Europeans. Thus, the fact that the Europeans have changed their
location is irrelevant to the determining of the truth-value of the savages' belief in
the correct position of the Europeans. Any consequences that follow from that are
irrelevant to the savages' belief. Moore seems to be holding that any consequences
contribute to determining the truth-value of any belief. The fact that the savages were
deceived could not have ever been predicted by the savages' belief in the position of
the Europeans. Such consequences are irrelevant to the beliefs truth-value. Since
James regards satisfactoriness as partly constitutive of the meaning of beliefs,
consequences that are external to the belief cannot be considered as constitutive of
its meaning. Moore's other example about the man who misses the train because of a
false belief about the accuracy of his watch can be dealt with in a similar way.
129
James's distinction on the one hand, between pragmatic truth, truth for the individual
as the starting point of his theory of truth, and ideal truth on the other, has given rise
to various criticisms, especially from philosophers like F. H. Bradley who were
committed to a version of idealistic metaphysics. Let us consider very briefly his
general view of truth. Bradley held, at one stage, a coherence view of truth which fits
neatly with his metaphysics. Truth, in his view, is identified with an individual,
all-inclusive and appropriately connected systematic coherent whole. Members of
this system are mental items to which he refers as judgements. Every judgement is
subject to the test of whether or not it fits within a complete system of those beliefs
which have already been accepted. Bradley characterises this test as follows.
The test which I advocate is the idea of a whole of knowledge as wide and
as consistent as may be. In speaking of system I mean always the union of
these two aspects, and this is the sense and the only sense in which I am
defending coherence.136
Bradley is not merely concerned with the coherence between beliefs, but also with
their comprehensiveness. The true set of beliefs, he argued, must include both
maximum coherence and maximum comprehensiveness. These two characters are
not two irreducible principles but two complementary aspects of a single
principle.137 Bradley thinks that reality is both coherent and comprehensive. Thus the
degree to which our theories can become closer to identity with reality depends
largely on their degree of coherence and comprehensiveness. However, this type of
truth, truth for ordinary purposes, should not aspire to a correspondence with reality,
it can only establish systems of beliefs which are for various tasks more or less
pragmatically useful. The kind of truth which seems to be appropriate for this
correspondence or identity is absolute truth which aims at grasping the real essence
l36Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 202.
lj7Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 223.
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of reality and which comes nearer to a correspondence with reality in its ultimate
nature.
Thus, we see Bradley attacking, on the level of ordinary judgements, 'the copy
theory of truth' in any of its forms because "[t]o copy is to reproduce in some other
existence more or less of the character of an object which is before your mind."138
This theory assumes that reality is independent of knowledge and of truth. However,
"[t]he moment that truth, knowledge, and reality are taken as separate," Bradley
argues, "there is no way in which consistently they can come or be forced
together".139 By taking truth to consist in copying fact, reality is made external to
thought and it is difficult to see how they can be connected again. Another objection
which Bradley raises is that if truth is taken to copy fact then,
the facts to be copied show already in their nature the work of truth-making.
The merely given facts are, in other words, the imaginary creatures of false
theory. They are manufactured by a mind which abstracts one aspect of the
concrete known whole, and sets this abstracted aspect out by itself as a real
thing.140
Thus, in Bradley's view, we never experience reality in an uninterpreted form.
Considering that the knower is a transformer of experience, it can hardly be
maintained that what is really experienced are the facts as they are in themselves.
Bradley solved this difficulty of the separation between reality and thought by the
identification of truth, knowledge and reality.
This brief examination of the main features of Bradley's views on truth helps us in
discussing some of his main criticisms of the pragmatic theory of truth. Bradley was
not entirely certain what the pragmatic theory of truth was actually affirming.141 He
L'sBradley, "On Some Aspects of Truth', 331-32.
' 'Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 110.
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argued that if truth is regarded merely as a matter of the practical success of ideas,
then one must be clear on what is precisely meant by 'practical success' if one is to
have a grasp of what truth means pragmatically. If the practical success of ideas was
established very broadly, then what this theory is claiming seems to be trivially true
and barely revolutionary. The successful working of ideas could be the result of the
correspondence between ideas and facts. If success is understood narrowly, then the
theory does not seem to be correct, for an idea could be false, but remain useful. Two
points can be made here. Bradley seems to be taking utility or satisfactoriness in its
ordinary usage as the only condition for determining the truth of ideas pragmatically,
and an attempt has been made to show that this is incorrect. The satisfactions in their
various kinds, practical or intellectual, do not constitute the meaning or essence of
truth. In MT, James emphasises the point that for him the 'true' is not defined in
terms of satisfactory results.
Good consequences are not proposed by us merely as a sure sign, mark, or
criterion, by which truth's presence is habitually ascertained, tho they may
indeed serve on occasion as such a sign; they are proposed rather as the
lurking motive inside of every truth-claim, whether the 'trower' be
conscious of such motive, or whether he obey it blindly. They are proposed
as the causa existendi of our beliefs, not as their logical cue or premise, and
still less as their objective deliverance or content.142
In addition, this criticism seems to be based on the assumption that the only success
that ideas might have is the practical, which is not true for James. James talks most
of the time about ideas helping us in the practical dealings with realities, but he did
not hold that this is the only kind of dealing that true ideas may help us in. Of the
different kinds of realities, he was more interested in talking about empirical realities
and the way true ideas help us in our practical dealings with them. Writing to Perry
on August 4, 1907, James points out
l42James, MT, 146-47.
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how unlucky a word pragmatism has been to attach to our theory of truth.
It seems to most people to exclude intellectual relations and interests, but
all it means is to say that these are subjective interests like all the others,
and not the sole ones concerned in determining the beliefs that count as
true. . . . You . . . use [the word "practical"] as excluding intellectual
practice. The pragmatic test of a concept's meaning is a difference in
possible experience somewhere, but the experience may be a pure
observation with no "practical" use whatever. It may have the tremendous
theoretical use of telling which concept is true, however; and that may
remotely be connected with practical uses over and above the mere
verification, or it may not.143
Hence, for James, ideas are not true only in virtue of their practical success. But
Bradley seems to think that the practical success is the only form of working that
James is using.
"[WJherever the word truth has its meaning," Bradley says, "that meaning to me
cannot be reduced to bare practical effect".144 He admits that the successful working
of ideas can be regarded as a criterion for determining their truth. At some
unreflective stage, the mind only accepts ideas which work practically. But even if
these practical workings are the closest we can get to truth, one cannot allow that the
essence of truth lies totally in such working ideas. Thus he says, "I agree that any
idea which in any way 'works', has in some sense truth. Only to my mind it has not
on this account ultimate truth".145
Bradley can hardly be right in thinking that the only type of truth that James held is
pragmatic truth. He distinguished, as we have discussed earlier, between pragmatic
truth and absolute or ultimate truth, which he characterised in a completely different
way from Bradley. James is concerned with truths for the individual which he holds
at a given time and which help him in choosing which beliefs to accept in the course
of his experience. For James, pragmatic truth does not aim at revealing the deep
l43Perry, 11,475.
"""Bradley, 'On Truth and Practice', 311.
'"Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 123.
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nature of reality, it is designed to help the individual in dealing with reality in a way
that satisfies his interests and needs. Hence, we find that the individual's interests
and aims have their contributions to truth. This does not mean that the postulation of
an objective type of truth is not legitimate. If ultimate truth is to be postulated, it can
function no more than "a purely abstract ideal that it only serves as a vanishing
point."146
But even when James postulated absolute truth, in one of his characterisations of it, it
was based on the subjective experiences of the individuals. Thus, subjective
experiences provide the foundation of absolute truth not the other way around. A
notion of absolute truth that is detached from the individual or human context is one
to which James can hardly subscribe.
The thinness of the notion of absolute truth, in philosophy, used without all
this other practical interest, is, to me, very surprising. Idealists make the
pretension that their notion of absolute reality, of absolute truth, puts them
in a far better position, somehow, than the outsider. But the extraordinary
thinness of the results is astonishing. 'The truth is that, to deny which is
absurd, to deny which is self-contradictory. The truth is that which you
have to affirm in order to deny.' Golly! Ifwe only had a truth like that!1 7
It can be said that Bradley's commitment to absolute truth parallels James's
commitment to pragmatic truth.148
Both Bradley and Royce believed in the existence of the Absolute which James often
described as the 'moral holiday' giver. For the Absolute as an explanatory
hypothesis of the way our ideas refer to or know their objects, James substituted the
'chain of intermediaries' as an alternative hypothesis which provides the bridge
between ideas and objects, as has been pointed out earlier. James describes his
l46James, ML, 434.
M7James, ML, 436.
MSIn this brief discussion of Bradley's views on truth, I benefited mostly from Sprigge's discussion of
Bradley in his James & Bradley.
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position as an equal alternative to the absolute idealist's on the grounds that both
accounts provide 'hypothetical conditions' to explain the way ideas know their
objects.
1 the pragmatist does just the same substituting the term "chain of
intermediaries" for "Absolute." //'there is to be knowledge the chain must
be there, and its being there will suffice. There must be, shall be, is
knowledge, we say, so we suppose the chain, as R. [Royce] supposes the
absolute.
We posit our condition in both cases. . . . Whose particular
knowledge is true, the definition doesn't say. And my doubt whether the
Absolute be there can pair off with Royce's doubt whether the chain of
intermediaries are there. Either, //there, will do the trick.149
Despite the criticisms with which Royce confronted James, James's reply to him was
by declaring that both his and Royce's conditions of knowledge are mere hypotheses
which may equally account for the same question, and thus, neither can be
legitimately discarded as false. This is a clear example of James's commitment to the
view which he emphasised with regard to science, that the same phenomenon cannot
be accounted for by one single and uniquely true hypothesis. In cases where we
cannot decide which view to accept on empirical or evidential grounds, we are
justified in deciding the matter on subjective grounds. From James's viewpoint, the
series of intermediary experiences must exist, if an idea is to know its object. In
Royce's view, the Absolute must exist in order to guarantee that an idea reaches its
reality. However, for James the belief in the Absolute, as shown earlier, conflicts
with his other beliefs which he is not willing to give up and so he had to reject it
despite its securing a 'moral holiday.' For, the degree of satisfaction which the
Absolute guarantees is less important than the satisfaction of consistency which




Some commentators such as Sprigge and Thayer emphasised the fact that James's
empirical account of the way our ideas know their objects was largely motivated by
Royce's challenging proof of the existence of the Absolute or God.151 This story is
told by Sprigge as follows. In his The Religions Aspect ofPhilosophy, Royce argues
that the admission of the undeniable existence of error implies the necessary
existence of an absolute mind which includes everything. An error, Royce tells us, is
an incomplete thought, that to a higher thought, which includes it and its
intended object, is known as having failed in the purpose that it more or
less clearly had, and that is fully realized in this higher thought. And
without such higher inclusive thought, an assertion has no external object,
and is no error.'52
Thus the possibility of error depends on a false thought being contained in a more
inclusive thought which is contained in the absolute mind of which our finite minds
are only fragments. On this account, my idea encounters the object of which it is
about directly. The relation between thought and its object becomes a '"distinctively
mental type of directedness on the Absolute's part"'53 which should make the
reference to our ideas intelligible.
Sprigge tells us that James took Royce's argument very seriously and tended to think
that Royce had proved the existence of the Absolute. However, James was struggling
to find an alternative and empirical account of the relation between a thought and its
object which would explain how errors arise and would escape the postulation of an
absolute mind. Thus, Sprigge argues that for James, an idea can have a definite
meaning and reference iff it is sufficiently helpful in preparing us for encounters
with some object that it is about. The meaning and reference of any idea are
determined by the conditions which must be satisfied if the idea is to encourage the
"'Sprigge, James & Bradley, 135.
"~Royce, The Religions Aspect ofPhilosophy, 425.
i5jSprigge, 'James, Aboutness, and his British Critics', 134.
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successful behaviour and to promote fruitful dealings with reality.'54 The truth of
thought does not consist in a certain relation of correspondence or some form of
copying between the thought and an object which exists independently of it, it rather
consists in the fact that the thought is more likely to put one into behavioural
relations with its object which are satisfactory and useful.155 As for the case of error,
Sprigge explains,
an idea will be false if there is no such object as it is fitted to put us into
satisfactory relations with, either because there is no such object to be
engaged with in a manner prompted by the idea, or because such object as
there is lacks essential features required if that engagement with it is to be
successful.'56
According to Sprigge, James has given an empirical account of how to account for
error without postulating an absolute mind. A true idea is one which is expedient in
the sense of securing fruitful relations with its object and thus its expediency
depends on its object actually existing.
Sprigge's account of James's views on truth is a realist one. It is intended to show
that within the realist universe of discourse, James's position can still be shown to be
tenable. Hence, Moore's criticisms, some ofwhich we have briefly examined, of the
equation of the true with the expedient could be met and shown to satisfy the
following requirement: Someone's belief that p is true iff p, where p is a proposition.
Sprigge starts by quoting one of the best-known passages of James on truth which,
he tells us, have shocked many philosophers, especially if taken out of context. In the
sixth lecture of Pragmatism, James writes:
Sprigge, James & Bradley, 59.
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'The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our
thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way ofour behaving.
Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the
whole of course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight
won't necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily.
Experience, as we know, has ways of boiling over, and making us correct
our present formulas.157
This passage follows a long discussion by James of truth as agreement pragmatically
defined and its first summatory sentence is intended to highlight a connection
between truth and utility which other accounts of truth, such as the intellectualist's,
whose position James took as a foil to his own, do not make. Hilary Putnam gives a
telling characterisation which is representative of the attitude of some critics
regarding the above passage.
Critics typically cite only the first sentence. Such readers attend only to the
idea that "expedience" is what determines truth, although most of this
lecture (P, lecture 6) is devoted to "agreement" with realities. Thus, Russell
quotes James as follows: "The 'true' is only expedient in the way of our
thinking. ... in the long run and on the whole of course." Russell omits "to
put it very briefly" and "in almost any fashion" - indications that what we
have is a thematic statement, and not an attempt to formulate a definition of
"true" - and also substitutes his own notion of what "expediency" is for
James's, and ends up saying that James proposed the theory that "true"
means "has good effects."158
There cannot but be full agreement with Putnam on this point. As said earlier,
satisfactoriness is a necessary but not sufficient condition of truth. Hence, the
equation of the true with the expedient does not hold. Truth cannot be defined in
terms of expediency. What does support the view that expediency is not the only
condition of truth and is specified as we have argued, is the following important
passage, which was cited earlier.
The social proposition 'other men exist' and the pragmatist proposition 'it is
expedient to believe that other men exist' come from different universes of
discourse. One can believe the second without being logically compelled to
James, PRAG, 106.
l58Putnam, 'James's Theory of Truth', 180.
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believe the first; one can believe the first without having ever heard of the
second; or one can believe them both. The first expresses the object of a
belief, the second tells of one condition of the beliefs power to maintain
itself. There is no identity of any kind, save the term 'other men' which they
contain in common, in the two propositions; and to treat them as mutually
substitutable, or to insist that we shall do so, is to give up dealing with
realities altogether.'59
Several points can be made here. If James is really defining truth in terms of
expediency by holding that the true is the expedient, then he must hold that 'it is
expedient to believe that p' is equivalent to saying that 'it is true that p', but he
obviously does not. Also, in order for James to be committed to defining truth in
terms of expediency or satisfactoriness, the latter should be a necessary and
sufficient condition for truth, and as we have tried to show, James holds that it is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition. The reason why James characterised this
condition in these terms is the following. For him, verifiability is the necessary and
sufficient condition for truth. The true is the verifiable. But, only beliefs which are
verifiable could be satisfactory for the believer. Any belief which is unverifiable will
not help its holder to deal satisfactorily with reality. It might be a satisfactory belief
in some sense, but it will not help one to act on it and cope with reality in an
adequate way. The result, if the believer held a satisfactory belief which is
unverifiable, is that the consequences that are expected to follow from the belief will
not occur and the believer's hopes that the required consequences would follow will
end in frustration. Thus we can say that for James, verifiability is a sufficient
condition for satisfactoriness. Satisfactoriness is dependent upon verifiability.
Another important point is that taking into consideration James's account of
meaning, he cannot admit to equating the proposition 'other men exist' and 'it is
expedient to believe that other men exist'. The equation of the two would confuse a
distinction between the consequences that follow from a proposition and those that
l59James, MT, 150.
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would follow from believing it. The meaning of the proposition 'other men exist'
consists only in the consequences that follow from it. While the meaning of 'it is
expedient to believe that other men exist' consists of the consequences that follow
from other men existing and the consequences that would follow from believing it.
Hence, the proposition that 'other men exist' and 'it is expedient to believe that other
men exist' cannot be equivalent.
So, for truth, as it is in the case ofmeaning, there are two conditions that determine
the truth of any belief: an objective condition concerning verifiability and a
subjective condition concerning satisfactoriness. The objective condition is the
primary one and the subjective is dependent upon the objective. Thus, the
determination of the truth-value of any given belief involves the application of these
two conditions thus characterised. As seen earlier, when we discussed James's view
of meaning, on similar grounds, the meaning of a belief is determined by both the
objective consequences that follow from the belief itself and the subjective
consequences for the believer upon holding the belief.
Let us go back to the quotation " 'The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the
expedient. . . " and examine Sprigge's account of it. Sprigge, like Moore and Russell
and other commentators, takes this quotation as representative of James's account of
truth. Hence, he takes James as equating the true with the expedient. Sprigge
considers satisfactoriness as the only condition of truth which we can say that he
takes to be both necessary and sufficient. He begins by introducing what he calls the
T pattern, It is true that p iff p, where p is a proposition. This pattern, he says, must
be satisfied by "any account of truth worth taking seriously."160
l60Sprigge, James & Bradley, 11.
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He then points out that when equating 'the true' with 'the expedient', the T pattern
cannot hold true of all its instances, or so at least it would seem. He gives the
example of the proposition that there is an afterlife. When 'the true' is equated with
'the expedient', we end up with something like: It is expedient (meaning true) to
believe that there is an afterlife even when there is no afterlife. So one can find many
examples where the T pattern is violated once the equation of 'the true' and 'the
expedient' is made. Hence, Sprigge undertakes to show how, when a certain
interpretation of some of the ideas involved in James's theory of truth is given, the
identification of truth with expediency satisfies the T pattern.
Since for James the truth-bearers are mental items such as beliefs and ideas, Sprigge
modifies the T pattern to the following:
Someone's belief that p is true if and only if p.
What must now be provided is an account of the conditions under which this pattern
can be satisfied.
According to Sprigge, such an account of truth which regards 'the true' and 'the
expedient' as equivalent would be particularly vulnerable to the following criticisms
which were initially raised by Moore and Russell. For on James's account, they
argued, "a belief that something exists may be true even though it does not." A belief
can be true because it is useful implies that it can be true that x exists even though it
does not exist.161 Thus, Moore says that if he had an idea that Professor James exists
and the latter has some thoughts which were useful, then on James's account,
Moore's idea "would be true, even if no such person as Professor James ever did
exist."162
161
Sprigge, 'James, Aboutness, and his British Critics', 129.
l62Moore, Philosophical Studies, 127.
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From a realist point of view, if one would avoid such an outcome while holding to
the equation of the 'true' and the 'expedient', an explanation must be given that
would emphasise the existence of the object of the belief so that it can consistently
be held both that the object of the belief exists and that the belief in it is useful. The
way that this relation can consistently be established depends on how one can
explain the role that satisfactoriness plays in the following:
Someone's belief that p is true if and only if it is useful if and only if p exists.
According to some version of a realist conception of truth, a belief is true if and only
if its object exists. The object to which it corresponds may be a fact that exists or an
object. The problem arises when 'useful' features in the above formula as a
necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of the belief and for the existence of
its object. For on a realist conception of truth and utility, all sorts of
counter-examples can be invented that would make this formula collapse.
Sprigge argues that an explanation of the role of utility, in its ordinary usage, can be
offered in light of James's account of the way ideas refer to their objects, which he
offered as an alternative to Royce's. According to James, as has been shown earlier,
ideas are connected to their objects by a chain of intermediary experiences that lead
from the ideas to the objects they refer to. These connections, if Sprigge is correctly
understood, could be either satisfactory or unsatisfactory, depending on whether the
idea leads towards (or into the universe of) its object successfully or not. If a true
idea leads one to successful relations with its object, then that idea is useful because
it secures good relations with its object; if it did not prompt successful encounters
with its object then the idea is false and not useful. Here the very notion of an idea
successfully leading to its object depends on the object's actually existing. Hence,
we cannot have useful ideas of objects that do not exist because the usefulness of the
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idea depends on its actually leading successfully to its object. The idea that
successfully leads to its object is one which is both true and useful.
A few points can be made here. Sprigge starts by taking the condition of
satisfactoriness as a necessary and sufficient condition of truth, thus he takes James
as equating 'the true' and 'the expedient'. However, he later seems to be using
satisfactoriness as a necessary but not sufficient and as dependent on verifiability.
For the successful dealings with reality that a true idea may secure depend on the
idea's actual leading to its reality. This can only be achieved through a chain of
intermediary experiences. This function of agreeable leading is what James means by
the idea's verification. In addition, the kind of satisfactoriness that Sprigge takes as
equivalent to truth is only one type of satisfactoriness, that is the second kind of the
third type of satisfactoriness, which we find in our beliefs and hypotheses, according
to James. Sprigge seems to be considering this as the maximum satisfaction that
might obtain, that is when the object of the belief actually exists. However, for
James, the maximum satisfaction, as emphasised, results from the belief being
consistent with other beliefs which constitute one's stock of beliefs.
Sprigge seems to be taking the proposition, to use James's example, that 'other men
exist' as equivalent to 'it is expedient to believe that other men exist'. We have
shown earlier that if these two propositions were taken as equivalent, then according
to James's theory of meaning, the consequences that would follow from either
proposition would not be different. The equation between these two propositions
would mean that they mean the same thing and thus both have the same
consequences. This leads to a contradiction because there is a distinction between the
consequences that would follow from a proposition and those that would follow from
believing it, as James's remarks concerning the third type of satisfactoriness seem to
indicate.
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Sprigge regards James's theory of truth incomplete. He agrees with James that an
idea may be true in a pragmatic sense whereby it guides us to behaviour towards its
object. However, Sprigge argues that we do in fact possess ideas which are true in a
non-pragmatic sense.163 He seems to be taking James as committed only to
pragmatic truth and either as denying the existence of absolute truth or giving it an
insignificant role in his account of truth. Bradley, as we have seen already, did raise
a similar objection to James's pragmatic truth. It has been shown that James
distinguished between these two types of truths, though he was mainly interested in
pragmatic truth and characterised absolute truth differently from Bradley and
Sprigge.164
11. CONCLUSION TO PART TWO
This examination of James's theory of truth shows how complex and unusual his
views were. An attempt has been made to show how certain propositions of science
to which James was committed had influenced the formulation of his views on truth.
Truth in science, as has been seen in Part One, is established on both evidential and
non-evidential grounds. In the case of scientific hypotheses, subjective qualities,
such as simplicity, are only applied to verifiable hypotheses. Also for scientific
theories or fomulae, the role of subjective factors is limited to that of choice between
equally well-evidenced theories. Hence, the application of subjective qualities is
dependent on the objective evidence for the truth of scientific theories already having
been established.
"Sprigge, James & Bradley, 64.
lwSee the exchange between Bird and Sprigge in Bradley Studies which seems helpful in clarifying
some aspects of Sprigge's account of James, especially on the use of the distinction between cognitive
and non-cognitive beliefs in discussing James.
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The structure of his project in science parallels that of his theory of truth, where the
truth of any idea of any kind whatsoever is determined by subjective and objective
conditions. The position that emerges is one which is pragmatist rather than realist.
Discussion has focussed on how objective and subjective conditions operate
according to James's view of truth. Verifiability is a necessary and sufficient
condition for truth. Satisfactoriness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
truth. The condition of satisfactoriness is constrained by the condition of verifiability
which guarantees some degree of objectivity to true ideas. A verifiable idea is always
one which is true and whenever an idea is verified, it is true. However, an idea can
be satisfactory but false. The view that James was a careless subjectivist is not one
that can reasonably be sustained.
The application of the pragmatic theory of truth to religious belief indicates how
these objective and subjective aspects of James's account of truth work as
determinants of the truth of religious claims. James's account of religion is the topic




In Pragmatism (lecture I), James argues that the request for empirical justification of
beliefs had resulted in what he called 'the present dilemma of philosophy'. On one
hand, there were philosophers, especially those of scientific orientation, who
demanded that only beliefs which can be justified empirically could be accepted.
Thus, those committed to this view, of whom there were many, felt themselves
forced to reject religious claims as lacking any empirical justification. On the other
hand, there was a group of philosophers, prominent among whom were Absolute
idealists, who adopted certain religious views which seemed to James empirically
vacuous, wholly abstract and of minimal relevance to the believer's religious life.
James saw the dilemma in religion in the context of these two very different
positions of scientific philosopher and speculative philosopher.
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The search for intellectual evidence for religious beliefs by the second group of
philosophers is marked by consideration of religious questions as theoretical
questions that could be solved conclusively by arguments. As for individual
believers, James observed that they do not hold their beliefs on the basis of
conclusive arguments. People without religious sentiment are not inclined to accept
the religious point of view and are unlikely to hold firm to religious beliefs on the
basis of argument. James also noticed that it is rarely probable that believers would
abandon their religious beliefs on the basis of arguments no matter how conclusive
that might seem to tie it down to the empirical. The point that James is highlighting
is that in many cases, if not most, religious beliefs held by individuals are not held
entirely on the basis of rational or supposedly conclusive argument. Hence, if we are
to look for justification for religious beliefs, perhaps we should not be focussing
wholly on rational evidence. We must look for justification where it is most likely to
be found.
Philosophers who viewed the religious question as merely the provision of
intellectual evidence, ignore the most important aspect of religion which is the
subjective experience of the believer. The religious experience of the believer is
more significant than the intellectual argumentation which tends to miss the whole
point of what is significant in religion. This is why James seeks to provide empirical
justification for religious belief. In his attempt, he follows the scientific philosopher
in his insistence on the necessity of providing an empirical evidence for beliefs, if
they are to be counted as true, and shares with the speculative philosopher his tenet
that religious beliefs can be evidentially justified. He departs from them in their
conclusions. James's position is that the evidence for religious belief can be provided
and is empirical. This treatment of religious belief might best be seen in the context
of the conflict between those opposing views.
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James's attitude towards religion is marked by his rejection of the attempts at the
provision of conclusive rationalist arguments for it and the adoption of the more
appropriate task of trying to articulate the way in which subjective experience
provides justification for religious belief which is per se empirical. Underlying this
empirical approach to religion is James's conviction that religion, like science, can
be justified on empirical grounds. In his view, religion could not retreat while
science advanced: it too must change as science did. As has been said in chapter two,
James was writing at a time that was predominantly scientific. Positivism and
agnosticism were then very common. He recognised how science was used to
support such positions. The root of this repudiation of religious belief is the claim
that religious beliefs cannot be justified in the same way that scientific beliefs can
through empirical evidence. For positivists and agnostics, religious experiences are
personal, subjective, and thus lack any evidentiary significance of the kind which
support scientific beliefs. They view the justification in terms of religious experience
as entirely subjective and hence regard religious claims as lacking the appropriate
kind of justification.
An examination of James's view of religion is proposed in this part including a
demonstration of how an understanding of his view of the methodology of science is
crucial to understanding his views on religious belief and religion in general. An
attempt has been made in previous parts to show the close linkage between
pragmatism and the scientific method, a relationship that played a significant role in
limiting pragmatism to a theory of meaning and truth. In his discussions of
pragmatism in both of these, James was always concerned to examine its
implications for religious beliefs and their justification. Hence, it is not surprising to
see the significant influence of James's views on scientific methodology and his
pragmatism on his views on religion.
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This treatment of James's views on religion is largely concerned to show the extent
to which his position towards the experimental method of empirical science is crucial
to understanding his views on religious belief and religion. For instance, his doctrine
of 'the will to believe' can only be properly understood and appreciated in the
context of his general theory of belief, including scientific belief. The question of
religious belief and its justification should be seen within the context of James's
characterisations of scientific belief and its justification. This account of James's
view of religion focusses on a close examination of the genesis and the relationships
between types of beliefs: scientific, religious, moral and logico-mathematical; of
verification and falsification in religion; of the justification of religious beliefs. The
main works of James that bear directly on these issues are The Principles of
Psychology, 'The Will to Believe', both essay and volume, and The Varieties of
Religious Experience.
2. TYPES OF BELIEFS
Within a total system of beliefs, various types enter. These James classifies into
different categories according to their origins. In the last chapter of The Principles of
Psychology, James examines the genesis of the natural sciences, of the pure sciences,
ofmetaphysical axioms and aesthetic and moral principles. What concerns us here in
examining the way he divides the different types of propositions, is to see what is the
status of the religious beliefs in relation to scientific and other propositions.
James was largely concerned with the extent to which the various types of truths are
products of external reality. This issue raises the following questions. Are the
different kinds of propositions merely the creatures or the 'off shoots' of our
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environment? Or do they originate inside the mind? James's answer is that some
propositions are the effects of environment while others are not. Hence, there is a
distinction between two categories of propositions: those produced by external
reality and those which originate in the mind. This initial distinction gives the
starting-point to James's classification of the various kinds of propositions.
Let us first consider the case of natural sciences. In his discussion of their genesis,
James points out that scientific conceptions are not coerced on us by external reality.
Our 'scientific' ways of thinking the outer reality are highly abstract ways.
The essence of things for science is not to be what they seem, but to be
atoms and molecules moving to and from each other according to strange
laws. Nowhere does the account of inner relations produced by outer ones
in proportion to the frequency with which the latter have been met, more
egregiously break down than in the case of scientific conceptions. The
order of scientific thought is quite incongruent either with the way in which
reality exists or with the way in which it comes before us. Scientific
thought goes by selection and emphasis exclusively. . . . what we think is
an abstract system of hypothetical data and laws.'
He continues that:
Every scientific conception is in the first instance a 'spontaneous variation'
in someone's brain. . . . Their genesis is strictly akin to that of the flashes
of poetry and sallies of wit. . . . But whereas the poetry and wit (like the
science of the ancients) are their 'own excuse for being,' and have to run
the gauntlet of no farther test, the 'scientific' conceptions must prove their
worth by being 'verified.' This test, however, is the cause of their
preservation, not that of their production.2
Hence, the propositions of the natural sciences are non-empirical. They are so
because of their origin. They are not effects of the environment. They differ
fundamentally from the proximate laws of nature, 'empirical truths', which are
duplicates or reproductions of the order of external experience.
'James, PP, II, 1230-31.
Tames, PP, II, 1232-33.
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The only cohesions which experience in the literal sense of the word
produces in our mind are, as we contended some time back, the proximate
laws of nature, and habitudes of concrete things, that heat melts ice, that
salt preserves meat, that fish die out of water, and the like. Such 'empirical
truths' as these we admitted to form an enormous part of human wisdom.
The 'scientific' truths have to harmonize with these truths, or be given up
as useless; but they arise in the mind in no such passive associative way as
that in which the simpler truths arise.3
Thus, what makes a proposition empirical or non-empirical is its origin or genesis,
namely, whether it is coerced on us by outer reality or derives from the mind. The
propositions of the pure sciences are "even less than the natural sciences effects of
the order of the world as it comes to our experience."4 For that reason, they are
classified as non-empirical expressing exclusively results of comparison. It should be
pointed out that although both the propositions of the natural sciences and those of
the pure sciences are non-empirical, the former, as James has just said, have to
conform with empirical propositions, i.e., the proximate laws of nature (and physical
theories). In this sense, they cannot be said to be expressing results of comparison
exclusively and consequently in this aspect differ from the propositions of the pure
sciences. Hence, no matter how abstract our scientific conceptions are, they had to
acquire empirical justification. This suggests that James held that the propositions of
the natural sciences and those of the pure sciences, which he calls 'rational
propositions', though they have similar origins, differ in that the former are verified
by sense-experience. The verification implies that the ideal and inward relations
among the objects of our thought are reproductions of the order of outer experience.
These forms of relations are congruent with the outer order of the passively received
experience. These ideal systems of rational relations are then applicable to the real
world.
3James, PP, II, 1233-34.
Tames, PP, II, 1237.
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However, there are systems of ideal relationships which have not yet been shown to
be congruent with the real world and are, in that sense, not as yet verified. These are
propositions which express metaphysical axioms and propositions which express
aesthetic and moral principles.5 Such propositions are not empirical generalisations
and for this reason they are classified as non-empirical. Although they are similar to
the propositions of the natural sciences in that they do not only express the results of
comparison, but differ from them in being as yet unverified. Metaphysical
propositions, James tells us, are those which are
formulated in such metaphysical and aesthetic axioms as "The Principle of
things is one"; "The quantity of existence is unchanged"; "Nature is simple
and invariable"; "Nature acts by the shortest ways"; "Ex nihilo nihil fit" ;
"Nothing can be evolved which was not involved"; "Whatever is in the
effect must be in the cause"; "A thing can only work where it is"; "A thing
can only affect another of its own kind"; "Cessante causa, cessat et
effectus"\ "Nature makes no leaps"; "Things belong to discrete and
permanent kinds"; "Nothing is or happens without a reason"; "The world is
throughout rationally intelligible"; etc.6
Such principles, James calls 'postulates of rationality' and not propositions of fact.
One can at best hope, James says, that these principles will eventually be verified.
They can only function now as ideals with which we hope that the facts will
conform. Referring to metaphysical principles, James writes as follows:
Many of the so-called metaphysical principles are at bottom only
expressions of aesthetic feeling. Nature is simple and invariable; makes no
leaps, or makes nothing but leaps; is rationally intelligible; neither
increases nor diminishes in quantity; flows from one principle, etc.,
etc.,—what do all such principles express save our sense of how pleasantly
our intellect would feel if it had a Nature of that sort to deal with? The
subjectivity of which feeling is of course quite compatible with Nature also
turning out objectively to be of that sort, later on.7
'James, PP, II, 1262.
6James, PP, II, 1262-63.
Tames, PP, II, 1265.
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The last sentence is very important in emphasising that the subjectivity of
metaphysical principles is not wholly independent of the objective facts which
furnish the ultimate test of the validity of these principles. We try to show how
nature conforms with such ideals, and to a certain degree we succeed in this, so
making nature more intelligible. However, our ultimate goal is the successful
application of those ideals to the real world in a manner similar to that in which
scientific conceptions are applied to nature. Thus, James considers metaphysical
ideals as not yet verified. The example of physics and its successful application of
scientific conceptions, James says, gives us grounds for hoping that metaphysical
principles too can ultimately be verified in the same way that propositions of the
natural sciences have already been verified.
Metaphysics should take heart from the example of physics, simply
confessing that hers is the longer task. Nature may be remodelled, nay,
certainly will be remodelled, far beyond the point at present reached. Just
how far?—is a question which only the whole future history of Science and
Philosophy can answer.8
What James is saying is that scientific conceptions were once in the state in which
metaphysical principles are now: 'postulates of rationality', 'ideal prototypes of
rational order' which await verification. This point is significant. It is so because it
tells us that metaphysical principles may at a later stage be subject to empirical
verification just as are scientific conceptions. The ultimate test of the validity of
metaphysical principles is their being empirically verified, when it is proven that
these ideal systems conform with the real order; in short, when sensible phenomena
verify these ideal models formulated by the mind.
8James, PP, II, 1264.
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When what James says about metaphysical principles as expressions of aesthetic
feeling is considered, this should not be taken as representative of the way in which
he characterises these principles. It has just been shown that it is not. We may,
therefore, at first glance agree with Ayer, for example, when he says that James
"does explicitly say that in many cases what pass for metaphysical principles are no
more than expressions of aesthetic feeling."9 We may disagree with him, however,
when we realise that Ayer totally ignores the qualifications imposed by James on
metaphysical principles which allowed him to speak of them as expressing feeling.
In PP, it should be emphasised that James must not be taken as holding that
metaphysical propositions are cognitively devoid of content, as Ayer and other
twentieth-century positivists had held. James maintained that the truth of
metaphysical propositions can neither be determined now on empirical nor on logical
grounds; hence his adoption of the view that feeling is what metaphysical principles
express. It should be pointed out that James is not entirely clear on how feeling is
shown to play a role in determining which metaphysical principles to accept.
Furthermore, this view of James in PP, which seems to restrict the role of feeling to
the class of metaphysical propositions only, was later abandoned by him in
Pragmatism, in which he moved towards a holistic view, where subjective factors
play a role in determining the truth of all propositions, as indicated earlier in Part
One.
Concluding the discussion of James's view of metaphysical principles in PP, a
comparison is made between them and scientific propositions. It seems to me,
according to James, the following holds:
(1) metaphysical principles are similar in origin to the propositions of the natural
science, inasmuch as both are non-empirical in origin;
9
Ayer, The Origins ofPragmatism, 209.
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(2) neither metaphysical nor scientific propositions express merely relations of ideas,
while those of logic and mathematics only express relations of ideas;
(3) scientific propositions have already been verified, while metaphysical
propositions await verification, the latter not now being subject to empirical tests of
verifiability;
(4) in the case of scientific conceptions, the verification occurs when the mental or
ideal relations constituted by the mind conform with the real order or sensible
phenomena; what is required of metaphysical propositions in terms of their
verification is the same as scientific ones; though this congruence has not yet been
achieved, it is, nevertheless, required if the verification is to take place;
(5) although subjective feeling is what metaphysical principles express now, and as
such are not as yet verified, they will eventually be verified, just as the scientific
propositions have been verified, and thus cease to be simply expressions of aesthetic
feeling.
What has been said about James's view ofmetaphysical principles can be extended
to religious propositions. In his discussion of the different kinds of propositions in
PP, James does not explicitly talk about the status of religious beliefs. It seems
reasonable to categorise them along with metaphysical principles. They can easily
and justifiably be placed in the class that includes metaphysical principles, aesthetic
and moral propositions. The main features of metaphysical principles would pertain
equally to religious propositions. A similar comparison can be made between
religious propositions and scientific propositions.
Before continuing into the next section, it should be recalled that the aim of this
discussion of James's views on religion is to show how the ideas which he brought
from science bear on those views. The structure of this discussion will follow
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roughly similar lines to the discussion of his account of truth; so I proceed to an
examination of how the propositions following from his views on science bear on his
views on religion. The main focus is on the following:
(1) James's account of religious belief, which is pragmatic and not realist;
(2) James's rejection of natural theology on scientific grounds;
(3) the idea of the absolute in religion;
(4) the empirical justification of religion;
(5) the multiplicity of religious doctrines ofwhich no one can be said to be the truest;
(6) the justification of religion in The Will to Believe and The Varieties ofReligious
Experience;
(7) verification and falsification of religious hypotheses.
3. PRAGMATISM IN RELIGION
In Part Two, it was argued that James's account of truth is a pragmatic and not a
realist account. An attempt has been made to defend James against the charge of
subjectivism by formulating the two conditions of truth (verifiability and
satisfactoriness) and the relationship between them, which puts objective constraints
on the beliefs satisfactoriness, thus securing a substantial degree of objectivity to
truth claims. Hence the truth of any belief is constituted by the consequences that
follow from what is believed and the consequences that follow upon believing it. It
follows that religious beliefs cannot be held only on the basis of their satisfactory
consequences for the believer.
156
This interpretation, however, is not shared by commentators such as Ayer, Russell
and many others who argued that in James's theory of truth, religious beliefs lose
any objective significance. What constitutes their truth, they argue, is the satisfaction
and the moral fulfilment that they offer for the believer. Ayer has argued for that
view which seems to deprive religious claims of any meaningful content. To quote
Ayer again:
The main point for James is that so long as people are psychologically able
to have religious faith, and so long as it gives them emotional satisfaction,
the beliefs which are its embodiment may be allowed to pass for true.10
Further he writes:
[H]is equation of what is true with what one finds it satisfying to believe
applies only to questions of faith or morals, with regard to which there are
no ascertainable facts. ... we must remember that the question whether
any given belief is true is always construed by James pragmatically as the
question whether it is to be accepted; and religious and moral beliefs
present themselves for acceptance or rejection like the rest. It is just that in
their case the criteria by which James wishes to determine whether they are
acceptable come down to being purely subjective."
Such remarks about James's pragmatic view of religious belief are not completely
without foundation. As it is often the case with James, he makes some claims that
once taken out of context are likely to undermine completely his position. Consider
the following passage, which is favoured by James's critics. In Pragmatism, towards
the end of the last lecture (VIII) he says that:
On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in
the widest sense of the word, it is true.12
l0Ayer, The Origins ofPragmatism, 223.
"Ayer, The Origins ofPragmatism, 223.
"James, PRAG, 143.
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What does this statement exactly tell us about the proposition 'God exists'? On close
examination, it tells one thing for Ayer and Russell and quite a different thing for
James. In the first case, if one held a realist point of view, that of Russell and Ayer,
the message that is taken as being representative of James's position runs along the
following lines. Believe that God exists because it is psychologically or morally
fulfilling and it helps you to cope with experience successfully. Indeed, such a claim
outrages believers and non-believers alike. It is really very unhelpful for someone to
whom the question of God's existence is at stake and who is struggling hard with his
doubts to be told just that. Hence, one can at the outset justifiably sympathise with
Russell's and Ayer's reasoning which amounts to saying that one's belief that 'God
exists' is true iffGod exists. It hardly makes sense to believe that God exists unless it
as an established fact that he does so. In other words, for him, the belief that 'God
exists' is true iff it corresponds to the fact 'that God exists'. The issue is that to talk
about the truth of the proposition 'God exists', God must exist in fact independently
of one's claims about Him, whether one believes in him or not. Although this
criticism may sound to many ingenious, it is, nevertheless, based on a lack of
appreciation of James's pragmatic position. It has been shown in the previous part
that James does not equate the belief that x and the fact that x exists. Any acceptance
of Russell's realist position would imply the outright rejection of James's pragmatic
position. What seemed to Russell to be wrong-headed in James's claims about
religious beliefs is the latter's denial that true propositions have objective reference
since for Russell and other realists, a true belief is one which corresponds to an
independent reality that exists.
For James, however, the objective reference of the proposition 'God exists' is not
logically independent of the consequences of believing it. There is no such
independence of facts from the experiences of the individuals. What constitutes the
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truth of the belief that 'God exists' is not a correspondence relation between the
proposition 'God exists' and the fact that He exists. It is, rather, the consequences
that follow from the belief itself AND those consequences for the believer from
believing it. Here there are two opposing views: (1) James's pragmatic view which
stresses that the truth of religious and other beliefs cannot be obtained independently
of human experience and (2) Russell's realist view which emphasises that the truth
of beliefs, religious ones in this case, is logically independent of the context in which
the truth claim is made. It depends on the fact to which the belief corresponds
actually existing.
Returning to the previous quotation of James, it reads:
On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in
the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual
difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that
the problem is to build it out and determine it, so that it will combine
satisfactorily with all the other working truths. I cannot start upon a whole
theology at the end of this last lecture; but when 1 tell you that I have
written a book on men's religious experience, which on the whole has been
regarded as making for the reality of God, you will perhaps exempt my
own pragmatism from the charge of being an atheistic system. I firmly
disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest form of
experience extant in the universe.13
It is clear, from what James is saying, that only ifthe hypothesis of God works, then
it is true. This hypothetical is conditioned by the two conditions that James has set
earlier concerning the meaning of the working of a hypothesis. It means two things:
that the hypothesis must cause the least disturbance to previously held beliefs and
that it must lead to some sensible terminus that can be empirically verified.14 If the
hypothesis of God is shown to 'combine satisfactorily with all other working truths'




experience does show that the hypothesis of God 'certainly works', in the sense just
described. However, he does not jump to the conclusion that the hypothesis of God is
true because experience shows that it works. To provide a proof of the hypothesis of
God's existence is not a straightforward matter. It involves the satisfaction of the two
criteria of truth, verifiability and satisfactoriness. In the above quotation, James
focusses on the satisfactoriness condition, claiming that in order that the hypothesis
of God be true, it must be consistent with other truths within the individual's total
system of beliefs. For the consistency with other beliefs is one form of satisfaction,
as was shown in Part Two. It is clear from what James is saying that, in this
particular quotation, and indeed in this lecture, he is focussing on the subjective
aspect of the truth of religious belief. The rest of the quotation is a reminder of the
objective condition of truth upon which the satisfactoriness condition is dependent.
Hence the requirement that religious beliefs be empirically confirmed by experience,
a topic to which he devoted his work on religious experience.
James's pragmatic view of religion is a direct application of his pragmatic view of
truth, which some had claimed to be an unfortunate one. A suspension of judgement
on his views will remain in place till the end of this part to give him a fair hearing.
The focal point in this discussion is that in the case of religious and other beliefs,
James draws a sharp distinction between the consequences of propositions and the
consequences that follow from believing them. The previous part of the thesis has
demonstrated how the relation between these two types of consequences is to be
conceived.
Over his many dealings with the problem of religious belief, one can witness a shift
of emphasis in James's discussion. This situation should not lead us to thinking that
he abandoned one or the other of these types of consequences, subjective and
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objective. The way he stresses at times the role of subjective consequences makes it
misleadingly appear as if these were the sole constituent of the truth of religious
beliefs, while this is only partially the case. The distinction between the subjective
and the objective in determining the truth of religious beliefs was always present in
his mind, though often not explicitly pointed out during his discussions of religion.
Thus, James's pragmatic view of religious belief has been confusing to some and
ridiculous to others. What is needed now is an examination and clarification of his
basic assumptions and assessment of his whole attempt to establish religion on
empirical grounds. A start is made by examining in detail the two distinct, though
dependent, conditions of the truth of religious beliefs. We start first by examining the
subjective factors that co-determine the truth of religious belief; that is the
consequences for the believers of holding them. This is the topic of the next section.
4. RATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
James's renowned essay 'The Will to Believe', which is the first essay of a volume
collection of essays under the same title, is often taken to offer a defence of the right
of the individual to religious belief. An attempt will be made to show this essay as a
defence of the right to believe of any belief, scientific, moral or religious alike. The
discussion will be restricted to religious and scientific beliefs. Here the comparison
between these two kinds of beliefs is helpful in clarifying the basic assumptions that
lie at the core of James's defence of religious belief.
James defended the experimental method of science against the Baconian conception
of the scientist as a passive spectator. He emphasised, as discussed in Part One, the
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active experimentalism of science, particularly the way in which scientific
hypotheses are initially held unwarranted. For the scientist must believe in an
hypothesis to a degree that would initiate the interest of testing it. It would be
difficult to envisage how else science could progress without a starting-point of the
adoption of an hypothesis which has yet to be verified or falsified.
James argues for a policy of risking belief. All beliefs including scientific ones are
fallible and subject to revision in the future. None is absolutely true or absolutely
false. This holds true as a general policy of belief. The two hallmarks of his general
view of belief are:
(1) beliefs cannot said to be definitively justified, (fallibilism);
(2) beliefs can be held in advance of evidence (policy of risking belief).
This applies to all beliefs, but since the focus is on scientific and religious ones,
discussion will be restricted to them. What might follow from this characterisation of
scientific and religious beliefs is that both kinds of hypotheses are subject to
confirmation or disconfirmation by experience. A religious doctrine that is not open
to any kind of empirical verification is one which is undoubtedly meaningless and
so, fails to qualify as an appropriate candidate for belief. Indeed, for James,
according to his pragmatism, any hypothesis of any kind that does not make an
empirical difference is meaningless. How this might be achieved in the case of
religious hypotheses required a lot of working out by James, for requiring
exploration of what exactly the empirical difference a religious hypothesis could be
said to make for its holder.
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5. TWO KINDS OF RATIONALITY
In his essay 'The Sentiment of Rationality',13 reprinted in the WB volume, James
examines the reasons underlying the act of philosophising. He begins the essay by
raising the following questions:
What is the task which philosophers set themselves to perform; and why do
they philosophize at all?16
The answer follows immediately:
They desire to attain a conception of the frame of things which shall on the
whole be more rational than that somewhat chaotic view which everyone
by nature carries about with him under his hat.17
But how can one be sure that what had arisen from one's own experience is a
rational conception? What are the essential features of that experience which give
rise to such conception as that of rationality? James assures us of the existence of
some 'subjective' marks, that once recognised, give confidence that 'rationality' has
been attained. These he lists as follows:
A strong feeling of ease, peace, rest, is one of them. The transition from a
state of puzzle and perplexity to rational comprehension is full of lively
relief and pleasure.18
The experience of rationality, James continues, is one in which the sense of
irrationality is absent.19 In this respect, it is not dissimilar to the experience of
breathing. Just as we sense no special pleasure when our breathing is perfect or
l5A reprint of an address to the Harvard Philosophical Club, delivered in 1880 and published in the
Princeton Review, July, 1882.
l6James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 57.
''James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 57.
lsJames, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 57.
l9James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 58.
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going smoothly, we feel distressed when our respiration is blocked in some way.
Similarly, what distinguishes rationality is our experience of uninterrupted fluency of
thinking.
This feeling of the sufficiency of the present moment, of its
absoluteness—this absence of all need to explain it, account for it, or
justify it—is what 1 call the Sentiment of Rationality. As soon, in short, as
we are enabled from any cause whatever to think with perfect fluency, the
thing we think of seems to us pro tanto rational.20
Hence an irrational thought is a disruptive one which prompts us into attempting to
get rid of it and return thought to its fluency. As it is the case with James, he
challenges us to discover a better conception of rationality, if we judge his to be all
too subjective and inadequate. Setting this question to one side, the discussion now
moves to how the experience of fluency of thought, also called the experience of
rationality, can be arrived at. James tells us that it can be obtained in two ways: a
theoretical way and a practical way. There are two conceptual modes, James says,
which assist the obtainment of rationality. We shall examine each respectively.
5.1 THEORETICAL RATIONALITY
There are two aspects of theoretical rationality to be sought in the way of thinking.
On the one hand, there is the requirement, or the passion as James refers to it, of
simplicity (or simplification); "The passion for parsimony, for economy ofmeans in
thought."2' There is, on the other hand, the passion for distinguishing; "the impulse
to be acquainted with the parts rather than to comprehend the whole."22 This second
20James, 'The Sentiment ofRationality' in WB, 58.
2lJames, 'The Sentiment ofRationality' in WB, 58.
22James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 59.
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requirement aims at doing justice to the uniqueness and the particularity of things.
These two rival passions of clearness and simplicity challenge the thinker to find an
equilibrium.
Though James admits the significance of these two aspects of theoretical rationality,
he immediately warns us of their limitations. There is Spinoza's monist system
which unites all things into one substance and there is Hume's system which
separates everything. Both instances show us how favouring one mode over another;
subordinating one mode to another, can result in philosophical systems which could
never be universally accepted and essentially inconclusive.23 Hence, James suggests
that "the only possible philosophy must be a compromise between an abstract
monotony and a concrete heterogeneity."24
What James is trying to convey to us is that we ought to recognise the difficulties
and limitations of abstractness and of speculation themselves when establishing
philosophical systems. The quest for simplicity and coherence results in the wholly
abstract, while the demand for clarity and analysis leads to 'barren looseness and
separateness' of everything. In the end, we must opt for a compromise which may be
deemed as unsatisfactory in terms of either mode of theoretical rationality. Here, as
thinkers' interests and intellectual needs vary owing to their philosophical
temperaments, they are likely to opt for different degrees of coherence or analysis in
the views they formulate. To appeal only to theoretical rationality seems somewhat
unhelpful as a means for deciding or settling the differences between the different
world-views that philosophers adopt.
2jJames, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 59.
24James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 60.
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But even were an ideal conceptual framework established to resolve the tension
between these two demands, it would still be the case that this system of thought
needs justification and explanation for the reasons behind the preference for that
particular system rather than its rivals. These cannot be easily resolved by the appeal
to theoretical rationality. The situation is described by James as follows:
Hence the unsatisfactoriness of all our speculations. On the one hand, so
far as they retain any multiplicity in their terms, they fail to get us out of
the empirical sand-heap world; on the other, so far as they eliminate
multiplicity the practical man despises their empty barrenness. The most
they can say is that the elements of the world are such and such, and that
each is identical with itself wherever found; but the question Where is it
found? the practical man is left to answer by his own wit.25
This tension between satisfying the demands of coherence and analysis limits the
effectiveness of these two modes of theoretical rationality in judging which
conceptual framework is the most conclusive. The theoretic need to reduce our
chaotic world to simplicity and clearness cannot, on its own, justify our acceptance
of one conceptual scheme rather than the other.
[Njought remains but to confess that when all things have been unified to
the supreme degree, the notion of a possible other than the actual may still
haunt our imagination and prey upon our system. The bottom of being is
left logically opaque to us, as something which we simply come upon and
find, and about which (if we wish to act) we should pause and wonder as
little as possible. The philosopher's logical tranquillity is thus in essence
no other than the boor's. They differ only as to the point at which each
refuses to let further considerations upset the absoluteness of the data he
assumes.26
Hence, both the boor's thoughts and the philosopher's speculations are in the end
arbitrary. One must not stretch this analogy to its farthest limits by suggesting that
the philosopher might succumb to boorish thinking. The significance of this analogy,
however, is its indication that unless we appeal to criteria other than those of
25James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 61.
:6James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 64.
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theoretical rationality, the conceptual schemes of the philosophers and the boor's
thoughts are in the final analysis arbitrary. What might tell us which of these views,
the philosopher's or the boor's, is the more satisfactory is the degree to which one
view harmonises better with the empirical evidence than the other.
But how can these judgements about the satisfactoriness of those world-views be
made? Do the criteria of theoretical rationality help us in deciding which one to
accept as the most satisfactory? At this point, James tells us that we must recognise
the limitations of theoretical rationality in the sphere of producing conceptual and
consistent schemes. We cannot merely dedicate ourselves to reflecting a great
number of possible world-views. At some stage, there comes a time when we must
think to ourselves, make a decision as to which is the more satisfactory, then that is
the one, the choice of which, has significant implications on the lives we lead and
our expectations and hopes. A choice has to be made between conflicting
world-views and the criteria of theoretical rationality simply do not help us because
of their limitations. In these circumstances an appeal to the second type of rationality
is justifiable, namely, practical rationality. What, then, are the aspects of practical
rationality and what are the conditions under which these criteria are applied? This is
the topic of the next section.
5.2 PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
What constitutes the feeling of rationality in its practical aspect? As we have said
earlier, James defines rationality as fluency in thought and irrationality as an
impediment to thought. So, he can hold that any impediment to the perfect fluency of
thought in the theoretical sphere can be eliminated by appealing to the criteria of
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practical rationality. The criteria of practical rationality are essential in diverting the
movement of thought from its "issueless channel of purely theoretic
contemplation"27 to its fluency and hence rationality. The conditions under which
the application of the criteria of practical rationality is possible are crystal-clear.
They are applicable only if all things are equal theoretically, that is, equally
satisfying our logical needs. Hence,
of two conceptions equally fit to satisfy the logical demand, that one which
awakens the active impulses, or satisfies other aesthetic demands better
than the other, will be accounted the more rational conception, and will
deservedly prevail.28
James continues:
There is nothing improbable in the supposition that an analysis of the world
may yield a number of formulae, all consistent with the facts. In physical
science different formulae may explain the phenomena equally well—the
one-fluid and the two-fluid theories of electricity, for example. Why may it
not be so with the world? Why may there not be different points of view
for surveying it, within each of which all data harmonize, and which the
observer may therefore either choose between, or simply cumulate one
upon another?29
If so, it is presumably rational to extend the application of practical rationality in
science to the more general realm of world-views. Just as our aesthetic and practical
nature allows approval or rejection of formulae in science, when things are equal
theoretically, application of practical rationality can be extended to approval or
rejection of the various points of view about the world. But what are the criteria of
practical rationality which will assist us in deciding between different world-views?
27James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 66.
28James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 66.
29James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 66.
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The first practical requisite which a philosophical conception should satisfy is that it
"must, in a general way at least, banish uncertainty from the future. "30 The relation
of a thing to its future consequences and the uneasiness to the mind caused by the
ambiguity of the future would leave a concept as unrationalised, whereas, the peace
and fluency that come to the mind when the demands of expectancy are satisfactorily
met would turn a philosophical concept to a rational one. The banishing of
uncertainty from the future can only be attained by the subjection of philosophical
conceptions or more generally, world-views, to verifiability by experience. If it were
true that future experience is of no relevance to that particular conception or
world-view, then the conception itself would be of no interest to us and would lose
its significance.
This first requisite, James says, is not by itself sufficient.
It is not sufficient for our satisfaction merely to know the future as
determined, for it may be determined in either of many ways, agreeable or
disagreeable. For a philosophy to succeed on a universal scale it must
define the future congruously with our spontaneous powersf
This second aspect of practical rationality tells us that the future predictability of a
philosophical conception is not by itself sufficient. It must be sensitive to our desires
and needs. It must not "disappoint our dearest desires and most cherished powers.'
When weighing pessimism and optimism, all things being equal, optimism is more
rational than pessimism because only the former promises the ultimate satisfaction of
our wishes and powers.
"
James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 67.
''James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 70.
169
These two criteria of practical rationality are applied only when other things are
equal theoretically. The contribution of personal elements enters under this
condition. As seen in Part One, scientific concepts are formed by abstracting certain
selected aspects of reality, the choice of which is influenced by our interests. To
quote James:
[T]he only meaning of essence is teleological, and that classification and
conception are purely teleological weapons of the mind. The essence of a
thing is that one of its properties which is so importantfor my interests that
in comparison with it I may neglect the rest.32
We have also seen that for James, subjective qualities such as elegance, usefulness
and congruity with our residual beliefs are all scientific values which we take into
consideration in theory choice. Interests also influence our evaluations of the
scientific evidence. The same collection of data may give rise to different
conclusions by scientists depending on the orientation of their own interpretations of
these data. These factors and the demand for successful predictions are all
expressions of the practical need to eliminate uncertainty from the future. Science is
strongly dominated by our theoretical needs. The appeal to practical rationality is
conditional on the primary satisfaction of theoretical rationality. But James tells us
that theoretical rationality is but one of the many human passions that we try to
satisfy and the active prominence of one need over the other hinges upon the various
forms of human inquiry; whether that of science, of metaphysics or religion. The
influence of passion and interest is manifested in every world-view that might be
posited and it is this personal contribution that gives a world-view its power and
makes it convincing.
32James, PP, II, 961.
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James's notion of rationality is broader than his critics would permit, for it includes
practical as well as theoretical criteria. According to James, a person who adopts
beliefs on the basis of practical criteria is rational, but in a different way from that of
theoretical rationality. One is justified in appealing to practical criteria by the
adoption of the appropriate means to arrive at the desired end. Hence the role of
prediction in practical rationality of the results that the adoption of the belief would
lead to. The restrictions that James has imposed on the application of practical
rationality makes it difficult for one to believe whatever one pleases.
The import of this discussion of the criteria of rationality is that passion and personal
interests influence the beliefs that we hold and the way we assess their justification.
The next section will consider how these criteria apply to religious belief. The issues
are: What role do our theoretical needs play in the formulation of religious belief?
How far do passion and personal needs influence our choices in religion? Does the
interference of our personal needs in our choices make religion irrational? If not,
then, can a rational justification of religious belief be given and what form can it
take?
6. THE WILL TO BELIEVE
6.1 BACKGROUND
In a letter to Renouvier, dated August 4, 1896, James writes:
I sent you a "New World" the other day, however, with an article in it
called "The Will to Believe," in which (if you took the trouble to glance at
171
it) you probably recognized bow completely I am still your disciple. In this
point perhaps more fully than in any other; and this point is central!33
Perry reports that James's WB essay and the other essays of the WB volume, "are
pervaded throughout by the influence of Renouvier."34 Perry continues that James
once wrote to Peirce that his WB essay was "cribbed from Renouvier."35 So what are
these views of Renouvier that James had cribbed in his WB essay?
For Renouvier, one cannot avoid making the choice between belief in freedom and
belief in determinism which are mutually exclusive. We must choose one or the
other and we cannot decide not to choose either. For, although in some issues one
can suspend judgement, which seems the right thing to do, in other issues the
consequences of the suspension of judgement is disastrous. For that reason, one is
forced to make the choice. He writes:
S'il en etait ainsi, par la liberte comme par la necessite, quoique sur des
motifs tout contraires, la speculation sortirait des voies de la raison
pratique, du moins de celles qu'avouent les honnetes gens de nos jours, et
pour arriver aux memes consequences funestes. 11 semblerait des lors qu'un
parti moyen entre la liberte et la necessite serait le plus utile, et la plus
propre a degager la morale. Mais un tel parti n'est tenable, s'il l'est, que
pour le mystique, pour celui qui, sans s'arreter a la contradiction, sape les
fondements de la science, ensuite n'etablit rien de net et de
comprehensible. La liberte et la necessite ne sauraient etre ni
simultanement vraies, ni simultanement fausses, car, de deux choses l'une,
ou les actes humains sont tons et totalement predetermines par leurs
conditions et antecedents, ou ils ne le sont pas tons et totalement. C'est
ainsi que se pose la question logique. La doute serait done notre seule
ressource : mais le doute ne nous tire point de peine quant a la morale : s'il
est souvent legitime en face des theories, il est la mort de Fame dans les
choses pratiques et touchant toute croyance d'ou depend la conduite de la
vie.36
3jJames, LWJ, II, 44.
"Perry, II, 209.
''Perry, II, 209.
"Renouvier, Essai de Critique Generate, Deiaieme Essai: Traite de Psychologie Rationelle D 'apres
les Principes du Criticisme, 330-31.
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If the choice between belief in freedom and belief in determinism cannot be avoided,
on what grounds can this choice be made? Renouvier tells us that it cannot be
decided on intellectual grounds. For both doctrines, he argues, are logically
indemonstrable. He says: "En resume, la these de la liberte n'est pas demontrable
logiquement, non plus que celle de la necessite."37
In this case, where the matter cannot be decided on intellectual grounds, one is
entitled to choose according to the kind of consequences that follow from choosing
either doctrine. Hence, for Renouvier, one must choose freedom because the
advantages that accompany the belief in freedom far exceed those that a belief in
determinism promises.
Dans l'impuissance de rien demontrer, l'unique ressource qui reste est
d'affirmer la liberte a titre de postulat. La verite, non pas prouvee, mais
reclamee et digne d'etre choisie, est celle qui pose un fondement pour la
37
Renouvier, Essai II, 89. The following quotations also express the idea of the impossibility of
providing proof of either freedom or determinism. "Ces objections contre le systeme de la necessite
sont d'une grande force. Elle etablissent en substance que le jugement de liberte est une donnee
naturelle de la conscience et se lie a nos jugements reflechis pratiques, dont il est meme le fondement.
C'est aussi ce que nous avons du reconnaitre dans Tanalyse des fonctions volontaires.
Toutefois il n'en resulte aucune preuve logique de la realite de la liberte. En effet, quand il
s'agit des fonctions intellectuelles et sensitives, on distingue entre les phenomenes de conscience et la
realite de leurs objets, c'est-a-dire entre ces phenomenes, dont on ne donte point, et Taccord ou ils
sont peut-etre, et peut-etre ne sont pas, avec l'ensemble des groupes et series de I'experience. Ici, la
distinction n'est pas moins justifiee, et toute verification de Taccord ou du disaccord est en outre
impossible."Essai II, 61.
Also in the following quotations where he argues that: "Apres tout ce quej'ai dit en plusieurs lieux, et
sous divers points de vue, de la probability d'existence d'une volonte libre, ou source de
determinations premieres dans Thomme, et de Timpuissance ou nous sommes neanmoins d'en obtenir
une preuve de fait ou une demonstration logique, il est clair que la solution du probleme ne peut plus
etre demandee qu'a la raison pratique. C'est une affirmation morale qu'il nous faut; toute autre
supposerait aussi celle-la. En d'autres termes, la raison pratique doit poser son propre fondement et
celui de toute raison reelle, car la raison ne se scinde pas : la raison n'est, selon notre connaissance,
autre chose que Thomme, et Thomme n'est jamais que Thomme pratique."Essai, II, 322.
And finally, "Impossibility de demontrer la liberte, aussi bien que de demontrer la necessite. Si la
these de la necessite, par le scepticisme absolu auquel elle conduit, provoque cette «revolte de l'etre
entier» dont on a essaye de donner I'ape^u, en revanche la these de la liberte ne permet pas non plus
a Tesprit de se reposer dans un savoir acquis demonstrativement. La liberte ne se demontre pas; elle
ne se constate pas davantage a la maniere d'un fait, attendu que Texperience n'atteint pas les
possibles comme reels, mais seulement, ce qui est bien different, la croyance qu'on en a, quand on l'a.
«Elle est la condition necessaire qui rend possible Toeuvre a la fois imparfaite et admirable de la
connaissance humaine et Toeuvre du Devoir qui en decoule, et c'est assez peut-etre pour nous assurer
qu'elle n'est pas une vaine conception de notre orgueil."Essa/, 11, 418-19.
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morale et aussi un fondement pour la connaisance pratique,
independamment de laquelle on ne peut asseoir «la science.»38
Renouvier's main conclusion is that if one cannot decide on intellectual grounds
which option to choose, then one is to choose the option that is morally beneficial for
one to believe.
Although James acknowledges Renouvier's profound influence on his WB essay, he
does not make any reference to his work or to him in the WB text. He does make,
however, references to another source of influence, that of W. K. Clifford. Clifford
(1845-1879) was a mathematician who held that rational believing can only be
established on scientific foundations. His essay 'The Ethics of Belief is cited by
some commentators, as the background against which James's WB can be read. A
brief examination of Clifford's basic claims and their influence on James is now
required.
Clifford maintained that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe
anything upon insufficient evidence."39 He warns us of the horrid consequences that
are likely to follow from adopting beliefs in absence of sufficient evidence. He paints
this gruesome picture ofwhat is likely to happen.
Our words, our phrases, our forms and processes and modes of thought, are
common property, fashioned and perfected from age to age ; an heirloom
which every succeeding generation inherits as a precious deposit and a
sacred trust to be handed on to the next one, not unchanged but enlarged
and purified, with some clear marks of its proper handiwork. Into this, for
good or ill, is woven every belief of every man who has speech of his
fellows. An awful privilege, and an awful responsibility, that we should
help to create the world in which posterity will live.40
>8Renouvier, Essai, 11, 419.
'^Clifford, 'The Ethics of Belief in Lectures and Essays, 186.
40Clifford, 'The Ethics of Belief in Lectures and Essays, 182.
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Whoso would deserve well of his fellows in this matter will guard the
purity of his belief with a very fanaticism ofjealous care, lest at any time it
should rest on an unworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be
wiped away.41
That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a pestilence,
which may shortly master our own body and then spread to the rest of the
town. What would be thought of one who, for the sake of a sweet fruit,
should deliberately run the risk of bringing a plague upon his family and
his neighbours?42
In like manner, if I let myself believe anything on insufficient evidence,
there may be no great harm done by the mere belief; it may be true after
all, or I may never have occasion to exhibit it in outward acts. But I cannot
help doing this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself credulous.
The danger to society is not merely that it should believe wrong things,
though that is great enough ; but that it should become credulous, and lose
the habit of testing things and inquiring into them ; for then it must sink
back into savagery. . . . The credulous man is father to the liar and the cheat
; he lives in the bosom of this his family, and it is no marvel if he should
become even as they are. So closely are our duties knit together, that
whoso shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of
all.43
The exaggeration of the evil effects of allowing ourselves to accept any belief, even
one single belief whatsoever its nature, before the evidence is fully available is
obvious. First of all, Clifford does not specify what he means exactly by 'sufficient
evidence'. It is not very clear to us how in such circumstances, individuals would
become credulous and the entire society would 'sink back into savagery'. Also, it is
not clear why the credulity of one person would encourage other persons to succumb
to deceptiveness. IfX knows of Y's credulity, X may or may not become credulous.
The same is true with the inclination to cheat and lie. These claims seem to be highly
doubtful and less than convincing. One can argue that in some ordinary life
situations, when establishing relationships among themselves, people do proceed
with a certain degree of trust. They do not enter into relationships encouraged by the
4lClifford, 'The Ethics of Belief
"Clifford, 'The Ethics of Belief
■"Clifford, 'The Ethics of Belief
in Lectures and Essays, 183.
in Lectures and Essays, 184.
in Lectures and Essays, 185-86.
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outcome of a vigorous empirical inquiry that had pointed towards going ahead with
the relationship.
Clifford tells us above that beliefs are not private, in the sense that they get
communicated to the rest of the society. They have consequences for other people,
with the possible risk of harming them, when held on insufficient evidence. Hence,
we must guard ourselves from beliefs that lack sufficient evidence to avoid getting
the society intoxicated with beliefs as such that can only jeopardise the well-being of
the whole society. Take for instance the belief z that any existing appreciation of
Dolly Parton's country songs will diminish completely soon after her death. Suppose
that X holds the belief z now, in absence of sufficient evidence, and z was eventually
circulated to the rest of the society, hence becoming a 'common property'.
Subsequently, we may find that many people might agree with X and adopt z, while
others, predominantly among them her loyal fans, might disregard z as complete
nonsense, yet others may not bother either to accept z or reject it. It is highly
doubtful that in these cases any of these three groups of individuals, would sink back
into savagery.
What seems to be at issue here is not Clifford's principle in itself, for it ought to be
commended and adopted as a general guiding principle for acquiring beliefs. It is,
rather, the kinds of beliefs to which it can be applied. What we have tried to point
out above is that in some, and may be many, ordinary life situations, this principle
seems difficult to apply. If we wish to take Clifford's claims seriously, we should
determine precisely the kinds of s to which it can be applied and the conditions under
which the application can be carried out successfully.
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James's WB essay, can be seen, in one aspect of it, as a classic response to the strict
evidentialism that Clifford was advocating. James counters Clifford's rule, that we
have a moral duty everywhere and at all times to believe anything only on the basis
of sufficient evidence, by arguing that, although we should normally hold beliefs on
the basis of adequate evidence, there are instances, such as the unverifiable belief
that God exists, when we have a right to hold beliefs in advance of sufficient
evidence. One of James's main concerns in the WB is to determine the conditions
under which we are justified in accepting beliefs prior to sufficient evidence. It is
beyond our concern here to examine James's exposition of Clifford's views and
whether he has misrepresented his views or not, but some brief remarks may be
helpful here.
James writes in the WB:
Believe nothing, he [Clifford] tells us, keep your mind in suspense forever,
rather than by closing it on insufficient evidence incur the awful risk of
believing lies. You, on the other hand, may think that the risk of being in
error is a very small matter when compared with the blessings of real
knowledge, and be ready to be duped many times in your investigation
rather than postpone indefinitely the chance of guessing true. 1 myself find
it impossible to go with Clifford."14
The crucial point at issue here, is how far adopting belief is conjoined with the
believer's acting on his belief. For James, if you believe x, then you will act on x. If
you suspend judgement or choose to disbelieve, then you are refraining from action
as well. His objection to Clifford's reasoning seems to centre on that issue. But if
Clifford's thesis is about belief only and not action, then it would seem that he would
not require, for example, an inquirer to stop his search for the verification of his
hypothesis, just because he cannot believe it in light of insufficient evidence; nor
44James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 24-25.
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would he invite us to 'postpone indefinitely the chance of guessing'. This position
that James ascribes to Clifford can hardly be maintained; that if one did not hold a
belief due to insufficient evidence, then one will not be prompted to act in order to
acquire evidence. James illustrates this point very clearly in the following.
Suppose, for example, that 1 am climbing in the Alps, and have had the
ill-luck to work myself into a position from which the only escape is by a
terrible leap. Being without similar experience, I have no evidence of my
ability to perform it successfully; but hope and confidence in myself make
me sure I shall not miss my aim, and nerve my feet to execute what without
those subjective emotions would perhaps have been impossible. But
suppose that, on the contrary, the emotions of fear and mistrust
preponderate; or suppose that, having just read the "Ethics of Belief," I feel
it would be sinful to act upon an assumption unverified by previous
experience—why, then 1 shall hesitate so long that at last, exhausted and
trembling, and launching myself in a moment of despair, I miss my
foothold and roll into the abyss.45
Now, whether Clifford's cited essay really implies this result, does not concern us
here. What is important for us to point out is that for James, belief is measured by
action. He tells us that "he who forbids us to believe religion to be true, necessarily
also forbids us to act as we should ifwe did believe it to be true."46
Now we move on to consider the thoughts of another mathematician and scientist on
the question of believing in light of insufficient evidence; we are referring here to the
ideas of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) advocated in his Pensees, published
posthumously in 1670. He presents us with what has come to be known in literature
as Pascal's wager. His wager is mainly concerned with the rationality of belief, in
particular religious (Christian) belief, not with its truth. His response to the question
of the existence of God is by adopting belief in Him. This seemed to Pascal to be the
rational attitude to take when confronted with such a question in favour of which no
evidence has yet been shown to be conclusive. For despite the insufficient evidence
45James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality' in WB, 80.
46James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 32n.
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for belief in God, Pascal argues, it would be irrational not to believe if his wager
wins. Hence, the audience at whom his Wager is aimed includes those unbelievers
whom he wants to persuade to become believers.
Pascal begins by claiming that God is a mystery for us. We can never know His
essence. We can know neither that he exists nor what he is like. He says that
[i]f there is a God, he is infinitely incomprehensible because having neither
dimensions nor limits, he has no relation to us. We are therefore incapable
of knowing either what he is, or whether he exists.47
What we are sure of, however, is that there is a possibility of God's existence and of
eternity. Once we recognise these possibilities, we realise how serious the situation
we are in really is and how the matter ought to be attended to with the utmost
concern. It would make us pause for a moment and think about the highly
undesirable consequences in afterlife for those who do not believe, if it turned out
that God existed.
Hence, we find Pascal having the highest sympathy with those who are distressed by
their doubts about the matter and who take great pains at trying to get rid of doubt
and attain faith. However, those who confront the religious question of God and
eternity with indifference, Pascal tells us, do not actually realise the gravity of the
situation. "Their neglect in a matter which vitally concerns themselves, their eternal
destiny, their all", Pascal says, "irritates me more than it moves me; it astonishes and
appals [sic] me: I find something monstrous in it."48
47Pascal, Pensees, entry #343, 201.
48Pascal, Pensees, entry #11, 104.
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He recognises that reason cannot help us to decide whether there is a God or there is
not. For there is insufficient evidence to support either alternative and hence to
convince us to adopt one hypothesis or the other. Hence, some will find themselves
justified in abandoning the belief in God, others may regard it appropriate to suspend
judgement. Pascal tells us that there are good reasons for not adopting either
position. The practical consequences that follow from believing in God, upon
recognising the possibility of His existence, is just too good to be ignored. Those
who suspend judgement or disbelieve are committing a terrible mistake. Here Pascal
presents us with a gambling game that we are forced to take part in. He writes:
'[W]e have to wager. You are not a free agent; you are committed. Which
will you have then? Come on. Since you are obliged to choose, let us see
which interests you least. You may lose two things: the true and the good;
and there are two things that you stake: your reason and your will, your
knowledge and your beatitude; and your nature has two things from which
to escape: error and unhappiness. Your reason is not more deeply wounded
by choosing one rather than the other because it is bound to choose. That
disposes of one point. But what about your beatitude? Let us measure the
gain and the loss by saying: "Heads God exists." Let us compare the two
cases; if you win, you win everything; if you lose, you lose nothing. Don't
hesitate then. Take a bet that he exists. . . . there is no room for hesitation:
you must stake everything. And so, since you are forced to gamble, you
must abandon reason in order to save your life, rather than risk it for the
infinite gain which is just as likely to turn up as the loss of nothing.'49
According to this reasoning, if one believed that God exists and it turned out that he
did, the possibility of infinite gain and finite loss is realised. However, if it turns out
that he did not exist, then what one ends up with is finite loss in terms of the earthly
pleasures that one had to abandon. On the other hand, if one did not believe that God
exists and it turned out that he does, then one is left with infinite loss coupled with
finite gain. If God does not exist, then one only wins finite gain. Now, in light of our
betting scores, wagering that God exists, Pascal insists, is the only rational decision
to make. Given that God gives believers infinite gain and unbelievers infinite loss,
44Pascai, Pensees, entry #343, 202-03.
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and given that the reward that theism promises is infinite, then no matter how much
pleasure or finite gain is won in life, in betting terms, the religious life is the better
bet. No matter how small is the chance that God exists, it is unwise not to wager,
because if he does exist, the reward for wagering is infinite in value.
But, what about those among us who cannot get themselves to bet in the first place?
Pascal addresses the problem of those who struggle in pursuit of faith, but are sadly
incapable of it. The sceptic says to him:
'[M]y hands are tied and my lips sealed; I am forced to gamble and am not
free; they will not let go of me. And 1 am made in such a way that I cannot
believe. What do you expect me to do?'50
Pascal got an answer to this problem. He offers the following recipe for curing these
poor souls from the disease of doubt:
'[L]eam from the examples of those who like yourself were in bondage and
who now stake their whole fortune: they are people who know the path that
you would like to follow, and who have been cured of an ill of which you
wish to be cured. Follow the method by which they began: it is by
behaving as though they did believe, by taking holy water, by having
masses said, etc. That will naturally make you inclined to believe and will
calm you.'51
Thus, people who find it hard to believe while wanting to, can come to believe by
imitating the behaviour of believers. This form of activity is supposed to put their
persistent doubts to rest. It is not very hard to imagine philosophers', and indeed
other people's, reactions to Pascal's advice on the method of attaining belief. It has
been received with much hostile criticism and suspicion of immorality. For one, G.
E. Moore's remarks about the wager that he would say nothing of it except that it
seemed to him to be 'absolutely wicked'.
50Pascal, Pensees, entry #343, 203-04.
"Pascal, Pensees, entry # 343, 204.
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There are certain features of Pascal's argument which are relevant in connection with
James's WB doctrine, which must be highlighted here. The first is Pascal's use of the
gambling language in the different stages of his argument. As we have seen above,
Pascal says to the sceptic that he must wager either that God exists or that He does
not. He does not say to the sceptic that he must believe. The gains or losses that the
sceptic might attain are dependent on his gambling on the existence of God. Pascal
tells him that the infinite gains that he might get are the outcome of gambling on
'calling heads that God is'. When the sceptic told Pascal that he could not believe,
Pascal replied by offering his advice on following the way by which other believers
started and do as they do. These believers who attained faith have 'now staked their
whole fortune'. They are the great models who have established themselves now as
gamblers. When the sceptic replied that that is exactly what he is afraid of, Pascal
surprisingly replied: "'But why? What have you got to lose?"'32 Indeed, if the
infinite gain is conditioned upon gambling, then the sceptic would have nothing to
lose in gambling. If he cannot force himself to gamble, then the infinite gain is surely
lost. If the sceptic cannot believe, then there is much to be lost, namely, infinite gain
which is conditioned upon belief. The sceptic's main problem, as Pascal sees it, is
that he knows that he is 'forced to gamble' and yet he cannot bring himself to do so.
Hence Pascal's advice. If he cannot bring himself to gambling, he could look up to
those gamblers who have staked all their fortune on God's existence. He could direct
his attention to those believers who attained faith and who gamble everything on
God's existence, then he will find that he would be able to attain faith himself. He
can start the process, step by step. First by thinking of all these gamblers and what
they have put at stake, then he can move on to taking holy water and masses until he
is prepared to stake all his fortune on God's existence.
"Pascal, Pensees, entry #343, 204.
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Here we must say a word about Pascal's view of the role of the will in acquiring
beliefs. He restricts the role of the will to directing one to choosing to look at the
world from one aspect rather than another. The way that the will directs us
influences what we are likely to observe in the world. Pascal is careful to point out
that his view does not imply that the will creates belief, it only shows the important
role of the will in the formation of beliefs.
The will is one of the principal organs of belief; not because it forms belief,
but because things are true or false according to the angle from which we
look at them. The will, which finds one more agreeable than another,
diverts the mind from the consideration of the qualities of those which it
does not like to see; and so the mind, marching in step with the will, stops
to examine the side that appeals to it; and so it judges by what it finds
there.53
Accordingly, in religious matters, one chooses to see what one wills to see. If one
wanted to see the good aspects of religion, one will undoubtedly see them. If one
chooses to focus one's attention on the defects and inadequacies of religion, one is
likely to find them.
We are forced to wager because reason alone cannot settle the question of the
existence of God.54 Hence, we are obliged to choose either to believe in God or not.
There is a small chance that God might exist and hence, the question of his existence
is one that is worth considering; bearing in mind the benefits of infinite gain that we
might obtain if it turned out that God exists; there is good deal at stake to make us
consider this question seriously.
''Pascal, Pensees, entry #375, 210.




For James, the fulfilment of interests and desires are stronger than any intellectual
rules or principles. What is paramount in human life is human striving and the desire
to fulfil needs and purposes. If this element of human life is stronger than the
intellectual aspect, then beliefs cannot appropriately be given a justification that is
simply based on intellectual grounds. But what does it mean to hold a belief on
non-intellectual grounds? The immediate answer is that the believer holds his belief
because it satisfies his own aims and desires, even if in terms of evidence, the belief
is insufficiently justified.
That is not precisely the point for James; his focus is on the issue of holding a belief
prior to the attainment of evidence. From a psychological point of view, people
adopt beliefs simply on the basis of subjective needs without adequate intellectual
evidence. But many have disagreed as to the implications of this psychological fact
on philosophical discussions including those of religion. In the case of religious
belief, we are faced with a completely different situation; it is a question of
specifying the conditions under which we might hold religious beliefs prior to
adequate evidence. Many of James's critics reject his view that emotional
considerations can offer any form of justification for beliefs of any kind. Only
rational grounds provide the appropriate justification for beliefs. This standard
criticism was addressed by hostile critics and has appeared in different versions of
which we shall mention some that are representative.
James's discussion of the conditions under which we may adopt religious beliefs is
set out in his renowned essay 'The Will to Believe'. As with his account of truth, this
essay was widely read and misread by critics and has engendered much criticism.
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Although written over a hundred years ago,55 it still raises much the same criticisms
that were raised by James's contemporaries. The following list captures the most
common criticisms and arguments.
(1) In holding that beliefs may be held in advance of adequate evidence, James was
promoting wishful thinking and being unreasonable. If a person is to believe
whatever he wishes in absence of adequate evidence, then on James's view, no belief
can be described as too irrational to be upheld. That one can choose to believe
anything that one likes for whatever reason or for no reason at all, would be justified
on James's view.
(2) James wrongly claims that we do exercise some control over what we believe and
the fact of the matter is that we do not have this control. We cannot hold or reject
beliefs in the same way that we can turn the heater or (TV) on or off.
(3) James's position leads to irrationality and self-deception. Self-deception might
seem, on James's view, rational. A person who adopts inadequately justified beliefs
will be deceiving himself about many things as to the nature of things related to that
particular belief. The extreme effect of this is that in such a state of affairs, more and
more of false beliefs are likely to be engendered and so become embodied in the
total system of beliefs.
(4) Many understood the essay as an attempt to give a justification for the existence
ofGod as established in traditional theism.
(5) What James was defending can hardly be called faith and does not deserve to be
called so.
(6) James was encouraging or advocating belief for beliefs sake; offering a licence
to belief.
55It was originally given as An Address to the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities.
First published in the New World in 1896.
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James's response to his critics was marked by his insistence that his essay was
misread and misinterpreted. In a letter to Peirce, dated February 3, 1899, James tells
him that he had been "in much hot water lately"56 over his WB thesis. The responses
of his critics surely had produced the intolerable heat. Sometimes he blamed the
unlucky title given to the essay. Had he called it 'The Right to Believe', critics such
as Dickinson S. Miller, "would have been without a pretext for most of what he
says."57 Miller's article on the WB, James writes, is "a complete ignoratio elenchi,
and leaves untouched all my [James's] contentions in the Will to Believe. "58 Another
critic, L. T. Hobhouse, had substituted for James's essay "a travesty for which I
[James] defy any candid reader to find a single justification in my text."59 Out of
complete frustration at A. E. Taylor's misrepresentation of his essay, James sends up
a prayer:
[A]nd 1 cry to Heaven to tell me of what insane root my "leading
contemporaries" have eaten, that they are so smitten with blindness as to
the meaning of printed texts.60
It must be conceded, however, that, as is the case with his account of truth, it was not
entirely the fault of his critics. His statements in the WB were not very clear. His
position was not as clear as he thought it was. No discussion or reply to individual
critics will be attempted here, this is solely an attempt to clarify James's main theses
and reply to the general objections listed above. This is in the context of my main
thesis, namely, as to how some ideas of James's view of science helped to shape his
WB doctrine and his general views on religion. The WB doctrine will now be
discussed in detail.
56Quoted in P. K. Dooley's Pragmatism as Humanism: The Philosophy ofWilliam James, 83.
"Perry, II, 243.
"Terry, II, 243.
"Tetter to Hobhouse, August 12, 1904, in Perry, II, 245.
"Tetter to Hobhouse, August 12, 1904, in Perry, II, 246.
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James describes the WB as
an essay in justification of faith, a defence of our right to adopt a believing
attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical
intellect may not have been coerced.61
What did James mean by this statement? And what kind of justification is he seeking
to establish? From the discussion of the criteria of rationality in its two types, the sort
of criteria which are appropriate to the establishment of religious belief are the
practical ones, not the theoretical. Now the question is: Why are the criteria of
theoretical rationality not applicable in the case of religious belief?
To appeal to the criteria of theoretical rationality for the justification of religious
belief is to miss out on the whole essence of religion. In this specific case, the
demands of theoretical rationality only lead to arbitrariness, and are of little help in
such questions as those of religious belief. When James characterised the 'religious
hypothesis' as a candidate for belief, he offered it a characterisation in the context of
the criteria of practical rationality. One important point that must be made regarding
this essay is that it is not concerned with any particular religious position or doctrine.
Nor is James concerned with the theistic claims about the existence of a supernatural
being that many would identify as God. He wrote once to James Leuba that he has
"no living sense of commerce with a God"; that the Divine for him is
limited to impersonal and abstract concepts which, as ideals, interest and
determine me, but do so but faintly in comparison with what a feeling of
God might effect, if 1 had one.62
6lJames, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 13.
"James's letter to Leuba, dated April 17, 1904, in Perry, II, 350.
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God for him was only 'dimly' real and he never experienced his presence, yet he
believed in him.63 He regards the God of theology as a "disease of the
philosophy-shop."64 The question of establishing the existence of God is, for James,
irrelevant to our religious faith.
This claim is undoubtedly unacceptable to those traditional theists among us for
whom the existence of God is the central tenet of their religions and faith. James's
WB essay ought not to be read as a defence of theism. It is, rather, as he says, a
defence of faith and our right to have one. Having said that, those criticisms, and
there are plenty of them, which charge him of making the existence of God a matter
of personal desire have hardly any grounds to support their claims.65
Before embarking on the discussion of James's main thesis in the WB, it should be
emphasised that in the WB, James, though mainly concerned with defending the
justification of faith, as he explicitly offers in his essay, his main intention is to
highlight the pragmatic consequences of religious belief. His goal is to show that
religious questions cannot be decided by rational arguments or scientific evidence.
Hence, the appeal to the pragmatic consequences that belief carries for the individual
believer is the only way that is likely to assist us in evaluating these beliefs. Later in
the VRE, James's principal concern is to show that some religious claims can be
empirically verified and thus possess some degree of objectivity. It cannot justifiably
be maintained that, for James, religious beliefs are justified only by appealing to
6'See James's response to a questionnaire in 1904 in LWJ, II, 213-15.
64James's letter to Charles A. Strong, dated April 9, 1907, in LWJ, 11, 269.
65For example, John Hick says that for James, "the existence or non-existence ofGod, ofwhich there
can be no conclusive evidence either way, is a matter of such momentous importance that anyone who
so desires has the right to stake his life upon the God-hypothesis.... the basic weakness of James's
position is that it constitutes an unrestricted license for wishful thinking." Hick, Philosophy of
Religion, 65-66. This does not only incorrectly present James as encouraging us to believe in matters
of religion whatever pleases us, it wrongly presents James's essay as offering a justification for the
existence of God.
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subjective criteria. Both his subjectivistic and objectivistic accounts of the
justification of religious belief must be taken into consideration, if one wishes to be
faithful to James's text. An interpretation that is faithful to James's text is one which
takes into account what he says about both religion and science in the WB and
elsewhere. The groundwork has now been laid to move to discussion of the WB.
James writes:
The thesis 1 defend is, briefly stated, this:
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option
between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its
nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such
circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open, " is itself a
passional decision—-just like deciding yes or no—and is attended with the
same risk of losing the truth.66
Whether James is defending a right or an obligation to believe rests on our
understanding of 'lawfully may, but must'. Here he seems to be making a strong
claim and a weak claim. The strong one is an obligation to decide an option and the
weak one concerns a right to decide an option. There is no specification of the kind
of hypotheses that are candidates for the will to believe thesis - though James's main
concern is the application of the WB to religious hypotheses. Nevertheless, he
introduces what he called above a 'genuine' option. He defines it as an option which
is 'live', 'forced' and 'momentous'. Genuine options, in James's characterisations of
them, concern what we are going to act or to perform, in practical terms, not merely
what we may believe.
66James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 20.
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An hypothesis, which is a candidate for belief, is a 'live' one, as against a 'dead' one,
when it is worthy of the consideration of the individual. The liveliness or deadness of
an hypothesis, James indicates, is measured by the individual's 'willingness to act.'67
A genuine option is one which is 'forced' not avoidable. By that James means that it
is an option which is mandatory. When such an option is presented to us, we must
make a decision. An avoidable option is one where it is possible for one to avoid
choosing either hypothesis. An example of a forced option, James writes: "Either
accept this truth or go without it."68 There is no third option. James concludes his
discussion of forced options by saying that "Every dilemma based on a complete
logical disjunction, with no possibility of not choosing, is an option of this forced
kind."69 Accordingly, a forced option must satisfy two conditions: (1) the suggested
alternatives must form a complete logical disjunction; and (2) that choice must be of
either of the alternatives, that is, the possibility of not choosing either of them does
not exist. A forced option, then would take the following form: Either believe T or
do not believe T. You can either choose to believe T (accept it) or not to believe T.
One might raise the objection that one can simply not believe one or the other. There
is always the possibility of suspending judgement and avoiding making the choice
between either alternative. If we are to do justice to James's claims about forced
options, we must list the suspending of judgement in the side of not believing T.
Elence, one alternative would be to believe T and the second alternative would be not
of judgement is decided on intellectual grounds to believe T and the third would be
the suspending judgement on T. The suspending, where there are no good reasons
for favouring the other two alternatives. If the suspending of judgement is not a
choice, then to say that the decision between believing T and not believing T cannot
67James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 14.
68James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 15.
69James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 15.
190
be made on intellectual grounds is to say that both alternatives are equivalent on
intellectual grounds, i.e., that both alternatives are equally supported by evidence
(logical or empirical). When the suspending of judgement is a possibility, then there
are intellectual grounds for suspending judgement and not believing T. When a
decision between alternatives cannot be made on intellectual grounds, there is always
the possibility of suspending judgement on intellectual grounds.70
When James says:
"Do not decide, but leave the question open, " is itself a passional
decision—-just like deciding yes or no—and is attended with the same risk
of losing the truth11
he is suggesting that if one does not decide, i.e., if one suspends judgement, one's
decision is (1) a passional one, and (2) would run the risk of losing the truth. This
does not seem to be true. One's decision to suspend judgement might be based on
either intellectual or passional grounds and, thus, one does not run the risk of losing
truth. If one chose to believe T rather than not believing T on non-intellectual
grounds, one would run the risk of being right or wrong. But one's decision to
suspend judgement makes sure that truth is not lost for one. It protects one from
believing wrongly and it guards one against believing correctly. But if one decides
either to believe T or not to believe T, one runs the risk of equally being right or
being wrong. Advising us in the above quotation not to suspend judgement, James is
not doing away with this choice because it is not a plausible line to take, it is, rather,
a position which the expense of adopting is too high to bear.
70If for James, belief is measured by action, then both suspending judgement and disbelief, though
theoretically different, would practically be equivalent. Hence, in terms of action, we only have two
alternatives to choose from.
7lJames, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 20.
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The third characteristic of a genuine option is that it is 'momentous' and not 'trivial'.
An option is trivial if nothing of particular significance hinges upon our deciding for
it. A momentous option is one in which the opportunity is unique, a great deal is at
stake and the decision is irreversible.72 In contrast, a trivial option is one in which
the opportunity is not unique, not much is at stake and the decision is reversible.
James gives us as an example of a momentous option that of someone who was
offered the chance of participating in Dr. Nansen's expedition to the North Pole.73
What one must decide when confronted with this option is what to do within a
limited period of time. One may never be asked again to join Dr. Nansen. One
cannot change one's mind later. The consequences of joining the expedition are just
too good to be missed and too much to lose if one decided against joining it. It seems
that the only plausible thing to do is to join the expedition.
A genuine option that combines all three characteristics is an option where the
consequences of choosing it are of vital significance for the individual. A genuine
option is one where we fully recognise and thus admit the uncertainties that confront
us and in such circumstances, we may, and must, follow the demands of practical
rationality. Thus, such an option, James tells us, is one which cannot by its nature be
decided on intellectual grounds. Intellectual grounds include both logical and
empirical ones. What does it mean that a genuine option cannot by its nature be
decided on intellectual grounds? Does it imply that it can never be decided on
intellectual grounds? A religious hypothesis, James tells us, is one which "obviously
cannot yet be verified scientifically at all."74 We may take this statement as
equivalent to saying that a religious hypothesis is one which cannot yet be decided
on intellectual grounds. Hence, the religious hypothesis is a genuine option which we
7"James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 15.
"James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 15.
Names, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 30.
192
cannot now decide on intellectual grounds. This seems to go well with our discussion
on types of beliefs, where we tried to show that for James, religious, metaphysical,
aesthetic and moral principles are all propositions that are not yet verified. We accept
them on the hope that they will be verified in the future in the same way that
scientific propositions have already been verified. This point will be returned to later
in the discussion, but now the discourse moves to examine two kinds of hypothesis
to which the WB doctrine is applicable: the scientific hypothesis and the religious
hypothesis.
6.3 SCIENTIFIC OPTION AND RELIGIOUS OPTION
James did not present his WB doctrine as a doctrine that is applicable to any specific
kind of hypothesis. Granted his intention in WB to show how religious belief can be
justified on the basis of the WB doctrine, he did not say, that the WB is applicable
only to religious questions. In fact, the WB can be applied to any hypothesis
provided that it satisfies the conditions stated above. James only excludes such
situations as those in which believing something contradicts the available objective
evidence whether empirical or logical. For these cases, the WB is not applicable.
James writes:
Can we, by any effort of our will, or by any strength of wish that it were
true, believe ourselves well and about when we are roaring with
rheumatism in bed, or feel certain that the sum of the two one-dollar bills
in our pocket must be a hundred dollars? We can say any of these things,
but we are absolutely impotent to believe them; and of just such things is
the whole fabric of the truths that we do believe in made up—matters of
fact, immediate or remote, as Hume said, and relations between ideas,
which are either there or not there for us if we see them so, and which if
not there cannot be put there by any action of our own.75
"James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 15-16.
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This tells us that the hypotheses to which the WB is applicable are those for which
objective evidence is not available now but may be obtained in future experience.
Hence, the WB is not applicable to the examples just mentioned in the above
quotation. For it can easily be verified that the man's belief about his health
condition is false and that he has been deceiving himself about his health status.
Thus, the WB doctrine is not applicable to such hypotheses or candidates for belief
as can be falsified on evidentiary grounds.
In Part One, we have discussed how in certain scientific cases, James argued for the
application of pragmatic criteria in choosing between competing scientific formulae
or theories, when the choice cannot be made on evidential grounds. These situations
where two or more competing theories are equally supported by objective evidence,
are situations in which we are justified in applying subjective criteria such as
elegance, simplicity and taste to help us to decide which theory to choose, that is, to
use the Jamesian language in WB, our decision in these situations is made on
non-intellectual grounds. Can we then describe these scientific situations as 'living',
'forced' and 'momentous'? Can the WB be exercised in these situations?
In my view, those situations, are ones which present themselves to us as forced,
living and momentous. Indeed, especially in Pragmatism, James highlights the role
of subjective factors in evaluating competing theories. His intention in Pragmatism
was to show how subjective factors influence our systems of beliefs, which include
beliefs of any kind. In the WB essay, however, James's aim was different. He was
concerned with the problem of belief in advance of evidence (with the religious
question especially in mind) and how to react when the evidence is not attainable for
the moment. Here we find him trying to draw attention to the differences between
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science and religion over the issue of evidence. We find him for example, saying
something like this.
Throughout the breadth of physical nature facts are what they are quite
independently of us, and seldom is there any such hurry about them that the
risks of being duped by believing a premature theory need be faced. The
questions here are always trivial options, the hypotheses are hardly living
(at any rate not living for us spectators), the choice between believing truth
or falsehood is seldom forced. . . . What difference, indeed, does it make to
most of us whether we have or have not a theory of the Rontgen rays,
whether we believe or not in mind-stuff, or have a conviction about the
causality of conscious states? It makes no difference. Such options are not
forced on us.76
Also when James defined 'momentous' and 'trivial' options, he said that
trivial options abound in the scientific life. A chemist finds an hypothesis
live enough to spend a year in its verification: he believes in it to that
extent. But if his experiments prove inconclusive either way, he is quit for
his loss of time, no vital harm being done.77
What James wants to point out is that in most scientific cases the WB is not
applicable. There are hypotheses which are neither living nor forced or momentous.
But there are scientific situations to which the WB is applicable; where the scientist
needs to believe in advance of the evidence.78 The other point that James is making
is that in religion the option is always genuine and the decision cannot be postponed
until the evidence is attainable as is the case in science. In matters of religious belief
we cannot afford not to decide. We must act and not wait till further evidence is
obtained. For by doing so we are risking the loss of vital goods that follow upon our
choice to hold religious belief.
75James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 26.
77James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 15.
78See Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, 191-93. He gives examples of the application of the will to
believe in science. Putnam is sympathetic to James's main claims in WB. He says: "Although this
essay has received a great deal of hostile criticism, 1 believe that its logic is, in fact, precise and
impeccable." 191-92.
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Now, let us consider the religious belief, the justification of which is the main
concern of the WB essay. James presents the religious question as a genuine option
to which the WB is applicable.
If 1 say to you: "Be a theosophist or be a mahomedan," it is probably a
dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive. But if
I say "Be an agnostic or be a Christian," it is otherwise: trained as you are,
each hypothesis makes some appeal, however small, to your belief. 9
What makes the first option a dead one for James while the second a live one? The
first option is a dead one, for him, because neither of the two competing hypotheses
is likely to fit coherently with his whole system of beliefs. The possibility for it to be
rejected is high. The second option, in contrast, is a live one because at least one of
the two hypotheses qualifies for consideration for belief; it initiates some interest for
him to consider it. This option is also forced for James for he can see no other
alternative hypothesis to compete with these two. He must decide to act on one or the
other. The option is also momentous, for it involves a fundamental alteration in our
expectations and hopes. It promises a certain amount of good that will enrich our life
a great deal. This option cannot be chosen on intellectual grounds; it cannot be
settled by the applications of the criteria of theoretical rationality. For neither
speculative philosopher, theologians or agnostics have succeeded in providing
conclusive evidence in support of their positions. Hence, the choice between
Agnosticism or Christianity is for James a genuine option that cannot be decided on
intellectual grounds. Thus, it may, and must, be decided on passional grounds,
namely, by appealing to the criteria of practical rationality, whose two demands are
met by the religious hypothesis.
Alames, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 14.
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James points out that in life, many of the options that we are presented with are not
genuine. Some might be forced, but others are not as momentous as is the religious
option. Hence his observation that we cannot bear the expense of not deciding
because a great deal is at stake in such situations. The consequences of not deciding
involve the risk of losing the chance of arriving at the truth in the midst of our
attempt to avoid believing wrongly. James emphatically stresses 'the risk of losing
truth', for the only way that the religious hypothesis is verified is by believing it. To
clarify this notion of the verification of the religious hypothesis, our discussion in
Part Two of absolute truth should be recalled.
We have seen that the experiences of individuals are the starting-point in James's
account of truth and so it is in the case of religion; it begins with the personal,
relative religious experiences of the individuals. As it is in truth, when James
provided an explanation for objective truth on the basis of the subjective experiences
of the individuals, in religion James also wanted to show how religion can be no less
objective than truth and of course, science. One can detect here a certain mechanism
of connecting the subjective with the objective which can be traced in his writings on
science, truth and religion.
The nature of the religious hypothesis and its generality makes its verification
somewhat different from the way that scientific hypotheses are empirically tested,
though essentially similar. To show how James argues for this refer back to our
discussion of absolute truth in Part Two. This has shown that the personal
experiences of individuals are the starting-point in James's account of truth, and so it
is in the case of religion; the personal, relative, religious experiences of individuals.
In his pragmatic account of truth, James provides an account of absolute truth on the
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basis of the subjective experiences of the individuals. In religion too, James is
anxious to show how religion can be no less objective than science.
We have shown in Part Two that James was committed to the doctrine of degrees of
truth. The way he links truth with verifiability and satisfactoriness, as the two
conditions of truth, implies that both the verifiability and the satisfactoriness of
beliefs have degrees. A relatively verifiable belief is one for which the empirical
evidence might increase with various degrees over a period of time. The degree of
verification of a belief is relative to the experiences of various individuals. The
satisfactoriness of a belief also extends over a certain period of time and varies
according to the different experiences of individuals. The same belief might be more
satisfactory for one person than for another. For a person, the same belief might be at
one time more satisfactory than at another time. But how can these personal and
relative experiences contribute to the establishment of an objective and ideal order,
be it a moral order or a religion?
Each individual acquires a certain number of experiences of the world that lead him
to form beliefs which are verifiable and satisfactory. The experiences of one
individual alone, however, cannot, because of their limitations, account for the
formulation of certain beliefs over a long period of time. The sharing of the
experiences of other individuals is crucial and vital for the establishment of a belief
over a period of time. This requires some kind of co-operation among individuals
which materialises in their sharing of their experiences through the social exchange
of ideas and verifications. Hence, James tells us in Pragmatism,
198
we exchange ideas; we lend and borrow verifications, get them from one
another by means of social intercourse. All truth thus gets verbally built
out, stored up, and made available for everyone.80
The implications of this form of activity are that individuals, through the sharing of
their experiences are more likely to acquire beliefs which have an increasing degree
of truth. Individuals will be more able to credit their beliefs with a higher degree of
truth, to better account for their experiences and to predict further experiences.
Hence, as time passes they tend to hold beliefs that are more objective; ones which at
the highest level may not be refuted by any further experiences. At that level, truth
reaches its ideal limit and becomes 'absolute'. The most significant point is that the
objectivity of truth is arrived at by the subjective experiences of individuals which
are conditioned by the criteria of verifiability and satisfactoriness.
Religion is one such case that expresses this harmony between the subjective and the
objective. As it is the case with truth, the objectivity of the religious hypothesis is not
obtained in one person's experience. Nor is it founded on a certain theoretical
argument. It is based on the long term experiences of those who adopt the religious
hypothesis in their lives. For the individual, the religious hypothesis is one which is
subject to the empirical testing within the believer's own experience. The
falsification of the religious hypothesis is not dependent on the individual's own
empirical testing of it. For, as we have said earlier, the personal beliefs that the
individual holds are only relative and subject to change over time. However, the
accumulation of the experiences of individuals over a long period of time may be the
means by which the confirmation of religious hypothesis is produced. Hence, the
believers who act upon their religious hypothesis are collectively the ones whose
conduct and action are likely to produce the confirmation of religious belief. The
80James, PRAG, 102.
199
objective truth about religion may one day arrived at in this way. The objectivity of
religion, as it is the case with truth and science, needs to be analysed in terms of the
relative experiences of the individual believers. James describes the confirmation of
the religious hypothesis as follows.
[T]he verification of the theory which you may hold as to the objectively
moral character of the world can consist only in this—that if you proceed to
act upon your theory it will be reversed by nothing that later turns up as
your action's fruit; it will harmonize so well with the entire drift of
experience that the latter will, as it were, adopt it, or at most give it an
ampler interpretation, without obliging you in any way to change the
essence of its formulation.81
If, however, the religious hypothesis is false rather than true, then
the course of experience will throw ever new impediments in the way of
my belief, and become more and more difficult to express in its language.
Epicycle upon epicycle of subsidiary hypothesis will have to be invoked to
give to the discrepant terms a temporary appearance of squaring with each
other; but at last even this resource will fail.
The verification of the religious hypothesis is achieved by the experiences of the
entire human race. The proofwill be complete, James says, only "when the last man
has had his say and contributed his share"83 to the cumulative experiences of other
individuals. Only then will the verification happen. One can see then that the nature
of the religious hypothesis (and other hypotheses of similar generality) through its
generality requires a verification in the long term, while the verification of the
scientific hypothesis can be short term. The objectivity of religion, unlike that of
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We shall examine next how within the experiences of the individual believers,
religious beliefs can be empirically verified. The objective account of religious
claims which James gives is analysed in terms of the religious experiences of the
believers. This James discusses in lecture XX, entitled 'Conclusions' and in the
'Postscript' to his monumental work on religious experience, VRE. We have seen
that, in his WB, James was mainly concerned with highlighting the wide divide
between religion and science on the issue of the justification of beliefs. In the VRE,
we find him occupied with narrowing the gap between science and religion as much
as possible.
7. INSTITUTIONAL RELIGION
James was convinced that the attempts by 'dogmatic theology' to establish the
existence of God by arguments or to define both his metaphysical and moral
attributes had deprived religion of its very essence, namely, the religious experiences
of the individual believers. The outcome was a variety of empty abstractions that
lack any support in the actual religious experiences of the individuals. An application
of Peirce's principle of pragmatism, James tells us, shows us the meaninglessness of
metaphysical attributes. Take for example the attribute of infinity. James asks: What
is this particular attribute known-as? What is the practical difference for the believer
that would result from its being true? None of these attributes, as James sees it, has
any 'cash-value' for believers; they lack any support in the actual experiences of the
believers.
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So much for the metaphysical attributes ofGod! From the point of view of
practical religion, the metaphysical monster which they offer to our
worship is an absolutely worthless invention of the scholarly mind.84
Moral attributes of God, such as holiness and goodness, James continues, are more
significant than metaphysical attributes; they have definite relations to our practical
life; they "positively determine fear and hope and expectation."83 But dogmatic
theology failed to prove that a God with such characters really existed. Thus, it failed
to offer a solid foundation for religious sentiment. With regards to God's moral
attributes, James tells us, dogmatic theology "stands with them as ill as with the
arguments for his existence."86
For James, the religious hypothesis of God's existence is meaningless unless we can
infer from it verifiable consequences in the world of facts. What make the difference
between the proposition 'God exists' and the proposition 'God does not exist', are
the consequences that follow from each and the consequences that follow for
believers upon holding them. Both kinds of consequences determine the meaning of
each proposition. If there were no consequences that would follow from the
proposition that 'God exists' at all, and hence no difference in the world to be made,
then, as James sees it, it is pragmatically equivalent to the proposition that 'God does
not exist'. Hence, James is highly sceptical of any religious view that does not take
into consideration the empirical consequences of the religious hypothesis. For
example, he rejects what he calls 'universalistic supernaturalism' on the grounds that





For James, it is only the empirical consequences of God in the natural world which
provide some objectivity to the idea of God, no matter how remote those objective
consequences may be. It is also the means by which the religious hypothesis can be
shown to be more objective and less subjective; in line with objective scientific
hypothesis. James even suggests the possibility of a critical 'science of religions'.87
If she [philosophy] will abandon metaphysics and deduction for criticism
and induction, and frankly transform herself from theology into science of
religions, she can make herself enormously useful.88
James's remark is that religion is to become scientific rather than metaphysical.
Whether philosophy could actually achieve that goal is the question. Care is needed
when attempting interpretations of James's words here. His remarks about the task of
philosophy to free religion from metaphysics ought to be understood only in the
context of his suggestion to establish a science of religion, .//religion can actually be
divorced from metaphysics, then a science of religion might be established.89
8. THE SCIENCE OF RELIGIONS
We begin by asking: Is a 'science of religions' possible? The abandonment of the
vacuous formulations of theology and the concentration on the 'cash-value' of the
religious hypothesis in the actual religious experiences of the individual believers
might be achieved in a series of steps that James tells us to follow.
87James was familiar with works on the science of religions, which were published as early as 1869.
In a letter to Charles Ritter, a friend of his from his days at the Geneva school, dated January 21,
1869, he says: 'I read the three last articles on "Science of Religions" by Emile Burnouf in the Revue
des deux mondes, and Religion by Vacherot.' Perry, I, 291.
88James, VRE, 359.
S9This line of thinking prevails in James's earlier work on psychology, where he attempts to divorce
psychology from metaphysics in his project to establish psychology from the point of view of
positivist science.
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(1) The realisation that in the matter of religion, we are dealing with a plurality of
religions. Each making different claims from the other which are in many cases
inconsistent with each other. At this stage, James tells us, "Philosophy can by
comparison eliminate the local and the accidental from these definitions. Both from
dogma and from worship she can remove historic incrustations."90
(2) The realisation that some religious theses are often 'absurd or incongruous' from
a scientific perspective.91
(3) We must identify the basic characteristics of religion. This involves getting rid of
the intellectually problematic aspects of each religion with its local and historical
characteristics and concentrating on what is common to all religions. Hence, we must
extract from the different religious doctrines what may constitute their essential core.
(4) Once we have obtained the essential characteristics that are common to all
religions, we can test the religious hypothesis empirically.
(5) These essential characteristics of all religions offer "mediation between different
believers, and help to bring about consensus of opinion."92 The success of
philosophy in achieving this science of religions depends on its success in
discriminating "the common and essential from the individual and local elements of
the religious beliefs which she compares."93
James then formulates a set of religious beliefs which he presents as including the
essential characteristics shared by all religions.
1. That the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it
draws its chief significance;







3. That prayer or inner communion with the spirit thereof—be that spirit
'God' or 'law'—is a process wherein work is really done, and spiritual
energy flows in and produces effects, either psychological or material,
within the phenomenal world.
Religion includes also the following psychological characteristics:
4. A new zest which adds itself like a gift to life, and takes the form either
of lyrical enchantment or of appeal to earnestness and heroism.
5. An assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and, in relation to others,
a preponderance of loving affections.94
James pays special attention to the third aspect of religious life. The most important
aspect of religious life is prayer. Prayer in a wide sense of the term, James tells us, is
"the very soul and essence of religion."95 The religious experience of prayer is the
one aspect of religious life that is more likely to be confirmed empirically than the
others. This religious phenomenon, James explains, consists in "the consciousness
which individuals have of an intercourse between themselves and higher powers
with which they feel themselves to be related."96 It is "every kind of inward
communion or conversation with the power recognized as divine."97 James is not
interested in the diverse forms of prayer which are practised in institutionalised
religions. However, by abandoning the formal ways of worship, James is not
claiming that these activities are lacking any religious feelings of some kind. His
main concern in religion is the very personal experiences of the individuals rather
than the varieties of formal ways of worship that are parts of many religions. These
forms of worship, as far as he is concerned, are irrelevant to the inner experiences of
the believers. When asked in a questionnaire98 whether he prayed, James reported





"8It is a questionnaire on the subject of religious belief, which was sent out by Professor James B.
Pratt of Williams College in 1904. LWJ, 11, 212-15.
"James, LWJ, 11,214.
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The most important feature of prayer, James tells us, is the contact that the person
who prays feels himself to be in with a spiritual object. Prayer is broadly understood
by James to include any kind of communion. This 'communion' expresses itself best
in prayer, not in rite or sacrifice, where "spiritual energy, which otherwise would
slumber, does become active, and spiritual work of some kind is effected really."100
Now, if the core of religion is the personal experiences of communion with a
spiritual object, in what sense is it possible that these experiences could provide an
empirical confirmation of religious claims?
James offers more than one answer to this question. There are he says:
(1) the feeling of a higher power that produces influences in oneself. This point is put
clearly in the following quotation:
[I]n this phenomenon [of communion] something ideal, which in one sense
is part of ourselves and in another sense is not ourselves, actually exerts an
influence, raises our centre of personal energy, and produces regenerative
effects unattainable in other ways. If, then, there be a wider world of being
than that of our every-day consciousness, if in it there be forces whose
effects on us are intermittent, if one facilitating condition of the effects be
the openness of the 'subliminal' door, we have the elements of a theory to
which the phenomena of religious life lend plausibility. I am so impressed
by the importance of these phenomena that I adopt the hypothesis which
they so naturally suggest. At these places at least, I say, it would seem as
though transmundane energies, God, if you will, produced immediate
effects within the natural world to which the rest of our experience
belongs.101
Indeed, it is only through the 'subliminal door', James says, that a higher power, if it
exists, can be able to affect us;102
(2) the individual becoming aware of being in contact with a higher consciousness,





He becomes conscious that this higher part is conterminous and
continuous with a more of the same quality, which is operative in the
universe outside ofhim, and which he can keep in working touch with, and
in a fashion get on board ofand save himselfwhen all his lower being has
gone to pieces in the wreck.103
Now to an examination in detail of these points that James claims to provide an
empirical confirmation of religion. James's initial proposal is that in communion, the
subconscious region of our consciousness, which he calls the subliminal
consciousness, comes into union with a 'higher part', or the 'more'. He asks, what is
the nature of this 'higher part'? He offers the following suggestion:
Let me then propose, as an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on its
farther side, the 'more' with which in religious experience we feel
ourselves connected is on its hither side the subconscious continuation of
our conscious life. Starting thus with a recognized psychological fact as our
basis, we seem to preserve a contact with 'science' which the ordinary
theologian lacks.104
James thinks that his proposal should satisfy the requirements of his fellow
scientists, to whom his empirical explanation of the supernatural may well appear
agreeable. Hence, he tells us that to keep in line with his 'science of religions'
project, he chose to replace such terms as the 'more' and the 'union' with their
references to particular theologies, with the more fitting term that would fit other
types of faith, namely, the subliminal consciousness. He assures us that this entity is
recognised nowadays as a "well-accredited psychological entity."105 The empirical
fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self is "a positive content of
religious experience which ... is literally and objectively true."106 On James's
proposal, then, this higher power is reduced to a small region in one's own






to an independent divine being. The higher power with which the believer comes in
contact in prayer is no more than one's own subjective deeper region of
consciousness from which it comes. It is hard to see how this interpretation might
satisfy the believer in that what he is aware of in his prayer comes down to no more
than a deep region of his own consciousness.
However, James's own favoured explanation of the higher power goes far beyond
this. His second proposal about its nature is likely to be more satisfactory than the
first, from the point of view of the individual believer at least: it might be considered
as less satisfactory than the first proposal by the scientist-philosopher. Let us now
move on to a discussion of James's second proposal about the nature of the higher
power. He adjusts his initial proposal by claiming that the religious experience of
prayer does not come from the subliminal consciousness, nor is it reduced to it. It is
rather the 'doorway' through which the experiences of the higher power may enter
into the individual's consciousness. The subliminal consciousness is thus the
'mediating term' through its participation in both the individual's consciousness and
the wider consciousness.
[l]t is logically conceivable that if there be higher spiritual agencies that
can directly touch us, the psychological condition of their doing so might
be our possession of a subconscious region which alone should yield
access to them.107
The higher power, the divine reality, is claimed to be an objectively higher level of
consciousness in which we all, our consciousnesses, take part. We arrive at the
objectively divine through the subliminal subconsciousness, the starting-point being
the subjective experiences of the believers. James's suggestion about the continuity
between the individual consciousness and the 'higher force' is based on denying any
l07James, VRE, 197.
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metaphysical independence between these two types of consciousness. Accordingly,
one cannot claim that he reduced the divine to the subjective states of the individual,
as his initial suggestion implied.
James's hypothesis concerning the continuity between these two types of
consciousness is based on his notion of the extension of the self. The self is an
ever-flowing series of experiences, whose boundaries are in continual change. God,
or the divine, is a wider series of experiences in which no boundaries exist between
them. Hence, the individual subliminal consciousness links the self with the God or
Gods. The reality of the divine lies in its being an extension of the self.
This 'higher force', James tells us, need not necessarily be one in number. Dogmatic
theology takes God as one and infinite. James sees it as an equally plausible
hypothesis that there is a multiplicity of finite Gods. He writes:
The ideal power with which we feel ourselves in connexion, the 'God' of
ordinary men, is, both by ordinary men and by philosophers, endowed with
certain of those metaphysical attributes which in the lecture on philosophy
I treated with such disrespect. He is assumed as a matter of course to be
'one and only' and to be 'infinite'; and the notion of many finite Gods is
one which hardly anyone thinks it worth while to consider, and still less to
uphold.108
James tells us that his account of religious experiences cannot be considered as
unequivocally supporting the widely held hypothesis that God is one and infinite. All
that it ascertains is the empirical fact that in religious experiences we come in contact
with a larger consciousness which we access through our subconscious. That is all
that religious experience can tell us. It neither favours nor supports any abstract
108James, VRE, 412-13.
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formulation regarding the nature of this larger consciousness; its number, unity or
magnitude.
Meanwhile the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me
sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion
continuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to him
and to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both
other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only
it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need
not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more
godlike self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated
expression, and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such
selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized
in it at all. Thus would a sort of polytheism return upon us—a polytheism
which I do not on this occasion defend, for my only aim at present is to
keep the testimony of religious experience clearly within its proper
bounds.109
James seems to be presenting polytheism as an interpretative possibility. He refrains
from examining it in VRE - though he gives the impression that polytheism is a
thesis that he thinks worth taking seriously and that he intends to defend it himself.
The empirical defence of polytheism rests on the premise that the believer's personal
self is continuous with a wider self. Since there are many selves, then it is plausible
to assume that there are many Gods which are continuous with the many selves that
there are. The continuity thesis and also the problem of evil are the two main reasons
for James's abandonment of the unity and omnipotence of the divine. Later in PU, he
discusses polytheism very briefly while commenting on Fechner's polytheistic view
of the superhuman consciousness as composed of distinct selves as 'very vague' and
problematic. He says, '"the word 'polytheism' usually gives offense, so perhaps it is
better not to use it."110 James still maintains, however, that the superhuman
consciousness may be considered either polytheistically or monotheistically."1 Then






monotheistic view of the universe, while avoiding polytheism, is "to be frankly
pluralistic and assume that the superhuman consciousness, however vast it may be,
has itself an external environment, and consequently is finite."1
The implicit motives behind abandoning the hypothesis of a supernatural being,
which possesses among his many attributes those of oneness and omnipotence, are
James's conviction that the assumption of an omnipotent supernatural being carries
with it the assumption that there is one single, truest, point of view from which the
universe could be made intelligible, which is the point of view of the higher
consciousness. The plurality of religious experience makes it rather doubtful that the
above hypothesis is true. For, according to the pluralistic hypothesis, the universe
can be seen from a diversity of viewpoints which may be incompatible.
Given James's account of religious experience, all that he can afford to maintain on
the basis of the empirical evidence available is that at certain moments we sense that
our consciousness is continuous with a wider consciousness, bearing in mind his
empirical and scientific commitments. Accordingly, any conception of God that he
may adopt must be one which is developed on empirical base, from religious
experience. James's God thus is finite, an empirical being, not a necessary one, and a
co-operative member of our pluralistic universe. For James, the universe is
represented in our religions as having a 'personal form.'llj Relations among persons
established on a basis of trust and intimacy, in order that these relations work, help to
create a universe in which relationships are meaningful and life is worth living.
Flence, religion, James says, represents the universe itself as a person; a Thou; he
does not affirm the existence of God as an external being, as a Thou. In his later
"2James, PU, 140.
"'James, 'The Will to Believe' in WB, 31.
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work, especially in PU, James's position towards theism developed into a clear form
of rejection to it. Hence, we find him describing his religious position, pluralistic
pantheism, as 'a more intimate Weltanschauung'. According to his religious
world-view, God can possibly be envisaged "as the indwelling divine rather than the
external creator", and human life can be seen as "part and parcel of that deep
reality."114
It is worth stressing that James is fully aware that no religion is infallible. He
presents his position as an interpretative possibility, a point of view worth
considering and taking seriously, but also one that might turn out to be mistaken in
the end. As he argued in the WB, we had to proceed in religion 'at our own risk'.
Religion is not much about a creator; an external being who enjoys certain attributes,
it is more about a life that is worth living.
We must distinguish between James's treatment of religion in the VRE, with his
project of the science of religions in mind, and his more metaphysical reflections on
religion in his later writings, expanded especially in his PU. Our main concern here
has been with his attempt to establish religion on empirical basis rather than with
examining his later metaphysical views. Some remarks follow on James's treatment
of religion as examined in the VRE.
The first obvious point that comes to mind is that the conception of God which
James defends cannot be identified with the God of traditional theism. God as a
finite empirical being neither omnipotent nor omniscient, can hardly be identified
with the God that the ordinary believer within the Judeo-Christian tradition worships.
Indeed, traditional theism has no commerce with a God with such attributes, whose
"Tames, PU, 19.
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existence might terminate at one moment of time, just like all contingent beings. On
the contrary, God, according to the divine religions, is a necessary non-empirical and
infinite being, which is superior to all finite contingent beings.
A wider consciousness with which our consciousness is continuous is a contingent
being, like our consciousness. From a psychological point of view, one can argue
that within a person's religious life, one's belief in God, or the wider consciousness,
might go through various stages of belief, doubt or abandonment of belief altogether.
In these different stages, the contact between one's own consciousness and the wider
consciousness might occur or lost and possibly regained. In such circumstances, one
can say, from a psychological point of view, that when the contact was lost, God
ceases to exist for the believer. In this sense, God might be considered as a
contingent being, but only from a psychological point of view. One cannot conclude
that from a metaphysical point of view God is contingent. Flere James might be
justifiably accused of confusion between God as an intentional object of the religious
experience and God as the object of experience whose existence is independent of
the believers' experiences of Him.
James might reply that this confusion does not threaten his position. His empirical
account avoids making any ontological commitments concerning the existence of
God. His account of God is one which is derived from experience and as far as he is
concerned, what the believers feel to be in contact with, in their experiences, is a
wider consciousness to which the unique categories that theology ascribes to God
simply do not apply. In this sense, James's empirical account of God might be
regarded by some as inadequate.
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James was fully aware that his hypothesis about the wider consciousness may mean
that it can be nothing more than a deeper region of our own consciousness. He was
sure, however, that this does not imply that the believer's inner experiences of the
wider consciousness are entirely subjective. For James, subjective experiences of a
'higher power' do refer to something which exists objectively outside the finite
consciousness. Religious and mystical experiences point towards something which is
outside our own consciousness. They are more than mere psychological phenomena;
they point towards another region of fact.
We have seen that James's pluralistic hypothesis requires that God be finite.
The line of least resistance, then, as it seems to me, both in theology and in
philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman consciousness, the
notion that it is not all-embracing—the notion, in other words, that there is
a God, but that he is finite, either in power or knowledge, or in both at
once.115
James's proposal of the finiteness of God has its roots in his position on the problem
of evil. It is an undeniable empirical fact that evil exists; by the existence of suffering
and evil in the world. If the goodness of God is to be retained, then his powers must
be genuinely limited. This is the only way that James found he could deal with the
problem of evil. Now his answer would surely be found unsatisfactory by many. It is
beyond our discussion here to discuss the objections to James's position.
James consistently argued that the hypothesis of God, and other religious claims,
must have some empirical consequences for the believer; ones which are not limited
to the experiences of communion between the believer and a wider-consciousness or
the divine. At the end of his 'conclusions', he states that:
"Tames, PU, 141.
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What the more characteristically divine facts are, apart from the actual
inflow of energy in the faith-state and the prayer-state, I know not. But the
over-belief on which I am ready to make my personal venture is that they
exist."6
In the "Postscript' to the VRE, he makes similar remarks:
If asked just where the differences in fact which are due to God's existence
come in, I should have to say that in general I have no hypothesis to offer
beyond what the phenomenon of "prayerful communion,' especially when
certain kinds of incursion from the subconscious region take part in it,
immediately suggests."7
Now, James seems to be again 'in much hot water', over his project of establishing a
science of religions. A science of religions, as he had clearly pointed out, requires
that religious claims have empirical consequences in the physical world. Yet we find
him unable to specify any of these consequences. The personal experiences of the
believers are not sufficient for the provision of empirical evidence for religious
claims.
9. CONCLUSION TO PART THREE
An attempt has been made in this part of the thesis to examine James's views on
religious belief from his pragmatic viewpoint. To sum up this discussion of James's





(1) In addition to regarding both scientific propositions and religious propositions as
similar in their origins, James also argued that a religious hypothesis, such as the
hypothesis of God, is subject to empirical verification, just as is a scientific
hypothesis. However, what distinguishes scientific hypotheses is that they may
already have been verified, while religious hypotheses await verification. This kind
of verification in the case of religious hypothesis is characterised by James as
follows. He tells us in the VRE, that the experiences that he surveys are intended to
persuade us that we might assume that connections with the divine may actually
happen. On this assumption, he goes on to argue that there is a multiplicity of Gods
which co-operate with us in a certain way. This hypothesis, he continues, can only be
made true, verified in the long run, when enough people have held that view.
Complete verification occurs when the consensus is total. So in the end, what
establishes the credibility of this hypothesis is empirical evidence, namely, the
support that the hypothesis might eventually gain through the believers believing it.
(2) The truth of the hypothesis of God, just as any scientific hypothesis, is
determined by the satisfaction of the two conditions of truth, verifiability and
satisfactoriness. In the case of the individual believer, a religious hypothesis might
be adopted so long as it fits with the facts that might satisfy the scientific impulse.
However, if this hypothesis no longer fits the facts, then it must be abandoned and
another hypothesis sought to replace it. As for the kind of satisfaction sought, it is
one which guarantees that the hypothesis of God "will combine satisfactorily with all
the other working truths".118
(3) The will to believe is applicable to both religion and science. Its application is
only legitimate when the choice between two or more competing hypotheses cannot
"8James, PRAG, 143.
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be made on objective grounds since all candidates are equally supported by empirical
evidence. It can be noted that there has been a change of emphasis in the WB from
VRE, the shift of focus from the subjective to the objective, without abandoning
either. In WB, he assigns to subjective factors a role in the justification of religious
belief which involves feeling and forms of satisfactions. The WB period was only a
step towards his later pragmatism which allowed to subjective factors a role in
determining all kinds of beliefs. In VRE, he was concerned with emphasising the
way in which an empirical account of religion can be established by focussing on the
religious experiences of the individual believer.
(4) Hence, we found him arguing that philosophy must abandon this futile approach
to religion with its empty formulations and turns towards religious experience;
determining its empirical consequences for believers. By granting priority in matters
of religious belief to experience; the turn from metaphysics towards experience, may
seem to relate positively to science, which from its origins has been marked by a
move from authority and metaphysics to empirical competence.
(5) Through experience, God or religion becomes accessible to us, like any other
physical phenomena. We can claim to know it or relate to it. If it were accessible to
us, through experience, God, like any other physical phenomena is not beyond us. So
James's approach is neither metaphysical, providing proofs of God's existence nor is
it dogmatic, concerned with the examination of specific views about the divine or
defending or attacking one or other of the institutionalised religions. James distanced
himself from these attitudes to dealing with religion which he judged as simply
irrelevant to his deepest concerns about the religious experiences of individuals.
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(6) James also regards the hypothesis of God, like any other scientific hypothesis, as
only probable. This position seems to be consistent with his empiricism which is
contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact
as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience.119
Hence, just as judgements concerning matters of fact are provisional and subject to
further testing, so that movement closer to the ultimate limit becomes possible, so is
the case with regard to the existence of God. Like any statement of fact, it is only
probable, even if the degree of the probability of His existence may be high. Just like
any other scientific hypothesis, the hypothesis of God is subject to verification, as





The main aim of this work has been to attempt to show how James incorporated
certain scientific insights into his pragmatic philosophy. The focus has been on the
impact of his view of science on the questions of truth and religious belief. It has
been shown that James's view of the nature of science as not absolute, and only
probable, had influenced his philosophical outlook.
Little attention has been paid to other aspects of his philosophy, for example, his
views on morality and his later writing on metaphysics. Similarity, little attention has
been given to the writings of other pragmatists, most notably Peirce.
It seemed at the outset more in line with the aim of the present work to focus mostly
on the interpretation of James's ideas. However, having examined his position on the
issues mentioned, it later seemed more appropriate for a further understanding of
James to examine how his views stood in relation to Peirce's. It would be worthwhile
investigating the differences between their views on the nature of science, given
James's insistence that science can never attain certainty and Peirce's confidence in
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scientific inquiry. This might well be the ground of their disagreements over
pragmatism.
James's ideas are reported to have influenced the thinking of Niels Bohr at some
stage, especially the former's views in PP concerning the claim of the wholeness or
unity of conscious thought and also his pragmatism. However, in the scientific
literature, one can only find comments on Bohr's reading of James. The writers
confine themselves in most cases to citing the controversy over the exact date on
which Bohr had read James.1 Bohr himself recorded his admiration for James's views
in PP in the last interview with him on the day before he died. One interesting
comparison that would be worth investigating is that between Bohr's notion of
complementarity and James's view on the interaction between the subject and the
object in the production of experience.
'See the references to James and Bohr in Holton, 'The Roots of Complementarity', Folse, The
Philosophy ofNiels Bohr: The Framework ofComplementarity, Jammer, The Conceptual
Development ofQuantum Mechanics and Stapp, Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics.
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APPENDIX
ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF FRENCH
PASSAGES
I. Delboeuf, J., "Determinisme et Liberte: La Liberte Demontree Par La Mecanique",
Revue Philosophique XIII, 453-480, 608-638, 1882, XIV, 156-189, 1882.
(1) "En d'autres termes, l'excercice de la liberte, si la liberte existe, implique-t il une
creation de force?
John Herschell, entre autres, l'a pense. II dit enquelque endroit qu'on est bien
force d'avouer que la force peut etre creee a nouveau, et, partant, de n'accorder au
principe de la conservation de Lenergie que la valeur d'une loi approximative.
Hatons-nous de donner une reponse negative a la question.
Scientifiquement parlant, il nous est tout aussi impossible de concevoir une
creation de force qu'une creation de matiere. Les corps animes, aussi bien que les
corps inanimes, sont incapables de creer le mouvement. Leurs deplacements, et les
deplacements qui en resultent pour les autres corps, s'expliquent par une simple
transformation ou un simple transport de forces." (I, 478-79)
(In other words, does the exercise of freewill, if freewill exists, imply the creation of
energy?
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John Herschell and others thought so. He says somewhere that one is indeed
forced to admit that energy can be newly created, and, from this, only to grant to the
principle of the conservation of energy an approximate value to the law.
Let us hasten to give a negative reply to the question.
Scientifically speaking, it is as completely impossible for us to conceive the
creation of energy as to conceive of the creation ofmatter. Animate bodies, as well as
inanimate bodies, are incapable of creating movement. Their change of position, and
the changes which follow for other bodies, are explicable as a simple transformation
or a simple transferring of energy.)
(2) "Ou l'homme a ce pouvoir, ou il n'est pas fibre. Ce resultat, comment peut-il
l'atteindre sans compromettre la loi de la conservation de Tenergie? en disposant du
temps." (I, 480)
(Either man has this power, or he is not free. How can this result be attained with
compromising the law of the conservation of energy? in the choice of time.)
(3) "Mais, s'il etait necessaire d'accorder a la volonte une part d'action sur les choses,
il etait impossible d'admettre qu'une force nulle put, a Taide d'aucun mecanisme,
produire un effet quelconque. Quelle puissance restait-il done a mettre a la disposition
des etres fibres? Une seule, le temps. Agir librement, e'est suspendre son activite."
(Ill, 188)
(But, if it is necessary to accord to the will a share of the action on things, it is
impossible to admit that a non-existent force is able to produce, with the help of any
mechanism, such an effect. What power remains then to put at the disposition of free
beings? One only: time. To act freely is to suspend one's activity.)
(4) "le fibre arbitre n'a rien a voir avec le principe de la conservation de l'energie.
Qu'on le veuille ou qu'on ne le veuille pas, la quantite d'energie reste
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necessairement la meme. . . . Libres ou non, l'homme et les animaux ne font que
convertir sans cesse du transformable en intransformable; ils precipitent le cours les
choses. ... II est possible, il est meme probable que les pensees et les sentiments et
les volontes sont accompagnes d'une depense d'energies; mais le principe de la
conservation de l'energie n'est nullement interesse dans la question de la liberte." (II,
617-18)
(Arbitrary freewill has nothing to do with the principle of the conservation of energy.
Whether one wishes it or not, the quantity of energy necessarily remains constant.
Free or otherwise, man and animals can only convert ceaselessly from transformable
into intransformable: they precipitate the course of events. ... It is possible, even
probable, that thoughts and feelings and wills are accompanied by an expenditure of
energy, but the principle of the conservation of energy is not at all concerned with
the question of freewill.)
(5) "II y a done certainement des mouvements discontinus, et ce sont precisement
des mouvements volontaires. Nous pouvons en inferer que tous les mouvements
volontaires sont discontinus." (II, 634)
(There are thus certainly discontinuous movements, and these are exactly freely
chosen movements. From this we can infer that all freely chosen movements are
discontinuous.)
(6) "A la science de la nature se substitue la recherche de la pensee et de la volonte
creatrices. Cette pensee d'ailleurs et cette volonte sont immuables et eternelles
comme les lois de la matiere. Au point de vue exclusif ou je me suis place, je n'ai
pas a critiquer ce systeme, que je declare irrefutable. II me suffit d'avoir montre que
la science est obligee de recourir a la liberte pour expliquer les mouvements
discontinus." (II, 638)
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(For the science of nature is substituted that of research on thought and the creative
will. In any case, this thought and this will are immutable and eternal like the laws of
matter. From the single point of view at which I stand, I have no criticism of the
system, which I claim to be irrefutable. It is enough for me to have shown that
science is obliged to have recourse to freewill to explain discontinuous movements.)
II. Renouvier, C. 1875. Essais de Critique Generale. Deuxieme Essai: Traite de
Psychologie Rationnelle D'apres Les Principes du Criticisme. Tome Deuxieme.
Paris: Au Bureau de La Critique Philosophique.
(7) "La liberte que nous pouvons admettre est ce caractere de Facte humain, reflechi
et volontaire, dans lequel la conscience pose etroitement unis le motif et le moteur
identifies avec elle, en s'affirmant que d'autres actes exclusifs du premier etaient
possibles aumeme instant. Cette possibility, apparente ou reelle d'ailleurs, est le titre
le plus net de la liberte, l'element le plus clair de sa definition." 11(73-4).
(The liberty, which we can accept is this character of the human act, reflective and
voluntary, in which consciousness is closely united with the motive and the motor
identified with it, whilst affirming that other exclusive first acts were possible at the
same instant. This apparent or real possibility is the clearest title of liberty, the
clearest element in its definition.)
(8) "Les actes libres ne sont pas des effets sans cause ; leur cause est l'homme, dans
1'ensemble et la plenitude de ses fonctions." 11(86-87).
(Free acts are not effects without cause; their cause is man, in the totality and
fullness of his functions.)
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(9) "... qui dit loi entend necessite. Rien de plus vrai et de plus legitime." (II, 83)
(Who says law implies necessity. Nothing is truer or more legitimate.)
(10) "Le motifpreponderant determine la volonte, on essaie d'introduire un enonce a
termes pleins et synthetiques, on trouve : L'etatforme de passion, d'intelligence et
de volonte, duquel fait partie la representation d'un motif juge capable de
determiner un acte subsequent, determine effectivement ce dernier acte. ... La
volonte est a elle-meme son motif. " 11(72)
(The preponderant motive determines the will, if one tries to introduce a statement in
complete and synthesised words, one finds: The state formed from passion, from
intelligence and from freewill, which is part of the representation of a reasoned
motive capable of determining a subsequent act, determines effectively this last act. .
. . Freewill is itself its motive.)
(11) "Ces objections contre le systeme de la necessite sont d'une grande force. Elle
etablissent en substance que le jugement de liberie est une donnee naturelle de la
conscience et se lie a nos jugements reflechis pratiques, dont il est meme le
fondement. C'est aussi ce que nous avons du reconnaitre dans Tanalyse des
fonctions volontaires.
Toutefois il n'enresulte aucune preuve logique de la realite de la liberie. En
effet, quand il s'agit des fonctions intellectuelles et sensitives, on distingue entre les
phenomenes de conscience et la realite de leurs objets, c'est-a-dire entre ces
phenomenes, dont on ne doute point, et Taccord ou ils sont peut-etre, et peut-etre ne
sont pas, avec Tensemble des groupes et series de l'experience. Ici, la distinction
n'est pas moins justifiee, et toute verification de l'accord ou du disaccord est en
outre impossible." 11(61)
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(These objections to the system of necessity are forceful. They establish substantially
that the judgement of freewill is a natural given of consciousness, which is linked to
our considered practical judgements, of which it is the very foundation. It is also
what we have had to recognise in the analysis of freely chosen functions.
All the same, no logical proof derives from this of the reality of freewill. In
fact, when it is a question of intellectual and sensitive functions, one distinguishes
between the phenomena of consciousness and the reality of objects, that is to say,
between these phenomena, which no one doubts, and the agreement that they are
perhaps, or perhaps not, in the totality of the groups and series of experience. Here,
the distinction is not less justified and any verification of agreement or disagreement
is furthermore impossible.)
(12) "En resume, la these de la liberte n'est pas demontrable logiquement, non plus
que celle de la necessite." 11(89)
(In brief, the thesis of freewill is not logically demonstrable, no more than that of
necessity.)
(13) "Apres tout ce que j'ai dit en plusieurs lieux, et sous divers points de vue, de la
probability d'existence d'une volonte libre, ou source de determinations premieres
dans l'homme, et de fimpuissance oil nous sommes neanmoins d'en obtenir une
preuve de fait ou une demonstration logique, il est clair que la solution du probleme
ne peut plus etre demandee qu'a la raison pratique. C'est une affirmation morale
qu'il nous faut; toute autre supposerait aussi celle-la. En d'autres termes, la raison
pratique doit poser son propre fondement et celui de toute raison reelle, car la raison
ne se scinde pas : la raison n'est, selon notre connaissance, autre chose que l'homme,
et l'homme n'est jamais que l'homme pratique." 11(322)
(After all that I have said in many places, and from diverse points of view, of the
probability of the existence of freewill, or the source of first determinations in man,
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and our complete inability to obtain an empirical proof or a logical demonstration, it
is clear that the solution to the problem can only be asked of practical reason. It is a
moral affirmation that we require; everything else posits that. In other words,
practical reason must provide its own foundation and that of all real reason, for
reason is not divisible: reason is not, to our knowledge, anything other than man, and
man is never other than practical man.)
(14) "Impossibility de demontrer la liberte, aussi bien que de demontrer la necessity.
Si la these de la necessite, par le scepticisme absolu auquel elle conduit, provoque
cette «revoke de 1'etre entier» dont on a essaye de donner l'aper9u, en revanche la
these de la liberte ne permet pas non plus a 1'esprit de se reposer dans un savoir
acquis demonstrativement. La liberte ne se demontre pas ; elle ne se constate pas
davantage a la maniere d'un fait, attendu que Vexperience n'atteint pas les possibles
comme reels, mais seulement, ce qui est bien different, la croyance qu'on en a,
quand on l'a. «Elle est la condition necessaire qui rend possible l'oeuvre a la fois
imparfaite et admirable de la connaissance humaine et l'oeuvre du Devoir qui en
decoule, et c'est assez peut-etre pour nous assurer qu'elle n'est pas une vaine
conception de notre orgueil." 11(418-19)
(Impossibility of demonstrating freewill, as well as of demonstrating necessity. If the
thesis of necessity, by the absolute scepticism to which it leads, provokes this "revolt
of the whole being", into which an attempt has been made to give insight, in contrast
neither does the thesis of liberty allow the spirit to rest in demonstrably acquired
knowledge. Free will does not demonstrate itself, no more than can a fact establish
itself, given that experience does not attain the possibles as the reals, but only, which
is quite different, the belief that one has of it, when one has it. "It is the necessary
condition which makes possible the task both imperfect and admirable of human
knowledge and the task of Duty which derives therefrom, and it is enough perhaps to
assure us that it is not a vain concept of our pride.)
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(15) "S'il en etait ainsi, par la liberte comme par la necessite, quoique sur des motifs
tout contraires, la speculation sortirait des voies de la raison pratique, du moins de
celles qu'avouent les honnetes gens de nos jours, et pour arriver aux memes
consequences funestes. II semblerait des lors qu'un parti moyen entre la liberte et la
necessite serait le plus utile, et le plus propre a degager la morale. Mais un tel parti
n'est tenable, s'il Test, que pour le mystique, pour celui qui, sans s'arreter a la
contradiction, sape les fondements de la science, ensuite n'etablit rien de net et de
comprehensible. La liberte et la necessite ne sauraient etre ni simultanement vraies,
ni simultanement fausses, car, de deux choses l'une, ou les actes humains sont tons
et totalement predetermines par leurs conditions et antecedents, ou ils ne le sont pas
tons et totalement. C'est ainsi que se pose la question logique. Le doute serait done
notre seule ressource : mais le doute ne nous tire point de peine quant a la morale :
s'il est souvent legitime en face des theories, il est la mort de Lame dans les choses
pratiques et touchant toute croyance d'ou depend la conduite de la vie." (II, 330-31)
(If that was the case, with freewill as with necessity, although from conflicting
motives, speculation springs from the paths of practical reason, at least those avowed
by the honest men of our age, and thus to reach the same fatal consequences. It
seems from this that a middle road between freewill and necessity would be more
useful, and more appropriate to redeem ethics. But such a position is not tenable, if it
exists, other than for the mystic, for whom, without stopping at the contradiction
undermines the foundations of science, thereafter establishing nothing either clear or
comprehensible. Freewill and necessity could not possibly either be simultaneously
true, or simultaneously false, for, of the two things, one, either the human acts are all
and completely predetermined by their conditions and antecedents, or they are not
completely and totally. It is thus that logic poses the question. Doubt would then be
our only resource: but doubt hardly takes us out of the difficulty as to ethics: if it is
often legitimate in the face of theories, it is the death of the soul in practical things
and touches on all belief on which depends the conduct of life.)
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(16) "Dans 1'impuissance de rien demontrer, l'unique ressource qui reste est
d'affirmer la liberie a titre de postulat. La verite, non pas prouvee, mais reclamee et
digne d'etre choisie, est celle qui pose un fondement pour la morale et aussi un
fondement pour la connaisance pratique, independamment de laquelle on ne peut
asseoir «la science.»" 11(419)
(Powerless to demonstrate anything, the solitary resource which remains is to affirm
freewill as a postulate. The truth, unproven, but claimed and worthy of choice, is that
it gives a foundation for ethics and also a foundation for practical knowledge,
independently ofwhich "science" cannot be established.)
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ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR WORKS BY JAMES
ML Manuscript Lectures
MEN Manuscript Essays andNotes
ECR Essays, Comments, and Reviews
VRE The Varieties ofReligious Experience: A Study in Human Nature
PBC Psychology: Briefer Course
EP Essays in Psychology
PP The Principles ofPsychology (followed by volume number)
WB The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy
SPP Some Problems ofPhilosophy: A Beginning ofan Introduction to
Philosophy
EPH Essays in Philosophy
PU A Pluralistic Universe: Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on
the Present Situation in Philosophy
ERE Essays in Radical Empiricism
MT The Meaning ofTruth
PRAG Pragmatism
LWJ The Letters ofWilliam James, (followed by volume number)
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